



“THE INVERSE PRAISE OF GOOD THINGS”: 
DIGNIFIED OPTIMISM IN THE SATIRE OF 
GEORGE SAUNDERS 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the 
Degree of  
Master of Arts in English 
in the University of Canterbury 
by Thaddaeus Hadaway 





Table of Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ____________________________________________________________ 3 
ABSTRACT _________________________________________________________________________ 4 
INTRODUCTION ___________________________________________________________________ 6 
CHAPTER ONE: UNDERSTANDING SATIRE _________________________________________ 12 
INTRODUCTION ____________________________________________________________________ 12 
THE MATERIAL OF SATIRE ____________________________________________________________ 14 
THE SATIRIST ______________________________________________________________________ 15 
TOWARD DEFINITION _______________________________________________________________ 18 
SATIRE AND POSTMODERNISM _________________________________________________________ 33 
SAUNDERS AND POSTMODERNISM ______________________________________________________ 40 
CHAPTER TWO: TROUBLE IN PARADISE: OPTIMISM AND NEOLIBERALISM _________ 44 
INTRODUCTION ____________________________________________________________________ 44 
INSECURITY AND ANXIETY IN “SEA OAK” ________________________________________________ 46 
AMERICAN OPTIMISM _______________________________________________________________ 56 
“ASK THE OPTIMIST!” _______________________________________________________________ 62 
OPTIMISM AND NEOLIBERALISM _______________________________________________________ 67 
“PASTORALIA” _____________________________________________________________________ 69 
“EXHORTATION” ___________________________________________________________________ 75 
SOFT LANGUAGE ___________________________________________________________________ 79 
CHAPTER THREE: “A RADICAL DEFENSE OF TENDERNESS”: SAUNDERS’ AFFECTIVE 
AMENDMENT _____________________________________________________________________ 88 
INTRODUCTION ____________________________________________________________________ 88 
THE RESULTS OF SATIRE _____________________________________________________________ 91 
THE VERY PERSISTENT GAPPERS OF FRIP ________________________________________________ 96 
NARRATIVE EMPATHY ______________________________________________________________ 100 
POINT OF VIEW ___________________________________________________________________ 105 
VIOLENCE _______________________________________________________________________ 117 
HOPE ___________________________________________________________________________ 125 
CONCLUSION _____________________________________________________________________ 136 





While this work is the product of my own academic pursuit, I have received great assistance 
along the way. I would like to thank Dr Nicholas Wright, who for many years has kindly 
assisted me in my interest of American literature, and whose empathetic and thoughtful 
encouragement made this thesis possible. Likewise, I thank Dr Christopher Thomson, whose 
expertise and feedback during this project was crucial and enriching. I also extend my gratitude 
to Peter Field, who introduced me to American history. I thank Dr Tearlach Maclean of the 
UC Health Centre. I am also indebted to the University of Canterbury for generously awarding 
me a Master’s Scholarship. Special thanks go to my parents, Vern and Dawn, my good friend 
Ryan, and to my partner, Wendi. I thank each of you for your love, patience, and reassurance 
as I struggled with various setbacks and injuries. Finally, I thank George Saunders: your 





Through a critical examination of the stories of George Saunders, this thesis examines how 
Saunders uses satire in literary fiction after postmodernism. In doing so, I show Saunders is a 
second-generation postmodernist who, despite owing much to his contemporaries and 
predecessors, appears to offer contemporary American fiction a way out of its preoccupation 
with irony and solipsism. By analysing the sources and contexts of Saunders’ satire, I argue 
that Saunders’ stories take pleasure in their engagement with postmodern irony, but never at 
the expense of a moral agenda laced with satiric wit and narrative empathy. Saunders’ literary 
satire differs from previous generations of postmodernists due to his satiric targets pointing 
to real world referents rather than language itself, as was popular in the late twentieth century. 
Additionally, I posit that satire in Saunders’ stories represents a turn toward affect both on 
and off the page—it is new, tender, and wholly empathetic to its characters and readers. 
However, due to Saunders’ use of violence and restricted narrative points of view, there are 
complexities and complications in Saunders’ morally-charged and emotional satire. While his 
hopeful satire is sincere in its evocation of empathy with others, Saunders restricts reader 
choice and reminds his readers of his authorial power by way of narrative point of view. After 
all, so many of his stories are about authority, and include acts of writing and speech making. 
In this respect, the reader (as much as Saunders himself) is implicated in and comes to 
experience the conditions of choice Saunders writes about—conditions which often preclude 
real choice and empathetic consideration. Despite such complexities, Saunders’ fiction offers 








In America, you’ll get food to eat 
Won’t have to run through the jungle 
And scuff up your feet 
You’ll just sing about Jesus and drink wine all day 
It’s great to be an American 
 






In 1999 The New Yorker published an article titled “The Future of American Fiction,” in which 
the magazine’s editors chose twenty writers who they believed to be the pioneers for a new 
generation of American fiction. Described as “most promising” and “most accomplished,” 
notable, well-established writers such as David Foster Wallace, Michael Chabon, Jonathan 
Franzen, and George Saunders were among those included (67). The article attempts to 
answer the question: “What are we to make of this snapshot of a generation on the eve of the 
next century?” (67). The editors are unable to confidently guess what the future of American 
fiction holds but they are assured that their list of writers offer “a satisfying picture ... of 
Americanness” (68). However, one is most certainly left to wonder what, besides their age, 
their “generation” is, and, too, what “Americanness” is on display. Interestingly, The New 
Yorker constructed another list in 2010 that followed the same rules. This later assessment 
concludes that: “the fiction being written in this country today is not necessarily fiction set in 
this country, or fiction by writers who were born in this country” (“20 Under 40” 50). The 
following thesis attempts to, in part, ascertain where George Saunders (a notable 
contemporary satirist) is situated among his contemporaries who are often described as 
postmodern.  
Critics of Saunders’ stories consistently emphasise his original, satirical voice in 
American fiction, while believing him to be picking up the torch from his American literary 
forebears. Michiko Kakutani writes that: “Mr. Saunders writes like the illegitimate offspring 
of Nathanael West and Kurt Vonnegut,” (Kakutani n.p.) while Zadie Smith states that: “Not 
since Twain has America produced a satirist this funny” (Saunders, CivilWarLand n.p.). 
Likewise, Abby Werlock emphasises the importance of Saunders’ satire in her volume The 
Facts on File: Companion to the American Short Story (2010), in which she describes satire as: 
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A fictional work that ridicules some aspect of human behavior with the intent 
of improving the behavior or the situation that caused it. Unlike writers who 
simply criticize or use sarcasm, satirists blend humor with their censorious 
attitudes. (577) 
This brief description, which I will elaborate on later, appropriately highlights the unusual 
blend of techniques in satire’s construction. Tracing back to one of America’s earliest satirists, 
Francis Hopkinson, Werlock notes that satire in American fiction has continued with greats 
such as Mark Twain, Edith Wharton, and Kurt Vonnegut into the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries (577). However, in this second edition of the short story companion, Werlock only 
mentions one writer in the contemporary era: “Writers such as George Saunders carry on the 
tradition today” (577). For Werlock, Saunders’ impact on the “fiction and satirical front” is 
nothing less than “gigantic”—an adjective that is not carelessly used (578). Werlock astutely 
places Saunders within an as yet unnamed generation of writers who are both heirs to 
America’s previous satirists and also innovators re-shaping literary satire in the present. 
Werlock concludes that: “George Saunders is a writer who has defined literary satire of the 
new millennium [and] will continue to do so” (579). The comparisons to West, Vonnegut, and 
Huxley do not necessarily provide a common ground these writers share; but, the recognition 
of Saunders as a leading contemporary satirist in the current era is one that invites many 
questions, specifically with regard to his relationship to postmodernism. 
In 2015, book critic David Ulin asked, “Did postmodernism kill literary satire?”, 
pondering whether it is merely a coincidence “that the rise of postmodernism in the 1970s 
overlaps almost exactly the decline of satire” (n.p.). If, as Ulin wonders, postmodernism did 
kill literary satire, we should not be surprised to see satire return in the new millennium, an 
era when postmodernism seems to have waned. As I argue, Saunders is at the forefront of 
this change. A living writer considered to be a second-generation postmodernist, Saunders’ 
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distinctive satire thus lies in a precarious position with regards to classification and cultural 
importance. As a result, I have chosen to focus on Saunders’ satire because his fiction seems 
to best exemplify a style that carefully borrows elements from both modernism and 
postmodernism in an attempt to propose a future for American fiction that is not bound by 
the techniques of postmodernism. His deployment of satire appears to work beyond both its 
traditional and its postmodern uses, thus situating Saunders’ fiction (and literary satire in 
general) in an uncertain place at the turn of the millennium. But, if Saunders’ fiction is a 
response to the failures of literary postmodernism, in what ways does his satire attempt to 
remedy and/or critique these failings?  
While Saunders has expressed indifference to the term, once stating that his reputation 
as a satirist is a “[s]light thorn in [his] side” (Ward n.p.), it must be stated that no one has failed 
to recognise Saunders as a satirist, or that his fiction contains satire. Deborah Treisman, for 
instance, states that Saunders is “one of the only effective social satirists writing today” (qtd. 
in Siegal 38). Layne Neeper also addresses such questions in his article, “‘To Soften the Heart’: 
George Saunders, Postmodern Satire, and Empathy”, in which he states that Saunders’ 
“postmodern fiction allows us to delineate a potent strand of the postmodern satiric aesthetic 
in the new millennium” (281). Neeper appropriately notes a point of difference in the satire 
of Saunders with that of his twentieth century peers, remarking that Saunders’ satire “[ends] 
with the emergence of some amorphous sense of correction” and “propose[s] the empathetic 
development of his audience” (281). Many critics understand this affective component to be 
an integral and distinctive aspect in Saunders’ fiction (Millen 2017; Byrne 2013; Basseler 2017). 
However, in my examination of Saunders’ stories, I argue that one of the targets of his satire, 
American optimism, plays an important role in understanding Saunders’ “postmodern satiric 
aesthetic” (Neeper 281). Further, I establish the complexities of satirising affect while, at the 
same time, attempting to alter the emotional state of his reader. In exploring the components 
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of Saunders’ satire, particularly by contextualising the subjects of his satire—the Puritan work 
ethic, positive thinking, neoliberalism, empathy—this thesis ultimately seeks to demonstrate 
that George Saunders is a hopeful satirist and ‘critical optimist’, that his satire is directly 
concerned with the real world, and that his satire possesses an affective component that 
demarcates it from his contemporaries and predecessors. Further, I seek to establish that 
Saunders’ consistent criticism of America’s fascination with positive thinking and self-help is 
related to his compassionate, affective satire. By replacing a commercialised, helpless, 
American consciousness with that of a dignified, socially-aware, and empathetic mindset, 
Saunders’ satire attempts to provoke compassionate optimism in his reader. 
In Chapter One, “Understanding Satire”, I seek to define and contextualise satire to 
reach an understanding of the term that is appropriate for Saunders’ particular style. As I 
argue, there is a tenuous relationship between Saunders, satire, and postmodernism. Although 
the majority of scholars contend that satire consists of a large degree of involvement with the 
real world, others, such as Steven Wiesenberger, insist that postmodern satire does not require 
this element. Therefore, I seek to locate Saunders’ satire outside postmodern satire, arguing 
that his satire is politically engaged, and reliant on historical and cultural contexts which all 
collectively dictate its form and target.  
In Chapter Two, “Trouble in Paradise: Optimism and Neoliberalism”, I continue to 
focus on what I believe to be Saunders’ most important satiric targets: American optimism, 
and the effects of neoliberalism on human subjectivity. In this respect, I detail the ways in 
which Saunders’ contemporary satire is directly concerned with American history, and how 
the manufacturing of the American ethos of self-improvement is self-destructive for his 
characters. Moreover, through an examination of his stories “Pastoralia” and “Exhortation”, 
I analyse the way these targets entwine, with attention to the ways in which Saunders satirises 
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the discourse of neoliberal, corporate speak, as well as those discourses of positive thinking, 
self-determination and ‘work ethic’ that contribute to the creation of the helpless neoliberal 
subject. More specifically, in regard to “Sea Oak”, I contextualise America’s legacy of positive 
thinking and the economic context of Saunders’ fiction to illuminate how such thinking 
encourages the negative effects of neoliberalism rather than open a path to success. 
In Chapter Three, “‘A Radical Defense of Tenderness’: Saunders’ Affective 
Amendment,” I contend that Saunders satire engages in moments of affective transformation, 
but in a manner that poses a number of questions regarding his authorial position, his readers’ 
sense of choice, and the content of his stories. Beginning with his children’s story The Very 
Persistent Gappers of Frip (2006), I argue that underlying Saunders’ satire is an unwavering 
advocation for human kindness and empathy. Indeed, narrative empathy is at work in a 
number of his stories, particularly “Escape from Spiderhead”. However, while “Spiderhead” 
is a story that intimately engages with its reader, I assert that it achieves this engagement 
through cruel, violent means, whereby Saunders’ use of point of view manipulates the story’s 
content and narrative perspective to construct his narrative empathy. Saunders’ approach thus 
raises many complexities about empathy, authority, and reading.  
Despite the complexities and ambivalence generated by his attempt to access narrative 
empathy through satire, Saunders has a moral understanding of the purpose of fiction. In 
recent years, Saunders has eloquently expressed his thoughts on the purpose of fiction and 
the craft of writing through various workshops, interviews, and videos. Yet, Saunders’ idea of 
art is most succinctly put in “Mr. Vonnegut in Sumatra”, an essay which appears in The 
Braindead Megaphone (2007). In it, Saunders reflects on his reading experience during the time 
he was working in Singapore, when he would have to load up on books to take back to his 
work base, hoping that they would last him until he was able to get more. Saunders begins by 
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stating that he was, at the time, an “untrained reader” whose understanding of literature was 
that “great writing is hard reading” (73). “A good literary sentence was like a floor with a hole 
hidden in it,” he writes (73). For Saunders, reading Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five was a 
surprise that contradicted his judgement of what literary fiction ought to be. Revelatory in 
tone, Vonnegut’s novel possesses aliens and a sense of humour out of step with romantic and 
modernist classics. Whereas Saunders had previously understood art to be “descriptive … a scale 
model of life”, he now elucidates it to be a “black box” (78). He explains: 
Now I began to understand art as a kind of black box the reader enters. He 
enters in one state of mind and exits in another. The writer gets no points just 
because what’s inside the box bears some linear resemblance to “real life”—he 
can put whatever he wants in there. What’s important is that something 
undeniable and nontrivial happens to the reader between entry and exit. (78) 
David Foster Wallace said that, “[f]iction’s about what it is to be a fucking human being” 
(McCaffery 131). While Saunders does not disagree with Wallace’s viewpoint, this idea of a 
“black box” connotes more than a mimetic approach to fiction. Indeed, Saunders insists this 
box is “meant to change us” and have us exit the book “altered” (Braindead Megaphone 79). The 
experience and relationship between writer and reader, in this description, is profoundly 
intimate and sincere—a clear separation from the cynical nihilism of much postmodern 
fiction. It seeks to go beyond postmodernism’s irony, attempting to ameliorate in the process.  
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Chapter One: Understanding Satire 
There is no more dangerous literary symptom than a temptation to write about wit and humor. It indicates the total loss of both. 
George Bernard Shaw 
 
Introduction 
No study of satire is begun without the acknowledgement of the term’s variable nature and 
its inability to remain within one strict definition. Writer Will Self’s response to the Charlie 
Hebdo terrorist attack is a modern example of this. As a reaction to Charlie Hebdo’s satirical 
depiction of the prophet of Islam, Muhammed, on one its magazine covers, two terrorists 
armed with assault rifles entered the offices of Charlie Hebdo, a popular French satirical weekly 
newspaper, and opened fire. In the wake of the attack, Self sought to respond to the question 
of what satire is, thus calling into question the comedic and political style of Charlie Hebdo’s 
cartoon: 
[T]he question needs to be asked: were the cartoonists at Charlie Hebdo really 
satirists, if by satire is meant the deployment of humour, ridicule, sarcasm and 
irony in order to achieve moral reform? Well, when the issue came up of the 
Danish cartoons I observed that the test I apply to something to see whether it 
truly is satire derives from H. L. Mencken’s definition of good journalism: it 
should “afflict the comfortable and comfort the afflicted”. The trouble with a 
lot of so-called “satire” directed against religiously-motivated extremists is that 
it’s not clear who it’s afflicting, or who it’s comforting. (Self n.p.) 
Self is uncertain that satire as he knows it—that which is deployed for moral reform—is in 
effect in the case of Charlie Hebdo, but he is just as uncertain as to whether his own definition 
is still adequate for contemporary satire. Self’s application of Mencken’s definition applies to 
‘good’ satire, but it is perhaps too specific to be a general definition, or a working framework 
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for understanding Saunders’ satire. What is evident is that classifying satire, and thus also 
defining it, has become increasingly difficult.  
Interestingly, Self’s recourse to Mencken’s definition is implicit also in the reported 
artistic intentions of both David Foster Wallace and George Saunders. In a 2000 interview 
with Publishers Weekly, Saunders said that “art should comfort the oppressed and oppress the 
comfortable” (Bahr 322). Wallace, in his oft-quoted interview with Larry McCaffery, shares 
that one of his creative writing teachers once told him: “good fiction’s job is to comfort the 
disturbed and disturb the comfortable” (McCaffery 127). This expression, however, is actually 
misattributed to H. L. Mencken. It first appeared in Finley Peter Dunne’s Observations by Mr. 
Dooley in 1902, where Dunne describes how journalism “comforts th’ afflicted, afflicts th’ 
comfortable” (Dunne 39). In any case, it is an aphorism that found its way into the minds of 
American writers at the turn of the millennium. For these writers, fiction has an explicit 
purpose, and so too does satire. The Roman poet Juvenal, one of the most famous 
practitioners of formal verse satire, famously claimed that “It is hard not to write satire” 
(Juvenal 4). The audience of satire is comprised of spectators for whom an art form does not 
exist just for art’s sake. Moreover, the satirist is not merely compelled to write satire but also 
conducts their art with a vigour born out of a feeling of necessity. “For who is so tolerant,” 
continues Juvenal, “of the unjust City, so steeled, that he can restrain himself…” (4). The 
satirist’s urge to tell others of their dissatisfaction outweighs all restraint. The abundance of 
stupidity, vices, and human folly that exist within society cannot, for the satirist, be simply 




The Material of Satire 
First, there are indeed characteristics of satire that, when surveyed, constitute an argument for 
the type of material that a satirist is drawn toward. The satirist’s image of the world is not 
necessarily the same as those of other artists. “Like other arts,” writes Leonard Feinberg, “the 
best satire is concerned with the nature of reality” (1967: 3). M. D. Fletcher states that satire 
is a “mode of aesthetic expression that relates to historical reality [and] involves at least implied 
norms against which a target can be exposed as ridiculous” (Fletcher ix).1 With regard to the 
perspective of a satirist, then, the “nature of reality” situates the perspective as wide, all-
encompassing, and concerned with the nature of being. Indeed, Matthew Hodgart affirms 
this, stating: “The perennial topic of satire is the human condition itself” (Hodgart 10). The 
human condition, as viewed by the satirist, is one not necessarily of joy, awe, or amazement. 
Rather, it is a concerned gaze at society. 
Satire is, in its most basic form, a critique. The subject of satire’s critique is most often 
dissimulation. In viewing the human condition, the satirist is unable to avoid the dissimulation 
of society, its individuals, communities, and organisations. “Pretense and hypocrisy permeate 
satiric literature,” observes Feinberg, “because pretense and hypocrisy are … inescapable 
attributes of man and society” (1967: 23). Feinberg’s argument is an appropriate one to apply 
to Saunders’ approach to satire. Feinberg argues that dissimulation is the result of “man’s [sic] 
pretense that he is always motivated by the ideal, the moral, the good, never by the actual, 
immoral, the evil” (23). Feinberg asserts that, by avoiding the admission of immoral 
 
1 These remarks by Feinberg and Fletcher are important in understanding the relevance of reality and 
objectivity in satire, more specifically with regard to the movement of postmodernism. Frederic Jameson 
characterises postmodernism by its “historical deafness” (Jameson xi) and its, “weakening of historicity, 
both in our relationship to public History and in the new forms of our private temporality” (6). These 
complications of satire’s relationship to postmodernism will be addressed later in the chapter. 
15 
 
motivation, humankind is always under the influence of an ideal, which is permitted by 
simultaneously believing that evil is temporary and that life’s unpleasant periods are merely a 
transition toward something better. In short, human values become subjected to 
misrepresentation for the sake of persisting with a perspective of the world that prohibits a 
direct acknowledgement of the real. The result of this is a conflict between what is desired 
and what is real, a “double standard in the structure of society” (24). The success of individuals 
in society does not necessarily equate with a path of established norms and common morality. 
Material success, for instance, is not governed by morality, and many people have risen to 
prosperity with ideals unchecked by morality—the common practice of a standard that is at 
odds with what is accepted. This double standard constitutes the dominant focus of satire. It 
is an unavoidable conflict as, one can argue, it is impossible for one to not deviate from 
standards and norms one professes to follow. As such, society will always be a source of 
material for the satirist for no society, no matter how enlightened, is excluded from 
dissimulation, vices, and human folly. 
 
The Satirist 
By using such material, satire thus corresponds to the real world, and as a result, so does 
satire’s influence. Juvenal’s belief that “It is hard not to write satire” is often connected with 
an understanding that the satirist is obliged to write under the influence of their morality. It is 
understood that morality is the focus for the satirist and is necessary component for a work 
to be a satire, or contain satirical elements in combination with other rhetorical devices. 
Northrop Frye believes satire “takes a high moral line” (1944: 224) whilst according to George 
Meredith, the satirist is a “moral agent” (44). In Gary Percesepe’s interview with Saunders, he 
begins by asking: “Do you see yourself as a satirist? Are you a moralist? How do you 
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understand these terms?” (Percesepe n.p.).2 Furthermore, Rueben Quintero states that the 
satirist “write[s] not merely out of personal indignation, but with a sense of moral vocation 
and with a concern for the public interest” (1). Satirists are not silently dissatisfied but 
compelled to express their criticism. Seeing injustice, the satirist attempts to criticise those 
they believe deviate from a society’s moral norms. The satiric target is thus a transgressor of 
moral law; the satirist its custodian.  
Yet, there are arguments against the idea that the satirist is a moral agent, or one who 
is even primarily concerned with the nature of reality, for there exists no scholarly consensus 
on the matter. The motivation of a satirist, argues Leonard Feinberg, is not necessarily 
morality, especially when compared to other writers. On the nature of the satirist’s intent, 
Feinberg writes that: “[H]is immediate purpose is to satirize, not to improve; his object in 
showing the ridiculous is to criticize, not to correct … The satirist, then, functions as an artist, 
not as a moralist” (1963: 40-1). It is not possible, of course, to assert with any real conviction 
the intent behind George Saunders’ works. However, Saunders has stated with regard to 
Orwell, that he was “liberated by the idea that this sort of satire could be Art” (Saunders and 
Derby 91). It is clear that in this case, at least, his satirical motivation is concerned not solely 
with aesthetics or moral order, but with both. Dustin Griffin offers a clearer response to the 
 
2 Saunders’ reply is not unlike other satirists who are indifferent to the term and refrain from viewing 
themselves as such: “I’ve never really thought of myself as a satirist.  My goals are pretty much the goals 
of the serious literary fiction writer.  But I found out early on that for me to do that work, I had to use 
humor.  I think this is because the world feels comic to me – not funny, necessarily, but comic, i.e., 
weirdly designed, given our basic human desires for love, dignity, continuity, order” (Percesepe n.p.). 
Importantly, a satirist’s motivation is relevant, but their intent does not determine whether a work is 
satire or not. 
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uncertainty of the “satirist as moralist” (Pollard 3) by removing the intent of moralism, 
conservatism, and radicalism—all descriptions attributed to a satirist’s intent: 
… there is little evidence that a satirist is typically motivated by clearly articulated 
political principles, or even by what might now be called political ideology … 
Indeed, it is likely that satirists’ concerns are more literary than political, that 
they write satires because they think it will advance their careers by winning 
audiences or patrons. (1994: 149-50) 
Morality is undoubtedly a feature of satiric literature, but it is one that does not constitute the 
whole of its purpose so cannot thus be reduced to its sole motivation. To construct satire for 
the purpose of art, or solely for aesthetic reasons, is one response to the unanswerable 
question of a satirist’s motivation and intent.  
More importantly, however, both of these theories do still deviate from the poetics 
and sociocultural conditions of postmodernism. This is indeed my point, which I will elaborate 
on later. Regardless of a satirist’s purpose—whether it be morality or invective, political or 
radical—the satirist still requires the acknowledgment of moral norms in order to criticise, 
irrespective of one’s moral opinion (as the satirist is well-aware of such moral relativism). 
Subsequently, the aesthetic value of satire as art for art’s sake is, too, dependant on a 
foundation of shared values—a centre which allows comparisons to those which lie outside 
of its order, such as the grotesque and ridiculous. Indeed, although Feinberg stipulates that 
the satirist functions “as an artist, not a moralist,” he supports this view, stating that the satirist, 
“[uses] for his material the moral values accepted by his society because satire deals with 
deviations from a norm – an actual or a pretended norm” (41). The two categories are not 
mutually exclusive. Before acknowledging the tenuous relationship between the material of 





According to George Saunders, satire is “the inverse praise of good things” (Z. Smith 
n.p.).3 This definition reveals Saunders’ strong moral and optimistic stance. The focus of 
Saunders’ critique is not that which is being critiqued, but the sincere expression of values that 
Saunders deems worthy of praise—an optimistic view toward irony’s purpose. However, in 
reaching a more scholarly definition of the term, one finds that satire, due to its miscellaneous 
nature, is notoriously difficult to define. As a word, satire entered the English language in 
1509, and since then its representations have consistently been multiplied, reworked, and often 
misunderstood (Worcester 3). For the average reader, it would seem difficult to have a grasp 
on what a writer is doing with satire’s ingredients, how they are utilised, and to what effect. 
Nor is the critic immune to the variability of satire’s form. Satire is arguably incapable of 
holding one definition. Whichever definition is used is most likely too broad, or not broad 
enough. It can be a genre of a literature whilst simultaneously being a mode or tone that can 
be used within many other literary genres. According to many scholars writing on satire in the 
1960s—mainly with regard to works of Horace, Juvenal, Dryden, Swift and Pope—satire is 
an inherently moral art form that is composed of varying rhetorical devices. Yet, the 
aforementioned remarks from Feinberg and Griffin contest the importance of morality’s role. 
The Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms (2015) defines satire in its opening sentence as: “A mode 
of writing that exposes the failings of individuals, institutions, or societies to ridicule and 
scorn” (Baldick n.p.) Certainly, this is our most common understanding of it: satire exposes 
vice or folly. The means by which it goes about such criticism and the exposure of failings is 
where the critic comes to a turbulent area that intersects with various other literary techniques. 
 
3 This quote is not from Saunders directly, but from the preface to an interview with Saunders conducted by 
Zadie Smith for Interview Magazine (Z. Smith, 2017). 
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To its end, satire employs wit, ridicule, and irony in order to make its point, whilst also entering 
the territory of the comic and parody. 
There are definitions of satire that apply to some writers but not to others. Some may 
seem perfectly apt in describing the works of Pope, Dickens, and Byron, but unhelpful at 
analysing and understanding the works of Aldous Huxley, George Orwell, Kurt Vonnegut, or 
George Saunders. This definition issue, despite the examples of writers just mentioned, is not 
confined within generations, as even one writer’s satire may seem completely at odds with his 
or her contemporaries. Achieving a consensus as to what satire is, is more difficult when 
supposed satirists often refuse to be described as such. In a 1969 interview, Kurt Vonnegut 
expressed indifference to the term:  
I speak a lot at universities now, and people ask me to define ‘satire’ and, you 
know? I’ve never even been bothered to look it up. I wouldn’t know whether 
I’m a satirist or not. One thing about being a chemistry major at Cornell, I’ve 
never worried about questions like that. It was never important to me whether 
I was one or not. (Vonnegut, Conversations 4) 
Indeed, whilst people who write poetry call themselves poets, and those who write novels are 
novelists, satirists, “often refuse to admit they are satirists” (Feinberg, 1963: 289). Instead, 
many satirists purport that their worldview is sincere. “It is worth mentioning,” writes 
Feinberg, “that many satirists believe, or pretend to believe, that they are not satirists at all, 
but realists” (1967: 63). Aldous Huxley, for instance, viewed himself as “by nature a natural 
historian” (Bald 4). Moreover, when screenwriter and humourist Charlie Brooker was 
questioned about satire’s relevance in 2016, he interrupted the interviewer to say: “I hate that 
word,” then continued to say he does not consider himself a satirist (Brooker n.p.). Satire and 
its practitioners are thus remarkably elusive, albeit not in all cases for the same reasons. 
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In an episode of British comedian Stewart Lee’s television show, Stewart Lee’s Comedy 
Vehicle, Lee performs a set that attempts to explain satire. Lee states: “Planet of the Apes is the 
same as here, but there’s apes in it. And that’s what a satire is. If anyone ever says to you, 
‘What’s a satire?’ ... A satire is when it’s the same as here, but there’s animals in it” (Lee, 2014: 
n.p.). Lee’s joke definition is offered as a means to better understand Parliament of the Fowls by 
Geoffrey Chaucer, and to introduce Animal Farm by the writer he describes as the “best at 
satirising things,” George Orwell (n.p.). This is, of course, a stand-up comedy performance. 
It is not a rigorous, academic answer as to what satire, as a genre or mode, actually is. However, 
Lee does go on to give his understanding of it more substance, by saying:  
But don’t get carried away, London, not everything with animals in it is a satire. 
Don’t get carried away, people at home, if you’re out and about and you see a 
little vole by the canal, cleaning its whiskers. Don’t be looking at it thinking, “Is 
this supposed to be... uh, “Theresa May?” It doesn’t know. The vole doesn’t 
know what that is, it’s not interested. Not all animals are trying to satirise things, 
do you understand? (Lee n.p.)  
Lee’s attempt to explain satire satirises the attempt to explain satire. Defining satire is, in this 
case, his satiric target. In doing so, Lee exposes the tiresome nature of analysing and explaining 
satire by providing a strawman definition (“there’s animals in it”); then, later in the show, 
undercuts the premise as he is being interrogated by notable satirist Chris Morris as to whether 
certain things are satirical, such as “an ostrich in a soda siphon” and a “wolf with a duck in it” 
(n.p.). Despite the absurdity and comic nature of Lee’s explanation and his humorous 
examples that close out the show, Lee highlights and satirises that almost-unknowability of 
what satire is, what its effect is, and how it functions within certain artistic disciplines, both as 
humour and a means of political critique.  
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More scholarly opinions on the matter are all in agreement with satire’s multiplicity 
and its ability to escape a stable configuration. Indeed, Don Nilsen likens it to pornography: 
“Satire is like pornography; we know it when we see it. And like pornography, some people 
see it everywhere, and other people don’t see it anywhere at all” (Nilsen 1). Moreover, Lisa 
Coletta believes satire to be “one of the most capacious and most misunderstood literary 
terms” (Coletta 856). In agreement with Nilsen, Leonard Feinberg informs us that satire, “is 
such a protean species of art that no two scholars use the same definition or the same outline 
of ingredients” (Feinberg 5), whilst Gerald O’Connor believes that satire: “exists as a literary 
genre, the real problem being not in finding it but in defining it” (O’Conner 216). Therefore, 
with respect to the kaleidoscopic nature of the term, I endeavour not to define satire, but to 
circumscribe an understanding of satire using multiple definitions in order to classify and 
compare, at least to a certain extent, the key components of satire with the satiric techniques 
used in Saunders’ fiction. This avoidance of a conclusive definition is because, as fluid and 
contested as satire’s definitions are, questions still remain as to the word’s origin. G. L. 
Hendrickson inconveniently states that: “Few of us I imagine are conscious that in using the 
series ‘satire,’ ‘satiric,’ ‘satirist,’ ‘satirize,’ we are dealing with words that are unrelated 
etymologically” (1971: 49). It is understood satire derives its name from satura, which means 
“full,” “mixture,” and a “medley of different things” (Lindvall 21); and, more specifically, lanx 
satura, which associates the miscellany of satura with food—a dish full of mixed fruit (a type 
of salad) offered to the god was called lanx satura (Highet 231). The intrinsic aspect stressed 
by this original derivation is thus one of variety, miscellany, and mixture.  
Scholars of the term, however, also acknowledge its other supposed derivation, that 
of satyr, which was used by Renaissance writers who understood that the poetic form was the 
product of ancient Greek satyr plays, thus providing a rather different understanding of satire. 
Alvin Kernan demonstrates this, writing: “The idea that poetic satire had its origin in a 
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dramatic form distinguished for its viciousness of attack and spoken by rough satyrs was the 
basis for nearly all Elizabethan theories of satire’’ (1959: 55). Perceiving the word’s origin to 
be connected to that of a mythological Greek god with characteristics of a horse or goat, 
sixteenth-century English writers hence continued the variable nature of the term with great 
polarity. However, with consideration to its different variations, I wish explore satire’s 
miscellany—its ‘salad-like’ nature—as essential in understanding the varying scholarly 
definitions and, as a result, the techniques which attempt to satisfy its nature. Leonard 
Feinberg opines that there is not, unfortunately, a universally accepted definition of satire 
(1963: 6). For the sake of alluding to what he means by the term, however, he explains that: 
“The technique of the satirist consists of a playfully critical distortion of the familiar” (7). This 
explanation is most appropriate for discussing Saunders, whose mix of surreal abstraction with 
real-world criticism is finely tuned—an embodiment of the satire’s salad-like nature. Indeed, 
Saunders says his draws a picture of the world that is “inconsistently distorted, more fun-
house mirror than shrinking ray … like a scale model, but melted” (Siegal 39). 
 With regard to my earlier expression that satire is primarily concerned with humanity 
and reality, much like other artistic disciplines, there is a clear distinction required in order to 
differentiate the composition of satire from other techniques. Firstly, it is worth considering 
the definition that has most widely been used in understanding satire, and to do so I turn to 
Northrop Frye whose formula has greatly influenced much satire theory in the twentieth 
century. Frye argues: 
The chief distinction between irony and satire is that satire is militant irony … 
two things are essential to satire: one is wit or humor, founded on fantasy or a 




This interpretation, which I will come back to later in this chapter, does its best to encapsulate 
that unusual scale on which satire operates. According to Frye, irony is not denotatively satire 
but it can be subsequently used within satirical works. What constitutes satire is its militancy, 
which distinguishes it from plain irony. As a form of critique, then, satire is thus understood 
to be composed of invective; but, the invective is at the mercy of other components, which 
dictate its strength.   
One of the most concise definitions on satire is the translation of the Chinese 
pictograph for satire: “laughter with knives” (Elkin, 1974: 3). Satire does, in most cases, evoke 
laughter, but there is a certain amount of insult, derision, and scorn attached to satire’s use. 
Saunders explains that “humor is what happens when we’re told the truth quicker and more 
directly than we’re used to” (Braindead Megaphone 80). The comic inclination of Saunders indeed 
produces laughter, but this aspect of his satire—like generative satirists before him—is 
secondary to his criticism, to his intent of raising awareness. M. H. Abrams, for example, 
describes satire as: “the literary art of diminishing or derogating a subject by making it 
ridiculous and evoking toward it attitudes of amusement, contempt, scorn, or indignation” 
(275). Paul Radin has traced this particular strand—contempt, scorn, and indignation—of 
satire back to primitive societies:  
I know of no tribe where satires or formal narratives avowedly humorous have 
not attained a rich development. Examples of every conceivable former found, 
from broad lampoon and crude inventive to subtle innuendo and satire based 
on man’s stupidity, his gluttony, and his lack of a sense of proportion. (Radin 
34) 
Indeed, Matthew Hodgart has pushed forward this historical claim with even more specificity 
by tracing derision, lampoon, and invective in Inuit culture. Within their societies there is the 
song of derision, a kind of satirical song with the intent of shaming its victim. Hodgart believes 
24 
 
this to be one of the earliest hints of satire in history, and argues that the Inuit satirist has the 
same intent and method as Alexander Pope: “[T]he man who is worsted in a satirical song-
contest will try to reform himself; in extreme cases one can picture him stumbling wretchedly 
out of the igloo, like Captain Oates on Scott’s polar expedition, to rid the community of its 
obnoxious burden—which is more than Pope’s victims ever did” (Hodgart 15). Some of this 
invective is not necessarily solely moral in intent, nor laced with black humour more 
commonly seen in contemporary satire but, as Hodgart argues, they all contain the germ of 
moral and political satire; that is, of literature as propaganda for right action (16).  
However, by way of revisiting the first part of Abrams’ definition, satire is not simply 
an attack by way of indignation, nor is its objective merely laughter. Whilst comedy elicits 
laughter “mainly as an end in itself,” satire ridicules its victim, often by way of exaggeration—
using animals, for example—and “uses laughter as a weapon, and against a butt that exists 
outside the work itself” (Hodgart 275). Indeed, this is perhaps best exemplified in satire’s 
Roman beginnings, where the poets Juvenal and Horace became notable for critiquing the 
failings of Rome through formal verse satire. Nevertheless, despite it being referred to as a 
genre, there are a wide range of satiric modes, and sometimes satire is an incidental element 
in a text that may not be perceived as wholly satiric, as David Worcester explains:  
The spectrum-analysis of satire runs from the red of invective at one end to the 
violet of the most delicate irony at the other. Beyond either end of the scale, 
literature runs off into forms that are not perceptible as satire. The ultra-violet 
is pure criticism; the infra-red is direct reproof or abuse, untransformed by art. 
(Worcester 16)  
Satire therefore exists somewhere within the boundaries of direct criticism and the comic. 
Juvenalian satire differs from Horatian satire, and other terms also exist in order to understand 
satire’s diversity, such as formal satire, indirect satire, and Menippean satire. Yet, in its 
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application, satire has two elements that complete the satiric mode: an amusement at the 
expense of the subject/victim who is the target of the satire, and a painful awareness that the 
criticism is valid because there exists an incongruity that needs to be exposed.  
The initial criticism seems easily enough to be identifiable, but it is the way a satirist 
juggles a variety of different techniques that can make their art either genius or entirely 
incomprehensible; or, depending on the audience—both. “Without style and literary form,” 
writes Worcester, the “[satirist’s] message would be incomprehensible; without wit and 
compression it would not be memorable; without high-mindedness it would not ‘come home 
to men’s business and bosoms’ ” (Worcester 13). Like a mixture of different things—as satire’s 
etymological roots testify—it is the combination of varying different forms that constitute its 
makeup. Rhetorical devices used in contrast and toward disparate ends serve to soften the 
blow of satiric criticism as plain invective, and, in doing so, enhance and simultaneously 
complicate a piece of satire. Humour and wit are two of these devices. 
In attempting to comprehend the nature of many of the words used to describe satire, 
H. W. Fowler created a table of classification of such terms using not definitions, but their 
motive, aim, method or means, and their audience. 
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 (Fowler 252). 
Although some terms are subject to cross-over and parallel classification, Fowler’s description 
of satire’s method, that of “accentuation,” is of interest. In differentiating satire from pure 
rhetoric, Dustin Griffin writes: “Like polemical rhetoric, [satire] seeks to persuade an audience 
that something or someone is reprehensible or ridiculous; unlike pure rhetoric, it engages in 
exaggeration and some sort of fiction” (Griffin 1). In attempting to expose dissimulation, 
satire accentuates its target or scene through exaggeration, playfully distorting what is 
perceived to be real, focusing on the discrepancies between what is considered real and what 
the satirist deems is real. This leaves space for humour, and exaggeration is often conducted 
with the use of the ridiculous. It is distortion by exaggeration using understatement or 
overstatement. Matthew Hodgart interprets this distortion of reality as “abstraction”: 
[T]rue satire demands a high degree of both commitment to and involvement 
with the painful problems of the world, and simultaneously a high degree of 
abstraction from the world … The satirist does not paint an objective picture of 
the evils he describes, since pure realism would be too oppressive. Instead he 
usually offers us a travesty of the situation, which at once directs our attention 
to actuality and permits an escape from it. (Hodgart 11-12) 
Therefore, with this understanding, it is fair to assume that if the satirist was to paint an 
objective picture of the evils she sees, it might likely be interpreted as pure invective. By 
accentuating the object of her attack through a process of exaggeration, satire is given a 
possibility of existence, in part due to the borrowing of other elements, such as the comic and 
irony. 
 This distortion of reality by way of accentuating the satiric target is evident in 
Saunders’ story, “My Amendment” (In Persuasion Nation), the title of which mirrors satire’s 
motive or aim in Fowler’s table. It is in the form a letter and is a reply to a recent article written 
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by someone who disagrees with same-sex marriage. In this satirical piece written by “Ken 
Byron” (71), Saunders adopts the voice of someone who is also against same-sex marriage, 
but does so by exaggerating his position on the issue, by asking to not only ban it, but also 
“propose a supplementary constitutional amendment” (65). Ken’s motivation has been 
spurred on by “Samish-Sex Marriage”, a phenomenon where heterosexual couples have an 
imbalance in “masculine and feminine characteristics” (67): 
Take, for example, “K,” a male friend of mine, of slight build, with a ponytail. 
“K” is married to “S,” a tall, stocky female with extremely short hair, almost a 
crewcut. Often, while watching “K” play with his own ponytail as “S” towers 
over him, I have wondered, Isn’t it odd that this somewhat effeminate man 
should be married to this somewhat masculine woman? Is “K” not, on some 
level, imperfectly expressing a slight latent desire to be married to a man? And 
is not “S,” on some level, imperfectly expressing a slight latent desire to be 
married to a woman? (66) 
Believing this is not what “God had in mind” (66), Ken has developed a “Manly Scale of 
Absolute Gender” which “assigns numerical values according to a set of masculine and 
feminine characteristics” (68). Those who score highly on the scale are recommended by Ken 
to either divorce, or drastically change their appearance by undertaking the “classic American 
project of self-improvement” (69). Given the piece’s overt absurdity via hyperbole, it is clear 
Ken’s voice is not that of Saunders. The object of Saunders’ attack is those who are against 
same-sex marriage, which is only known by registering the ironic component of the satire. 
 Furthermore, this process of exaggerating the object of attack is where humour enters 
the framework. By overstating the case against same-sex marriage, Saunders presents an 
opinion that does not “paint an objective picture of the evils” he is describing (Hodgart 11). 
While same-sex marriage is generally understood to be a legal union between two people of 
the same sex, describing such a situation would not be satirical, hence Saunders’ distortion of 
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reality by viewing masculinity and femininity as genders in their own right: “I, for one, am sick 
and tired of this creeping national tendency to let certain types of people take advantage of 
our national good nature by marrying individuals who are essentially of their own gender” 
(71). Saunders thus humorously ridicules those against same-sex marriage. For Saunders, satire 
and earnestness “are actually two manifestations of the same energy” (Saunders and Derby 
90). However, Saunders’ satire is certainly subversive and seeks to amend. As Ken’s frustration 
is increased near the end of the letter, he states: “I, for one, am not about to stand by and let 
that happen” (71). This statement is not against same-sex marriage, but a rallying cry for it, 
especially given the context of its publication. Originally published by The New Yorker in 2004, 
“My Amendment” is notably topical, written about a controversial topic. That year, President 
George W. Bush announced that he would support a constitutional amendment to ban gay 
marriage in order to protect “the most fundamental institution of civilization” (Stout n.p.). 
“My Amendment” is perhaps Saunders’ response to Bush, ending on a similar emphatic note, 
ironically stating that with “suitable correction … the race will go on” (71). This degree of 
fictionality is an essential ingredient in satire’s salad-like nature. 
 Where Hodgart describes satire’s elements of distortion with reference to what he 
regards as “true satire” (11), Maynard Mack believes that the use of this element in satire is 
what makes it good: “All good satire, I believe it is fair to say, exhibits an appreciable degree 
of fictionality” (Mack 193). As such, there is a consensus here with regard to satire’s reality. 
Satire purposefully creates a reality that, although it appears real, is strikingly hyperbolic. As 
satire mixes with genres and techniques, it also plays with truth in order to stake its own 
critique of moral norms. “For all satire,” writes Edward Rosenheim, “involves, to some extent, 
a departure from literal truth and, in place of literal truth, a reliance upon what may be called a 
satiric fiction” (Rosenheim 17; original emphasis). This echoes William Hazlitt’s belief that, 
“Man is the only animal that laughs and weeps; for he is the only animal that is struck with 
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the difference between what things are, and what they ought to be” (Hazlitt 65). This 
incongruity by way of exaggeration invites the comic element into satire’s critique. It is where, 
to paraphrase Elkin, laughter meets knives. The “satiric fiction” is thus the exaggerated reality 
that the satirist, more often through understatement, purports to be true; it is presented as 
realism but its content is not: 
This distortion of reality in an attempt to make vice as ugly and ridiculous as it 
truly is always requires a considerable amount of rhetorical skill, but, as we have 
seen, in order to establish his credibility the satirist must present himself as a 
plain, outspoken man who calls a spade a spade (Kernan, 1965: 265). 
In calling a spade a spade, the satirist is understating the ridiculous nature of the satire’s 
exaggeration. Reductio ad absurdum (reduction to absurdity), a form of argument in logic, is a 
device understood to be adapted for satire’s use. It is a method used in disproving a theory by 
showing that the consequences of such a theory, when carried out, are absurd. It may also 
accept an opposing proposition but carry such an idea to absurd, unacceptable conclusion, as 
evidenced by Stewart Lee’s supposition that his audience might start thinking that all animals 
are satire. Furthermore, the hyperbole in satire is most often directed at victims, systems, or 
human tendencies—the ‘target’ of the satire. The utopia of a satirist is thus inverted through 
this ironic, distorted, satirical critique, as Feinberg explains: “Instead of stating what is 
desirable, he exaggerates the undesirable characteristics of society and pretends that they have 
produced a satisfying way of life” (Feinberg, 1967: 56). By rendering the satiric target (the 
‘real’) as utterly ridiculous, amplified to the point of absurdity, the satirist ironically shows 
what they consider the ideal. As George Saunders describes it, it is “the inverse praise of good 
things” (Z. Smith n.p.). By employing extreme forms of exaggeration in combination with 
irony, the satiric target is made to be ridiculous, therefore arguing that the opposite is not.  
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By circumscribing many of these common characteristics and definitions of satire, I 
seek to reduce satire to an understanding of it as, to quote Leon Guilhamet, “a borrower of 
forms” (14). Satire is, by way of its construction and function, unlike other genres and 
techniques for its essential make up is that of a compilation. By borrowing many other literary 
techniques—invective, comic, parody, hyperbole, sarcasm, irony—it must be stressed that 
satire cannot be confused with the structures and forms it borrows, as during its appropriation 
of such terms, satire consequently re-works their traditional, generic understandings for its 
own purpose. As Arthur Pollard observed in 1970, “satire is a chameleon adapting itself to its 
environment” (22). Guilhamet explains that the instability of satire is due to this appropriation 
of other forms: 
The apparent instability of satire, however, is a normative condition by which 
the host genres are deformed or restructured to compose the satire. But even in 
this restructuring those host genres do not lose their internal defining traits. 
What they do lose is their dominant and defining relationship to the overall 
literary structure. Instead of dominating, the host genre plays a subordinate role 
in relation to other generic strategies and to a deforming ironic pattern. 
(Guilhamet 165)  
Whilst in each satire the compilation of each technique may be used to different extents, each 
technique is, in any case, subsumed by the overall satire. By mixing genres and techniques, 
there thus exists an incongruity which is unmistakable as satire. For instance, whilst satire 
borrows invective, it is not actual invective since the employment of other forms, such as 
comedy and irony, alters invective from being a “direct statement,” as Fowler defines it (252). 
This also holds true with regard to irony, which in satire is usually personal. In satire, irony is 
attitudinal and therefore subjective; in tragedy, as in epic and comedy, objective (Snyder 140). 
Further, although satire consists of a high degree of fantasy and distortion, it is wrong to 
assume that all distorted writing is satire. As a borrower of forms, then, satire’s best 
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definition—with exclusion of the satyr—is in its varied nature, lanx satura. Like a potluck 
dinner, satire is not the dish you brought to the potluck, nor the others assembled on the 
dining room table. Rather it is what is on your plate after you have circled the table acquiring 
some food from each dish and using your selection for what you deem to be the best meal, 
while silently lamenting the fact that, yet again, Sharon has used gelatine in her lemon 
cheesecake, and Derek—the new hippie from across the road who spends his recreational 
time walking tightropes between trees—has put chickpeas in everything. Whilst each plate is 
a meal compiled from the same selection, each proportion can differ wildly. Saunders’ satire 
ascribes to satire’s lanx satura understanding. 
To return to Griffin’s statement regarding satire’s use of exaggeration, it is important 
to continue his comment, in which he describes satire’s relationship beyond the page:  
[S]atire does not forsake the “real world” entirely. Its victims come from that 
world, and it is this fact (together with a darker or sharper tone) that separates 
satire from pure comedy … Finally, satire usually proceeds by means of clear 
reference to some moral standards or purposes” (Griffin 1).  
Indeed, here we have comparisons that expose the varied components of satire, but 
importantly, as Griffin demonstrates, satire still depends on this exaggerated fiction being 
connected to the world, still attached to society’s norms and shared values. M. D. Fletcher’s 
definition subtracts the varied elements of satire in favour of the real: “Satire … is a verbal 
aggression in which some aspect of historical reality is exposed to ridicule” (Fletcher ix). Here 
we have a conflict with Saunders’ work as being postmodern, but also with his fiction—as 
satires—requiring an objectivity, something postmodernism sought to dispose of. In order to 
“paint an objective picture of the evils” (Hodgart 11) of society, the satirist must also have a 
set of norms and values that dictate what is considered evil and good. Indeed, as Maynard 
Mack declares: “Satire … asserts the validity and necessity of norms, systematic values, and 
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meanings that are contained by recognizable codes” (Mack 194). With this understanding of 
satire that I have circumscribed above, it is difficult describe something as a satire, or as 
satirical, if it is lacking a stable configuration of values and an acceptance of reality, especially 
those which exist outside of the text itself.  
If we are to follow with our understanding of postmodernism’s relationship to 
historical reality, or lack thereof, as put forth by Frederic Jameson, then the following quote 
from Edward Rosenheim would seem all but compatible with such a lens: 
All satire is not only an attack; it is an attack upon discernible, historically 
authentic particulars. The “dupes” or victims of punitive satire are no mere 
fictions. They, or the objects which they represent, must be, or have been, plainly 
existent in the world of reality; they must, that is, possess genuine historic 
identity. The reader must be capable of pointing to the world of reality, past or 
present, and identifying the individual or group, institution, custom, belief or 
idea which is under attack by the satirist. (Rosenheim 317-18) 
Rosenheim, Jr. dictates that one of the requirements of a satirical text is that its content 
possesses referents in the real world. The targets of satire are, quite simply, real; and they 
require the reader to understand the signifiers of invective and the irony at work. Indeed, 
Graham Matthews states: “Within the post-modern era and the accompanying deluge of irony, 
cynicism and detached enjoyment, critics have bemoaned the loss of real world referent amidst 
a sea of simulacra (Matthews 1). Rosenheim’s explanation of satire’s required reliance on 
external norms and frameworks, that which he describes as “historically authentic particulars,” 
is most definitely at odds with postmodernism which proposes that art cannot be concerned 




Satire and Postmodernism 
Responses to the Charlie Hebdo attack were varied. While many around the world 
adopted the slogan and logo “Je suis Charlie” (“I am Charlie” in English) as a way of 
simultaneously expressing grief and advocating for freedom of the press, some looked outside 
the margins, calling into question the use and relevance of contemporary satire. Just over a 
week after the Charlie Hebdo shooting, David Ulin, writing for the Los Angeles Times, wrote an 
article entitled “Has America turned into a spoof of itself?”, which begins with a question 
which Ulin says he was made to ponder after the attacks in Paris: “Did postmodernism kill 
literary satire?” (n.p.). This question, posed in regard to postmodernism, is undoubtedly a 
response to irony, an attitude which postmodernism pushed to the forefront of American 
literary fiction in the second-half of the twentieth century. The ubiquity of irony in American 
fiction is well-known, but Ulin’s connection to satire, a similar form to irony, is worthy of 
exploration. “Is it a coincidence,” Ulin ponders, “that the rise of postmodernism in the 1970s 
overlaps almost exactly with the decline of satire? Is it a coincidence that after the turmoil of 
the late 1950s and 1960s … we turned inward, forgoing satire for irony?” (n.p.). Ulin 
references Joseph Heller’s Catch 22 (1961) and Kenneth Patchen’s Memoirs of a Shy Pornographer 
(1945), among others, in speculating on what he sees as the failure of the United States to 
heed the advice offered by its popular satirists, be they Benjamin Franklin or Mark Twain. 
Instead, it now seems that more people look back at many absurd and surreal satirical works 
as if they were not absurd at all: “Do we even need to say that, 70 years later, in a world of 
bots and tweets and news feeds, such an idea hardly seems outrageous?” (n.p.). Despite Ulin 
rhetorically suggesting that many satirist’s fears often reach fulfilment anyway, the production 
of satire has not waned in recent times.  
For its insistence on stable values, and its inherent aim to apply some form of moral 
judgement, satire can thus be understood to be in contention with the popular techniques of 
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postmodernism. As I will explore, there is indeed a tenuous and fragile relationship between 
the standards and values that inform what we have come to call postmodern literature and the 
nature of satire. The traits of postmodernism—more specifically its criticism of objective 
reality, morality, and truth—come into significant conflict with satire, a corrective genre with 
prerequisites of ethical certainty, moral standards, and historical reality. M. D. Fletcher 
remarks that this is presumably why, at the end of the twentieth century, we heard a great deal 
about “black humor, absurd humor, cosmic satire, and absolute irony, but little about satire 
as it is defined here” (Fletcher ix). This observation is crucial in understanding how the very 
nature of satire is at odds with the movement of literary postmodernism. Sub-genres such as 
cosmic satire and black humour began to flourish in the twentieth century, attempting to 
supplant and negotiate a space for art that is, at least to a certain degree, corrective in nature 
such as satire. Be that as it may, in spite of the many works described thus, it is still not satire 
as we know it. John W. Tilton, in his study of the contemporary novel, most succinctly 
describes cosmic satire as at variance with satire: “Cosmic satire has no corrective or utilitarian 
function. It recognises no ‘arm against fantasy,’ for it finds man’s ailment incurable. Each of 
the cosmic satirists conveys his conviction that man will always find fantasy of illusion 
preferable to reality” (Tilton 19). Indeed, this refusal to acknowledge (a) reality is a theme 
throughout many works of cosmic satire and black humour in the twentieth century.  
As a result, there is a conspicuous lack of purely satiric works in the mid-twentieth 
century and even more notable absence of the lack of enquiry as to satire’s place in literary 
theory during this time. Susan Lever writes that: “There has hardly been an important critical 
study of satire in English since 1970, when the term was applied pretty well exclusively to 
eighteenth century practice. In fact, satire has often been dismissed as one of the museum 
genres of the past” (Lever 215). When considering famous satiric works, one looks back to 
Jonathan Swift, Alexander Pope, and Mark Twain, to name a few. Rarely will one conjure up 
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a brilliant work of literary satire in the past century without affixing to its description a sub-
genre. In 1993, Walter Poznar, after observing that the contemporary American novel has 
failed to produce a work comparable to classical satirists, asks: “Where in American society is 
a potential satirist to find those values from which to challenge society?” (Poznar n.p.) The 
values Poznar is referring to are those moral and ethical norms that Quintero, Hodgart, and 
Frye all spoke of with regard satire’s ingredients. Quintero emphatically states that, “satire 
cannot function without a standard against which readers can compare its subject,” appending 
the following question to his statement: “How could we perceive something as ridiculous, 
monstrous, wicked, or absurd without having a comparative sense of what would not be the 
case?” (Quintero 3). By arguing that typical protagonists in American novels suffer from 
ethical confusion, Poznar elaborates on this “spiritual bankruptcy” and absence of norms by 
noting that: “[C]ontemporary American novelists wander aimlessly in a darkening wasteland 
with little if any expectation that they can escape the nightmarish inferno of the modern 
world” (n.p.). Furthermore, Susan Strehle writes that, “[C]ontemporary satiric fiction “indicts 
without consoling; it finds large scope for unchecked greed and virtually none for ethical 
values” (Strehle 145). This criticism targets the postmodern condition which prohibits 
objective meaning and implied norms—both notable features of satire. “Satirical texts,” writes 
Paul Simpson, “are inextricably bound up with context of situation, with participants in 
discourse and with frameworks of knowledge” (Simpson 1). For Poznar, the American novel, 
influenced by the discourse of postmodernism, is without meaning, for all of its meaning is 
interpretative and subjective. Indeed, in beginning his study of mid-to-late twentieth century 
fiction, Charles Harris asserts that: “The belief that ours is an absurd universe, chaotic and 
without meaning, is perhaps the dominant theme of the modern American novel” (6). 
Poznar’s article, then, contains criticism that needs explanation; and perhaps, a response. 
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In 1995, Steven Weisenburger published one of the very few large studies on twentieth 
century satire, Fables of Subversion: Satire and the American Novel, 1930-1980. In response to the 
aforementioned definitions of satire, Weisenburger’s study challenges what has, since classical 
times, been our common understanding of satire. Fables of Subversion argues against the 
formalist New Critics—Northrop Frye, Alvin Kernan, Maynard Mack, and Robert C. Elliot—
who all refrained from allowing new interpretations of satire theory that deviated from it as a 
moral, normative and corrective mode or genre. Many writers, Weisenburger is correct to 
point out, questioned the absence of satire in the twentieth century (2); Alan Wilde referred 
to it in 1981 as “a minor form in modern times” (Wilde 28), whilst many others saw cosmic 
satire and black humor as topical—appropriate sub-genres to supplant the original. 
Weisenburger thus sought to rectify the conspicuous absence of traditional satire in the 
twentieth century, establishing a theory of satire that splits the mode into two categories: 
generative satire, and degenerative satire. His argument is founded on the idea that, unlike the 
American literary establishment’s theory of satire in the previous century, satire was not a 
“minor form” in the twentieth century, nor that satire had gone “stale and mouldy” and unable 
to “speak for the twentieth century” (Frye, 1944: 78). “Satire,” Weisenburger succinctly states, 
“could not address the central anxieties of modernity and even seems complicitous with the 
worst forms of modern, propagandistic consensus-building” (2). Traditional understandings 
of satire had left it, as a mode and genre, unfit for the contemporary era. Although satire had 
become disconnected from its traditional, classical roots, it had not vanished with the advent 
of postmodernism. Instead, such satire of the twentieth century is identifiable as 
“degenerative” satire, a “subversive mode” that participates in oppositional work and stands 
outsides clear relations to signifiers and the consensus-building approach of its traditional 
understanding (Weisenburger 19). For Weisenburger, the traditional framework of satire 
required adjustment. On viewing Burgess, Barth, and Vonnegut as “conventional social 
37 
 
satirists,” Tilton recognises the difficulty of discerning what constitutes satire: “[T]he problem 
is that no theory of conventional or traditional satire, based as it must be upon past satirical 
practice, can possibly embrace the contemporaneity of their satire” (Tilton 14). This is what 
Weisenburger seeks to address. However Tilton’s study is concerned with cosmic satire which 
“though often hilariously comic”, is a satire that has profoundly “tragic overtones”—a type 
of “tragic satire” (19).   
By contrast, Weisenburger’s definition of “generative” satire is comparable to the 
definitions I have mentioned above—those by formalist New Critics who, despite each of 
them favouring one element more than the other, all understood satire to be corrective, 
normative, rhetorical, and that it has an object or target for its attack. The works of Swift and 
Twain, for example, function as generative satire, artists whose fiction points out folly and 
vice through humour and are composed with a corrective intent amid an understanding of 
implied norms. Weisenburger’s “generative” model of satire aims to “construct consensus, 
and to deploy irony in the work of stabilizing various cultural hierarchies” (Weisenburger 1). 
Writers such as Pynchon and Gaddis, in contrast, do so in a degenerative mode: “to subvert 
hierarchies of value and to reflect suspiciously on all ways of making meaning, including [their] 
own” (3). Weisenburger considers degenerative satire as a wholly “postmodern phenomenon” 
where, although its historical targets appear absent, this is because its “infections erupt mainly 
within, amid discursive activity itself, and are therefore identified with semiotic practices of 
which the text is itself an instance” (19). However, meaning and objectivity are not missing in 
these texts. Just as postmodern thought attempts to deny “the existence of an authoritative 
prescription of ‘the good’ or the possibility of constructing one” (Fletcher ix), degenerative 
satire’s purpose is to “subvert hierarchies of values” through a suspicion of all knowledge and 
ways of representation, including its own (Weisenburger 3). This is why, to a certain extent, 
many postmodern writers have sought to construct narratives that attempt to exist outside of 
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the text through metafiction and a conflation of narrator and author. The degenerative satirist 
perceives language itself as a dissimulation and yet expresses this using language—a paradox 
that implies awareness of a text’s limitations. 
To support his theory of postmodern satire, Weisenburger turns to P. K. Elkin’s The 
Augustan Defence of Satire (1973) wherein Elkin proposes that Augustans comprehended satire 
as “historically relative,” and that distinct ages seemed to have wildly different ideas about it 
(Elkin 1973: 35). Why, then, should American postmodern satirists be restricted from utilising 
satire as a means to delegitimise and interrogate the very structures which satire was 
understood to require as stable? Weisenburger’s answer comes back to “the desire of formalist 
New Critics to generalize [satire’s] elements by comparing masterworks from selected epochs” 
(Weisenburger 9). In this view, the textbook definition of satire was so limiting, and the hold 
of formalist New Critics over the term so strong that, when the definition was no longer seen 
as suited for postmodern works, such a realisation was taken “as a sign, not of something new 
in literary satire, but of satire’s demise” (11). When postmodern satire no longer seemed 
aligned with satire in its rhetorical, corrective, and normative functions, then the work often 
seemed best described as black humor or cosmic satire; Susan Strehle goes so far as to label 
the works of Pynchon, Gaddis, DeLillo, Barth, Coover, and Barthelme as “postnormative” 
satirists (145)—satire that exists beyond convention and without the values Frye and Kernan 
argue as indispensable. J. Green affirms this lack of moral focus in postmodern fiction, stating 
that: “West, Gaddis, and DeLillo raise dissenting voices, but without presupposing a clear 
moral or social norm against which to measure current deviance” (2005: 186). In short, 
postmodernism’s influence on literature, through assumptions of metaphysical and ethical 
uncertainty, did not permit satire an opportunity to enter the mainstream without criticism of 
its reliance on objectivity and norms, which were subject to endless deconstruction. Yet, the 
deconstruction of language is the targeted aggression that Weisenburger points to as a chief 
39 
 
distinction between generative and degenerative satire, for degenerative satire takes aim not at 
particulars outside of the work, but within, subverting the very fiction that is being created (19). 
One may point to this as no longer being corrective or rhetorical; however, Weisenburger 
criticises how with one hand “literary theory denied satire the rights of mutability and 
ambiguity, while with the other it granted those rights to irony” (22), hence the question raised 
by Poznar about satire’s absence in American fiction.  
I have attempted to establish a background of both traditional definitions of satire 
coupled with introducing a contemporary theory of satire that posits a revisiting of those 
traditional definitions. This is because, although the many descriptions of Saunders  remarked 
on his likeness to greats such as Vonnegut and Twain, I argue that Saunders is interestingly 
unlike these two. Firstly, as I will soon discuss, Saunders does possess the generative mode of 
Twain and Vonnegut. However, unlike Twain, Saunders operates within (and outside of) the 
postmodern and remains playful with metafictional elements. The similarities between 
Vonnegut and Saunders are numerous, even with regard to their chosen religion, Buddhism. 
However, whilst Saunders and Vonnegut quite obviously pick apart at the fabrics of the 
American ethos—the American Dream, Puritan Work Ethic, capitalism—Vonnegut extends 
his awareness of life’s problems with an admission that life’s problems are unable to be 
resolved; or, at the very least, appears devoid of hope. In contrast, Saunders too, like any 
satirist, campaigns for awareness, but he does so with a firm, critical perspective of how 
positive thinkin, and American optimism operate, then seeks to leave his reader with 




Saunders and Postmodernism 
I have referred to George Saunders earlier as a second-generation postmodernist. If 
one is reluctant to call for the end of postmodernism, one may be more inclined to categorise 
postmodern writers as consisting of multiple generations in a larger movement, as David 
Cowart has done: “From writers born in the 1920s to those born (virtually) yesterday, one 
discerns three or so generations of postmodern literary endeavour” (Cowart 29). 
Postmodernism, in this sense, is ridiculously robust: able to engulf at least three generations 
of artists despite many of the second- and third-generation postmodernists being aware of, 
and arguably resistant to, postmodernism’s aesthetic grasp. Writers whose work began to 
appear after the Second World War are those often considered to be of the first generation, a 
period which saw the United States move from being an industrial to post-industrial economy 
(Jameson 53). Kurt Vonnegut, fellow satirist and a strong influence in George Saunders’ work, 
is of this earlier ilk. Joseph Heller and Gilbert Sorrentino, among others, are considered 
Vonnegut’s contemporaries, along with—albeit a little younger—the likes of Don DeLillo, 
Toni Morrison, Cormac McCarthy, and Thomas Pynchon.  
Dividing prominent postmodern writers by generation does little to affirm 
postmodernism’s end given the effervescence with which some, albeit now only a few, first-
generation postmodernists are still writing and publishing. Regardless, the second wave of 
writers, those of whom were born in the 1940s and 1950s, sought to displace the postmodern 
aesthetics as the literary dominant. Following David Cowart’s approach, Alice Walker (born 
in 1944), Richard Powers (1957), Gloria Naylor (1950), Tim O’Brien (1946), Donald Antrim 
(1958), and George Saunders (1958) are among those considered second-generation 
postmodernists. Writers born in the 1960s and whose work was published in the 1980s, such 
as Chuck Palahniuk (1962), Dave Eggers (1970) and David Foster Wallace (1962), are the 
third. This mentioning of various writers serves only to categorise certain stylistic shifts within 
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American literary postmodernism and is subsequently no more than a guideline, as one may 
think of postmodernism itself. Whilst David Foster Wallace was born in the 1960s, he was 
published at a very young age (The Broom of the System in 1987 for instance); George Saunders 
is four years younger, but his first short story collection was published in 1996. Contextual 
factors such as this are valuable so as not to emphasise age over publication date. 
By categories of age, output of work, and literary style, George Saunders occupies a 
liminal position among America’s writers at the end of the twentieth century. His fiction is 
not believed to be part of the early postmoderns, such as Vonnegut, Pynchon, or DeLillo, but 
nor is he situated with contemporary younger writers such as Joshua Ferris, Karen Russell, or 
Jonathan Safran Foer. While Saunders’ contemporaries, as a result of age, may be seen as 
Wallace, Jonathan Franzen, and Chuck Palahniuk, among others, his aesthetics—particularly 
his satire and insistence on writing short stories over novels—is less concerned with directly 
responding to postmodernism (such as Wallace sought to) than it is proposing a unique style 
of satire in the current era. As a result of this, there is a clear transition in Saunders’ work from 
navigating the achievements of postmodernism—pastiche, blankness, sense of exhaustion, 
irony, rejection of history, acute self-consciousness (Gitlin 100)—with a renewal of sincerity 
and affect sometimes associated with post-postmodernism, whatever that may be.4 
 
4 Often viewed his artistic manifesto, David Foster Wallace’s essay “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. 
Fiction” outlines his frustrations with the metafictional games of postmodernism. In it, he states that:  
“The real literary ‘rebels’ in this country might well emerge as some weird bunch of anti-rebels, born 
oglers who dare somehow to back away from ironic watching, who have the childish gall actually to 
endorse and instantiate single-entendre principles. Who treat of plain old untrendy human troubles and 
emotions in U.S. life with reverence and conviction” (Wallace 1998: 81). Adam Kelly refers to this 
response as a “New Sincerity” in American fiction, a categorisation that situates Wallace’s work (along 
with the fiction of his contemporaries Dave Eggers, Zadie Smith, Jonathan Safran Foer, among others) 
outside of postmodernism (Kelly, 2016: 198). 
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Those who pursue the idea of ‘American literature’ indulge in the idea that it is part of 
something bigger, yet it simultaneously resists the desire to be classified—national 
exceptionalism constantly meets staunch individualism. Stephen Burn illustrates this impulse 
with regard to American writers who became associated with the rise of postmodernism in 
the mid-twentieth century, believing they were: “unusual not just in their self-conscious efforts 
to classify their relationship to literary history, but also in their tendency to dramatise that self-
consciousness within their fiction” (Burn 2). Indeed, as Brian McHale’s asserts: “From the 
very outset, postmodernism was self-conscious about its identity as a period, conscious of its 
own historicity, because it conceived of itself as historical” (McHale n.p.). For writers 
emerging from the shadows of such postmodern greats as Thomas Pynchon, John Barth, and 
Robert Coover, the desire was to regard postmodernism’s poetics as the style guide to which 
their own art should adhere to and emulate. The 1990s was, as Stephen Burn describes it: “a 
transitional decade, torn between the emergence of a generation of writers seeking to move 
beyond postmodernism and the prolonged vitality of many writers … associated with the 
original rise of the movement” (Burn 10). Jonathan Franzen, for example, admits to the 
influence of such writers, stating that he began writing novels to create a “conversation with 
the … great sixties and seventies Postmoderns” (Franzen and Antrim 73). But a change of 
thinking in who and what fiction is for has seen Franzen, and to a greater extent his 
contemporary David Foster Wallace, express reservations with the untold tenets of literary 
postmodernism. 
Just as there are a multitude of accounts of postmodernism’s (supposed) beginning, 
there are just as many—if not more—arguments as to when its twilight period was, or whether 
it even existed at all. Debates among literary scholars and philosophers have not dwindled 
either. Writing in 1997, Richard Rorty believed that “nobody had the foggiest idea was 
postmodernism meant” (1997: 13). William T. Vollman’s essay “American Writing Today: A 
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Diagnosis of the Disease” was published in 1990 and against the “games of stifling 
breathlessness” associated with postmodernism, such as ironic cynicism and metafiction 
(Vollman 358). For all its evasiveness as a term, postmodernism remains the best point of 
demarcation to survey the most significant aspects of American culture for the last seventy or 
so years. Furthermore, the need to at least explain postmodernism’s connection to 
contemporary fiction is not to settle arguments of its worth or existence, but to convey a sense 
of the self-aware and literary-conscious environment the majority of writers, such as David 







Chapter Two: Trouble in Paradise: Optimism and Neoliberalism 
All is for the best in the best of possible worlds 
Pangloss 
Change your thoughts and you change your world 
Norman Vincent Peale 




Saunders’ first collection of stories CivilWarLand in Bad Decline (1996) introduces the reader to 
the most common subject matter in his fiction: The United States of America as a riven, 
divided, and failing project. Its title story is set in an American Civil War re-enactment 
amusement park, although Saunders’ satiric vision and humour incontrovertibly shows the 
theme park to provide little amusement for the story’s central characters, if any at all. Like 
most of Saunders’ characters, they are constantly operating in a space of division and distress 
and are at some point faced with a moral dilemma. This version of America is the outcome of 
one of Saunders’ most repeated targets, late capitalism; the theme park the perfect place in 
which to stage American luxury alongside capitalism’s grotesque underside. The United States 
that Saunders portrays exists in a dystopian near-future, one that is rife with the troubles of 
both America’s past and present: slavery, warfare, illegal immigration, poverty, and 
disillusionment. One cannot simply understand Saunders’ fictional America to be divided 
merely by political persuasion, but also by history and future, rich and poor, black and white, 
and, most notably, the individual and the corporation. Forever on the edge of being further 
dehumanised by a growing culture that favours greed and prosperity, the powerless individual 
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is Saunders’ most commanding subject to satirise slavery, work, consumption, and class 
comparisons. “ ‘I pour my life’s blood into this place and you offer me half what I paid?’ asks 
the father to his estate agent in “Isabelle” (CivilWarLand 28). ‘‘Market forces at work,” replies 
the estate agent—a suffocating remark amidst financial struggle (28). This frustration with a 
system that appears to be crushing the individual human spirit occurs again and again in 
Saunders’ fiction. “Market forces at work” best describes the corporate rhetoric of late 
capitalism that debilitates the individual and leaves very little room for hope in an alternative. 
For a country deemed the “land of the free” and “home of the brave,” Saunders’ 
characters are not exceptional. Instead they are often made to endure the hardships of a nation 
that promises freedom and leisure but only offers boredom and bureaucracy in return. As one 
of his characters laments: “Do you know what we do? In our country? We work” (Brief and 
Frightening Reign of Phil 10). Saunders’ America is viewed almost entirely through the lens of the 
postmodern working class where neoliberalism has all but destroyed the individual, leaving 
moral questions and subjectivity to waste. Yet, in spite of all adversity, Saunders’ characters 
often become agents of American optimism and self-improvement—satiric vessels for 
America’s obsession with positive thinking. Saunders’ criticisms have their roots not in 
newfound, modern frustrations, but, unlike postmodern fiction, in an awareness and 
understanding of history. Saunders is quite evidently conscious of class and, as such, there are 
rarely middle-class characters in Saunders’ fiction: there is simply the wealthy and the working-
poor. There are the low-wage amusement park operators, the male stripper in “Sea Oak,” the 
caveman in “Pastoralia,” and the man who pays his way by giving “drive-thru hand jobs” in 
“Bounty.” Saunders’ tendency to write about work is rather simple: “[I]t’s the most dominant 
thing in American life,” Saunders says, “It’s almost all people do, and we do so much of it, 
too much of it maybe, and most always for someone else’s improvement than our own” 
(Saunders and Derby 87).  
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If there is no escaping it in reality, then there is no escape in Saunders’ stories. His 
own working experience is where he admits to finding most of his material, “in the everyday 
struggle between capitalism and grace” (Solomon n.p.). In this context, this chapter will 
explore the settings which Saunders constructs to represent the American workplace, and the 
ways in which satire is at work in these settings. I will examine the characters’ relation to work 
and the ways in which the American dream they pursue is often at odds with their emotional 
and physical wellbeing. Both their mental health and body have been turned into commodities 
by late capitalism. In short, Saunders’ stories do not possess the scent of a bountiful America 
rich and free, brave and bold. Rather, there is a hint not merely that an amusement park is in 
decline, but that something with wider America is inherently wrong. Like Juvenal correcting 
the urban evils of Rome through verse, the stories in these collections point to real-world 
referents, particularly the dehumanising of the individual through corporate language and 
commercialisation. For Saunders, there is trouble in paradise. 
 
Insecurity and Anxiety in “Sea Oak” 
“Sea Oak” is a story of a working-class family, involving the death of a lonesome woman who 
later comes back to life in order to criticise the economic system that prohibited her from 
living a fulfilling life. The target of this satire is not individual human failing, but the failing of 
those people in power to acknowledge the illusory nature of the American Dream under free-
market capitalism. Consequently, the task of writing about the contextual elements 
surrounding the makeup of Saunders’ stories requires at least a brief mention of the economy. 
Since the ‘stagflation’ of the 1970s, the U.S. economy has been in decline, resulting in an 
increasingly large wealth gap and leaving many with full-time jobs, such as those in Saunders’ 
stories, living below the poverty line. As mentioned, Saunders pays close to attention to class 
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and the effects that low paid and degrading work have on the human experience and the ability 
to live gracefully in the world. David Rando states: “Among other forms of marginalization, 
Saunders’s subject is above all the American working class” (437).  
The economic and social context surrounding Saunders’ most common subject is thus 
imperative in understanding his satire. In The Contemporary Novel in Context (2011), Andrew Dix, 
Brian Jarvis, and Paul Jenner conclude that: “The rise and dramatic fall of the US economy 
from 1980 to the present is an inescapable influence on, and topic for, contemporary 
American fiction” (Dix et. al 13). In their assessment of contemporary literature, Dix, Jarvis, 
and Jenner seek to: 
[U]nderline the salience of the American economy when thinking about the 
contemporary American novel. For while it is true that economics figures among 
the specialist knowledge of relatively few current novelists, the expansion, 
contraction, transformation and distribution of money in the United States 
between 1980 and 2010 constitute, nevertheless, the chief structuring upon the 
national life explored by their fiction. (Dix et al. 4-5) 
Suggesting the prevailing rhetoric in politics was concerned with almost nothing else near the 
end of the millennium, Dix et al. cite Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign theme: “The economy, 
stupid” (5). However, it is not just about the economy. This focus creates a kind of subjectivity 
that is determined by neoliberal discourse and assumptions. For Saunders, who was writing 
during this time, the effects of the economy are not merely an inescapable influence in his 
work but are the very thing his characters cannot escape from.   
Thus, the U.S economy has been, and continues to be, an increasing authority in 
fiction during and after postmodernism, and serves as the critical context with which to 
analyse the individual’s relation to society. The fictional works that Dix, Jarvis, and Jenner 
include in their survey of contemporary American fiction highlight the importance of 
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understanding the U.S. economy as a critical context, focused on the role of consumption. 
After tracing the involvement of the contexts surrounding postmodern works such as White 
Noise (1985), Fight Club (1996), and American Psycho (1991), they observe  that: “Often obsessed 
with consumerism, contemporary American fiction pays little attention to the largely invisible 
infrastructure of production,” and they go on to ask: “Why are there so few novels about the 
world of work?” (135). They provide no definite answer, although Liam Connell’s recent book, 
Precarious Labour and the Contemporary Novel (2018) affirms the lack of attention paid to the 
nature of work and/or workers: “[I]f there is a newfound wealth of economic and political 
literary-criticism, the question of work has been relatively under-examined” (1). Through a 
selection of novels by David Foster Wallace and Aravind Adiga, among others, Connell argues 
that the contemporary novel does make visible the insecure and precarious nature of work in 
the current era through the presentation of fictional characters. The replacement of Keynesian 
economics with neoliberalism in the 1980s, Connell stipulates, has consequently enabled an 
era of “flexible labour” which has, in part, “been possible by workers absorbing and 
acquiescing to comparatively high levels of uncertainty” (3). Talk of a ‘living wage’ and a ‘zero-
hour contracts’ have featured in news outlets in the years since, and employment has thus 
come to possess a worrying amount of contingency, instability, and risk. Indeed, Connell’s 
choice to conduct his study under the title of “precarious labour” mimics the nature of 
neoliberalism itself, which most scholars define and refer to through terms of “insecurity” and 
“uncertainty” (Gusterton and Besteman). The most harrowing aspect of this change in the 
economy is that, in America, work—specifically the idea of working hard—is unequivocally 
affixed to the promise of success, prosperity, and happiness. 
Saunders examines the uncertain prospects for workers under neoliberalism 
repeatedly. Since the term neoliberalism is consistently used in varying ways, I do not seek to 
define it as, to borrow Matthew Eagleton-Pierce’s explanation, there is “no way of neatly 
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encapsulating what has now become a kind of catch-all expression” (xiii). Instead, I shall 
briefly explain ideas surrounding its use and the system of practice it seeks to describe. David 
Harvey, in his influential work A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005), succinctly explains that:  
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. 
(Harvey 2) 
Harvey argues that these political economic practices are an agenda that emerged after the 
perceived failures of Keynesianism, when many powerful elites in the 1970s and 1980s became 
threatened by various post-war social movements. Influenced by classical ideas of economic 
liberalism, world leaders in the twentieth century—such as Ronald Reagan and Margaret 
Thatcher—embraced policy shifts away from government spending, toward complete trust in 
the free-market through privatisation and austerity. Social theorist Pierre Bourdieu is more 
scathing, defining neoliberalism as “[a] programme for destroying collective structures which 
may impede the pure market logic” (Bourdieu n.p.). In the introduction to Noam Chomsky’s 
Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order, Robert McChesney observes that in the United 
States “neoliberal initiatives are characterized as free market policies that encourage private 
enterprise and consumer choice, reward personal responsibility and entrepreneurial initiative” 
(McChesney 7). Similarly, Jennifer Silva lists the characteristics of neoliberalism as: “self-
reliance, rugged individualism, untrammelled self-interest, and privatization, equating lack of 
state interference and labor market efficiency with human freedom” (Silva 14).  
Neoliberalism and its characteristics have an equivocal relationship with literary 
criticism. According to Mitchum Huehls and Rachel Greenwald Smith, to use the critical 
context of neoliberalism as a platform with which to view the landscape of Saunders’ fiction 
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may, in fact, be a rather bootless errand: “Depending on your critical viewpoint, the 
expansiveness of the term makes it either absolutely vital or totally useless for critical work on 
contemporary culture” (Huehls and Smith 1). The overuse of the term and subsequent varying 
definitions have, they argue, placed neoliberalism as a “Sasquatch-like quality” that becomes 
difficult to prove and, noting Clive Barnett’s opinion, that it is additionally a “consolation” for 
left-leaning academics which reduces sociological complexity to economic structure (Huehls 
and Smith 1; Barnett 10). A disputed term, then, it is no wonder that at the 2014 American 
Studies Association meeting, Huehls and Smith recall that neoliberalism was labelled as one 
of several critical terms that might be “so overused as to be evacuated of any specificity” (qtd. 
in Huehls and Smith 2). By way of rationalising the varying definitions of the term, Huehls 
and Smith in their volume Neoliberalism and Contemporary Literary Culture (2017) propose that 
the progression of neoliberalism has advanced through four different phases: “the economic, 
the political-ideological, and sociocultural, and the ontological” (3). Although earlier 
postmodern texts in the 1970s referred to economic policies, it is only since the 1990s and 
2000s where representations of neoliberalism’s effects are displayed through sociocultural and 
ontological realities. Whereas novelists such as David Foster Wallace and Jonathan Franzen 
sought to respond to a culture rampant with profit-margins and consumerism, Saunders, I 
argue, is most suitable to succeed these earlier neoliberal representations with a focus on 
Huehls and Smith’s fourth phase, the ontological: “No longer just a set of ideological beliefs, 
neoliberalism becomes what we are, a mode of existence defined by individual responsibility, 
entrepreneurial action, and the maximisation of human capital” (9). This margin of difference 
is small, but the demarcation from consumption and ideology to neoliberalism’s omnipresence 
and re-defining of subjectivity, does, in the pursuit of classification, permit a path of 
succession and difference, placing Saunders’ satirical stories as something beyond the 
postmodernism of the 1980s. With regard to his satire, moreover, Saunders’ common 
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targets—neoliberalism and class ontologies—are required to be normative in his stories, and 
although they are critiqued through his satire, the ontological realities are not undermined like 
they are in degenerative satire.5 Thus, my focus is concerned with those most affected by 
neoliberal politics, which, by no coincidence, are exactly those who people Saunders’ stories: 
the working class.  
 “George Saunders peoples his stories with the losers of American history,” writes 
David Rando (437). Likewise, in her review of Tenth of December, Laura Miller imagines George 
Saunders to be the “bard of the wage slaves” (Miller, 2013: n.p.). Indeed, Saunders gives a 
voice to those not achieving the American Dream promised to them, regardless of their ability 
to work hard. This is satire, whereby “satire requires the inclusion, not the exclusion, of human 
failing” (Quintero 2). Rando considers the story “Sea Oak” to “represent the realities of class 
in an era when the concept has lost its objective determination and has become one coordinate 
in a differential field of experience and identity that includes race, gender, sexuality, and 
culture” (437). It is the individual that Saunders works so well to depict in their struggle against 
dehumanising corporatism. In “Sea Oak,” the fear of poverty is a treadmill that requires 
endless work in the face of growing impossibility. Saunders, whose own work history consists 
of working in oil rigs in South East Asia and as a ‘knuckle-puller’ in a slaughterhouse, attempts 
to depict the brutalising nature of work. It is these experiences, Saunders says, “[that] 
contributed to my understanding of capitalism as a benign-looking thing that, as Terry 
Eagleton says, ‘plunders the sensuality of the body’” (Saunders, “Chicago Christmas” n.p.). 
 
5 “Sea Oak” points toward this pervasive, ontological neoliberalism, which is dramatised using the 
supernatural. Likewise, the uncertain humanity of the girls who act as garden ornaments in “The Semplica 




The narrator of “Sea Oak,” Thomas, is a male stripper who waits (“Pilots”) tables at a 
restaurant that appears to be a gender reversal of the American chain Hooters (Pastoralia 92). 
One of the many absurd elements in this story is that the narrator does this job whilst wearing 
an oversized “Penile Simulator.” This work is described as “stressful” because, “[t]he minute 
your Cute Rating drops you’re a goner. Guests rank us as Knockout, Honeypie, Adequate, or 
Stinker” (92). Thomas, self-described as “a solid Honeypie/Adequate” does not complain, 
reasoning: “At least I’m working” (92). Accustomed to daily showing strangers his “penile 
simulator,” Thomas is no less worried about his objectification than he is grateful for being 
employed. 
Residing in an apartment complex named Sea Oak, Thomas lives with his sister, Min, 
and her baby Troy; Jade, his cousin, and her baby Mac; and Aunt Bernie, who is the story’s 
focal character, though not by way of point of view. While the narrator’s other relatives serve 
to depict a working-class home, with an underprivileged, uneducated family all living together 
to make ends meet, Aunt Bernie’s character progression becomes the voice of a sociological 
critique of class, opportunity, and positive thinking. Initially, Aunt Bernie is described as a 
“peacemaker” supported with examples of her gratification in the face of adversity and the 
tribulations that come with being poor: “When I say Sea Oak’s a pit she says she’s just glad to 
have a roof over her head” (95). Aunt Bernie’s disposition is to “be thankful” despite there 
being an “ad hoc crack house in the laundry room” and “brass knuckles in the kiddie pool” 
(97). This eternal optimism is satirically translated in the very fabric of the dialogue. Rando 
notes that by way of structuring his characters within various forms of difficulties, “Saunders 
subtly positions his reader as a consumer of working-class satire” (Rando 449). This is evident 
in a conversation between Aunt Bernie and Jade: 
“What a nice day we’ve had,” Aunt Bernie says once we’ve got the babies in bed. 
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“Man, what an optometrist,” says Jade.” (PS 95) 
Here, Jade’s response shows how giving authentic voices to those with limited language skills 
is a deliberate choice by Saunders. By mistaking ‘optimist’ for ‘optometrist,’ Jade’s error allows 
the reader to be immersed into not only the setting the protagonist exists in, but also the 
limited vocabulary the story’s characters possess. Linguistic freedom is not granted to Jade, 
and thus like Jade, the reader is also cast into the struggle of understanding a world where 
some voices are powerless. Moreover, the fact that only Bernie possesses a positive outlook 
toward life makes this small reply a pun. Indeed, by “positioning the limited, imperfect voice 
as the central structuring force in his narratives, then, Saunders is able to explore the political 
and social contexts within which the ‘losers’ of his lens suffer and grow” (Hayes-Brady 37).  
The growth of the story’s characters is really only evident in Bernie which, to begin 
with, is the main tension in the first part of the story, as Aunt Bernie’s optimism conflicts with 
the working-class frustrations of her relatives: “ ‘You know what I do if something bad 
happens?’ Bernie says. ‘I don’t think about it. Don’t take it so serious. It ain’t the end of the 
world. That’s what I do. That’s how I got where I am.’ ” (PS 98). Saunders’ omission and 
phrasing of sentences is skilful, deliberately producing grammatical errors in the working-class 
speech. Frequent omission of adverbs and prepositions point to a language that is 
underdeveloped.  
The narrator loves Bernie, but sees fault with her thinking, noting that she is sixty, 
owns nothing, was a slave to her father, and never had a date in her life (98). Min sarcastically 
replies, “ ‘Oh, we’re doing great,’ ” whilst pulling “Troy out from behind the couch” and 
brushing duck shards off his sleeper (98). Later, after dying of fright during a home invasion, 
Aunt Bernie’s death becomes the rising action whereby aspects of the family’s poverty are 
further brought into the foreground upon only being able to afford a cardboard box for her 
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coffin (103). However, in a climactic and surreal turn of events, Aunt Bernie is brought back 
to life, now occupying a zombie-like-undead existence within the same world. Bernie’s body 
is the same (“same perm, same glasses, same blue dress we buried her in”) but Bernie, the 
eternal optimist, is now aggressive and rude—the antithesis to her previous personality and 
attitude (112). As a speaking corpse, her language becomes vulgar, obscene; her sentences 
shorter and her disposition now outwardly practical, verging on cynical: “ ‘Sit the fuck down,’ 
she says … ‘You, mister,’ she says to me, ‘are going to start showing your cock’ ”(112). 
Measuring pathos with surreal, dry humour, Saunders’ marred resurrection of Bernie perhaps 
exposes the failures of eternal optimism; although by no means does it favour the opposite. 
Bernie realises she has been hardworking all her life, but she never reaps what she sows. Hers 
is a Sisyphean situation: no merit in work ethic and doomed to fail regardless of her past 
optimism. One may argue that Aunt Bernie is a representation of the American people, those 
in the individual pursuit of prosperity and happiness, but ignorant of the circumstances 
hindering their ability to succeed. It is a saddening account of a working-class family, but it is 
one that is also aware of its inability to accurately portray such tribulations in the realist mode. 
Aunt Bernie’s character invites analysis of Saunders as a satirist, and his response to 
neoliberalism. Firstly, it is important to note Aunt Bernie’s return to a state of being after 
death. Bernie’s profane language and frustration at a system (neoliberalism) that has left her 
to die poor, a virgin, with no travel experience, and no inheritance for her children, literally 
tear her apart. The resurrection is not so much a portrayal of the undead as it is a psychological 
awakening of the American experience for the postmodern working class—a reaction to 
‘ontological neoliberalism’. Indeed, Michael Trussler states: 
Rather than instigating an apocalyptic social breakdown (as traditional zombies 
do), Saunders’s “undead” have little, if any, durable agency, and are ignored by 
the society that created them. They are disavowed by mainstream American 
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culture: if their wretchedness was to be taken seriously, this act would repudiate 
the pervasive American ideology of “positive thinking,” an ethos that is fully 
endorsed by neoliberal corporations because it severely circumscribes the 
possibility of existential experience and political emancipation. (Trussler 206) 
Saunders’ undead characters thus operate in a space of critiquing the society with a voice they 
are not permitted to have when alive. Thus, it is only after death that Aunt Bernie understands 
the hypocrisies of her family’s Sisyphean struggle: “Never married, no kids, work work work” 
(PS 102). You work until you die, and then you work some more; there is very little, if any, 
virtue in suffering. Both dead and frustrated at her inability to live gracefully in the world, 
Aunt Bernie expresses this physically, even ripping the microwave door off. Moreover, Aunt 
Bernie’s newfound impoliteness is matched with a practical wisdom previously unpossessed—
gone is her positive thinking, replaced with a hardened, practical approach to survival.  
This approach is sustained and satirically repeated through the remainder of “Sea 
Oak”. After Bernie’s funeral, Freddie, the narrator’s mother’s boyfriend, interprets Aunt 
Bernie’s death as a “wake-up call” to “pull yourselfs up by the bootstraps” (105). Undead and 
angry, Bernie seems to have returned to preach such calls. Yet, her undead status is different 
to that of zombies in popular culture, as Trussler explains: 
The disreputable “undead” in Saunders’s stories … differ from Hollywood’s 
zombies in that their genesis derives specifically from the socioeconomic 
conditions that formed the basis of their lives, whereas zombies in popular 
culture often have a mysterious and vaguely defined origin (such as radiation). 
(Trussler 206) 
Saunders’ characters in “Sea Oak” do not exist as bodies separate from their socioeconomic 
status. Rather, their subjectivity is entirely regulated by such status. Rando writes that the story, 
“provocatively suspends the techniques of realism and postmodernism in the tense differential 
relation [which] creates productive incongruities that allow Saunders’s fiction to undermine 
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class ontologies” (Rando 438). Indeed, as Huehls and Smith state: “No longer just a set of 
ideological beliefs, neoliberalism becomes what we are” (Heuhls and Smith 7). Saunders, by 
the very nature of his satire, undermines states of being as insufficient to describe the human 
experience. Bernie is resurrected by her own repressed anger at the conditions that 
significantly impaired her quality of life, that once had her once believe that working hard 
would lead to prosperity. “All her life she worked hard. She never hurt anybody. And now 
this,” laments her family. (100) Amidst all absurdity, it is Bernie’s sincere question that echoes 
after reading: “Why do some people get everything and I got nothing?” … “Why? Why was 
that?” (123). Yet immediately after the question she says, “Show your cock,” and then dies 
again (123). No amount of positive thinking or hard work would ever emancipate Bernie. As 
George Saunders has remarked: “American society is uncomfortable with the idea that some 




While most of Saunders’ stories critique the importance of individual will in neoliberal 
landscapes, Saunders’ more sustained critique of Aunt Bernie’s situation is directed at 
America’s fascination with optimism and positive thinking, often satirising where the two 
destructively intersect. After the death of Aunt Bernie, Freddie lays out the facts “about this 
country” to his family, stating:  
Anybody can do anything. But first they gotta try … It’s the freaking American 
way—you start out in a dangerous craphole and work hard so you can someday 
move up to a somewhat less dangerous craphole. And finally maybe you get a 
mansion. But at this rate you ain’t even gonna make it to the somewhat less 
dangerous craphole. (PS 106) 
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Freddie’s ideology is that success is determined by one’s will, not circumstance. Here, the 
problem is not circumstance, but a lack of will. The idea that “Anybody can do anything” is 
sustained throughout Saunders’ fiction in a multitude of ways. Saunders’ critique of the 
American present is satirically presented in an unusual, anachronistic future wherein his 
characters suffer the consequences of an historical past. In this way, Saunders illustrates the 
creation, manipulation, and sale of nostalgia that is rooted in American history. Thus, with 
regard to portrayal and satirical distortion of real world referents, it is fitting that aspects of 
American history be examined to understand the roots that Saunders’ satire explicitly targets. 
In doing so, I seek to establish a foundation with which to assess Saunders’ stories within the 
context of a group of key terms. Firstly, I deem it appropriate to revisit the construction of 
the United States and the ideology and ethos that many scholars believe to have contributed 
to its dominating beliefs and principles. In Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous work Democracy in 
America—believed to be originally published between 1835 and 1840—he notes that “the 
position of the Americans” is “quite exceptional” (Tocqueville 440). Since then, and 
specifically in the mid-twentieth century, many scholars began, and continue to, refer to a 
concept known as American exceptionalism. Indeed, the rhetoric of American exceptionalism is 
still active in the postmodern era, writes Wilber Caldwell, noting that: “The bounded 
homeland and the bold distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ remain very real” (Caldwell 159). 
Writing about the success of the American Revolution and the construction of its democratic 
republic during his visit to the country, “Tocqueville,” writes Seymour Martin Lipset, “is the 
first to refer to the United States as exceptional—that is, qualitatively different from all other 
countries” (Lipset 18). With respect to America’s exceptionalism regarded as a matter of 
difference, then, its national character defined through its work ethic and thinking positively are 
most definitely factors that set it apart from other countries. 
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By Tocqueville’s day, Europeans already perceived America as a land of endless 
opportunity. The Dutch historian Henri Baudet wrote that it became a place, “onto which all 
identification and interpretation, all dissatisfaction and desire, all nostalgia and idealism 
seeking expression could be projected” (Baudet 55). Contrary to many of the more common 
arguments that place the escape of religious persecution at the centre of migration to America, 
there is evidence that the marketing of the country depicted it not solely as an escape, but as 
a place where all desires could be fulfilled, however ambitious they may be. Rather than merely 
serve as a place to evade persecution, America was also envisioned as Eden—an exceptional 
country without the shackles of history. Jack Greene notes that not long after its discovery, 
“America became the locus for a variety of utopian constructions” (Greene, 1993: 30). Sir 
Thomas More’s Utopia (1515-16) is a classic example of such envisions. A political satire that 
takes aim at the ailments of sixteenth-century England, More’s Utopia positions the New 
World as the place to evade the maladies of European polities. Robert Elliott declares in his 
book The Shape of Utopia, that “it is in Thomas More’s Utopia itself that the two modes of satire 
and utopia are most clearly seen to be indivisible” (Elliott 22). Elliott, a scholar of satire with 
his seminal work The Power of Satire: Magic, Ritual, Art (1966), correlates the intent of the satiric 
mode to bring about positive change (at least with respect to the satirist’s opinion) with that 
of an imagined place considered desirable. Although More’s Utopia is both influential and 
relevant to discussions on satire, there is not the space to elaborate on it specifically. However, 
with regard to Saunders, it is interesting to consider that, to some degree, More serves as a 
traditional bookend to Saunders. Whereas More’s Utopia scrutinises Europe in favour of the 
New World’s possibilities, Saunders’ satire points to the New World as failing, in “Bad 
Decline”, and registers these disappointments through his characters’ voices: “I’m sorry, but 
I feel that life should offer more than this” (CivilWarLand 48). The immense potential of the 
New World, so entrenched into the consciousness of Europeans, is not perceived as a utopia 
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by Saunders. Whilst More proposed America as a solution, Saunders perceives it, five hundred 
years later, as the problem.  
America was envisioned by those in Europe as a place for the bold, brave, and 
enterprising. Many of these visions were framed with the ideal of economic prosperity, a 
utopia of wealth. Interestingly, Greene proposes that: “European invaders slowly identified it 
as a place that provided exceptional opportunities for the mass conversion of souls to 
Christianity or, more commonly, for the acquisition of individual wealth and fame.” (Greene, 
1993: 30). It is important to note here that the mass migration of people from Europe to the 
New World was not so much a result of the discontent and oppression at home, or a 
fundamental desire to spread English power, nor even wholly founded in ideas of liberty. 
Rather, it was a desire for achieving fortune and the acquisition of land, an aspiration that was 
deeply entrenched due to the promises of riches that many of promoters of the New World 
described (Greene, 1998: 193). G. R. Elton relates this desire with the emotions of “greed and 
the search for greater wealth” (114). Furthermore, Perry Miller, in his text Errand in the 
Wilderness (1952), notes that most immigrants “came for better advantage and for less danger, 
and to give prosperity the opportunity of success” (4). Brewing in the colonial imagination 
was more than an escape from the British Empire—it was the chance to have a dream actualised 
through a sense of place. Additionally, it was also the optimistic belief in such a chance being 
fulfilled. 
The United States’ embrace of commercialisation and consumer capitalism is not 
solely due to a post-Second World War booming economy. Rather, the communities that 
founded the nation were transformed into an empire of freedom guided by the mark of 
economy, wealth, and prosperity. It is in this context where Saunders’ critiques of human 
tendency are plainly exposed through his satire. In New England, many people became more 
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invested in their individual pursuits of happiness—pursuits that were fundamentally rooted in 
materialism and consumption. This created, Greene argues, a longing in some to turn back 
toward their diminishing religious roots which consisted of a more “pious and coherent social 
order” (Greene, 1993: 203). The religious appeal for New Englanders has been said to have 
intensified “special themes of New England providential thought” with a yearning to have 
such heaven-sent thinking spread across America (203).  
This picture of American culture is not complete without acknowledging its history as 
a nation of people whose beliefs in their future selves were governed by a sense that they had 
been chosen. Many in New England held firm to the belief that their successful migration—
although many others lost their lives en route—was nothing less than providential and, as a 
result, they sought to expand their spiritual awakening to the other colonies. “[T]he myth of 
America”, writes Sacvan Bercovitch, is central to the idea that, “[i]n the beginning was the 
world and the word was with the New England Way, and the word became ‘America’” 
(Bercovitch 5-6). The New Englanders were guided by this sense of individual betterment, 
but this was not the case for all European colonies. New Spain, New Amsterdam, and New 
France constructed their societies in the image of home in Europe, whereas the Puritans in 
New England sought prosperity, a tenet that would later have a large influence on the 
American self. 
The New England Way, comprised of individual betterment and a sense of 
providence, is also intrinsically connected to the rise of Puritanism, which began to emerge in 
England in the late sixteenth century. Puritans followed the ideas of the theologian John 
Calvin, who taught that the world is divided between the appointed and the damned. Whether 
one was of the appointed elect and offered salvation by God was unknowable, even though it 
was understood that God had already made his decision. Eric Foner writes that although 
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“nothing one did on earth … would make any difference,” leading a good life and “prospering 
economically” might well be indications of God’s grace (Foner 65). Unlike other colonies, the 
Puritans who settled in New England saw themselves as on the elected side of God’s decision, 
based on the assumption that Catholicism in Britain was not the true faith and so God had 
sent them into the New World—their growing community confirmed the belief that they were 
instruments of “sacred historical design” (Greene, 1988: 21). This sense of religious 
exceptionalism, coupled with the way the New World was publicised to Europeans, is not 
without direct connection to Puritanism’s wider effects on the American ethos. Indeed, 
American exceptionalism, religion, and capitalism, are all imperative in understanding the 
contemporary America that Saunders mocks and criticises in his satiric fiction.  
Furthermore, most settlers in New England were Calvinist, a branch of reformed 
Protestantism. Calvinism in the North American colonies was important in constructing 
modern cultural identity. Burdened and constantly pre-occupied with the thought of death 
and sin, many of those in New England—and Protestants in other colonies for that matter—
developed illnesses that, despite later being scientifically explainable, were at the time regarded 
as treatable through positive thinking. In his work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
(1920), Max Weber notes that Calvinist theology, which had a great influence on the American 
Way, spread values that encouraged capitalist tendencies: “[T]he spirit of capitalism … was 
present before the capitalist order” (Weber 55). Indeed, as if harking back to Greene’s 
assertion that early migrants were in pursuit of “individual wealth and fame” (Greene, 1993: 
30), Weber most succinctly redefines this desire not as an opportunity but as a responsibility: 
The tonic that braced them for the conflict was a new conception of religion, 
which taught them to regard the pursuit of wealth as, not merely an advantage, 




As a result, New England—mainly consisting of Puritan families—initially prospered, 
championed by the requirement of hard work in the pursuit of wealth; and, by extension, 
happiness. It is evident that Americans’ optimism toward individual betterment is deeply 
rooted in the New England consciousness, which, entwined with religion and capitalism, 
spread throughout the United States, and arguably still does. However, the Calvinists, so very 
occupied with the dangers of sin and the fear that their current situation was a sign they were 
of the damned, developed many illnesses. The solution, however, bears an almost symmetrical 
relation to their solution for financial and religious hardship: thinking positively and working 
hard. Consumer capitalism, the setting which stages the majority of Saunders’ stories, is 
hospitable to this desire for growth, for betterment, and for the ever-increasing determination 
to achieve perfection—a pursuit which is more complicated when entwined with the project 
of late capitalism. For those who were not prospering—or not to their own Puritan 
ambitions—then this was not a result of circumstance but a failure to think positively enough 
to overcome the obstacle. 
 
“Ask the Optimist!” 
Saunders’ satire embodies the work ethic of Calvinism in combination with America’s 
optimistic tendencies that inform much of the country’s motivational and self-help literature. 
Saunders’ criticism of this American tendency to think positively and help oneself, can be 
traced back to the nineteenth-century where one Mary Patterson, believed to have never been 
free from illness, sought help from the spiritual healer Phineas Quimby. No more than a week 
after seeing Quimby, Patterson felt cured from her ailments—a rapid and responsive recovery 
to afflictions that had previously never been healed. Quimby’s method, based on ‘mental 
healing,’ was a practice which had begun in Europe one hundred years earlier through a belief 
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in the importance of magnetic fluids and mesmerism. Marquis de Puysegur (1751–1825), one 
of the founders of hypnotism, was a French magnetiser whose work in mesmerism was 
influenced by the Viennese physician Franz Anton Mesmer. Puysegur explains mesmerism 
thusly: 
The entire doctrine of Animal Magnetism is contained in the two words: Believe 
and want. I believe that I have the power to set into action the vital principle of 
my fellow-men; I want to make use of it; this is all my science and all my means. 
(Ellenberger 72) 
This doctrine of mesmerism was later pioneered in New England and throughout America by 
Charles Poyen de Saint Saveur. Upon reaching the shores of America, this form of spiritual 
healing became immediately popular in the minds of a group of people who had already 
cultivated their selves as exceptional and instilled with providence—a naturally optimistic 
disposition. The transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote on January 13, 1837, that he  
“went to see the magnetic sleep & saw the wonder” (qtd. in Janik 55). By 1843, more than 
two hundred magnetisers sold their services in Boston alone, whilst would-be mesmerisers 
were tempted with dozens of books with do-it-yourself instructions which promised self-
improvement—a clear beginning of America’s fascination with self-help (55).  
For Quimby, sickness was due to an erroneous belief and required nothing more than 
mind over matter. “Disease is something made by belief or forced upon us by public opinion,” 
Quimby wrote (164). Mary Baker Eddy, formerly Mary Patterson, would later found Christian 
Science, and Quimby’s teachings would later lead to the movement of New Thought. The 
progression from Calvinism to New Thought can be seen as a result of the teachings imbued 
by Quimby. John Haller and Robert Fuller explain in The History of New Thought that such 
thinking is central to America’s proclivity for optimism and the pursuit of happiness: 
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In a broad range of publications that included motivational literature, 
philosophical and religious texts, and even occasional novels, nineteenth-century 
New Thought writers exposed the speculative aspects of their world with a 
temperament of curiosity mixed with optimism. Like Emerson and Swedenborg, 
they had only contempt for those who dwelled on tragedy or fatalism. Arguably 
the most philosophical movement in American culture, New Thought 
represented a form of applied idealism that resonated across the religious and 
secular landscape, offering a purposive life filled with optimism, practicality, 
healthy-mindedness, and economic well-being. (6) 
In many aspects influenced by the movement of transcendentalism, New Thought favoured 
the subjective human experience over empirical objectivism. As a consequence, certain ways 
of thinking were favoured whilst others were seen as inherently wrong. Positive thinking not 
only affixed itself to America’s inherently optimistic outlook, but simultaneously sought to 
reject any pessimistic references. It is with regard to this strand of thinking that one can most 
confidently state that the New Thought movement, in combination with the optimism of 
America’s founding colonists, have contributed greatly to one of the most conspicuous set of 
ideas in American culture today; and, more specifically, fed in postmodern writing—the 
generation within that which Saunders represents. 
By this reasoning, if one’s current situation or future prospects are looking bleak, it is 
not because they genuinely are, but because one is not thinking positively enough about them. 
In American culture, the self-help credo of positive thinking is ubiquitous. Just as a 
paracetamol may be the first solution for a headache, positive thinking is America’s solution 
for everything, which, as a result, includes headaches. In the context of neoliberalism, Saunders 
targets this often self-destructive way of thinking. In “Ask the Optimist!”, a story that 
originally featured in The New Yorker and was later published in The Braindead Megaphone, 
Saunders adopts the form of a typical self-help column where readers write in to ask for advice. 
In this case, the person offering counsel is an optimist. Like many of Saunders’ short and 
65 
 
highly-satirical pieces, the story places emphasis not on plot so much as on the language of an 
idea or system. The satiric approach of “Ask the Optimist!” is merely the surface of Saunders’ 
distinctive satire, and although it pointedly takes aim at this mode of thinking, the make-up of 
Saunders’ more complex satires target optimism within the framework of a neoliberal 
landscape. The story initially begins with individual letters with Saunders’ humour satirising 
the mundane:  
Dear Optimist: 
My husband, who knows very well that I love nothing more than wearing 
bonnets, recently bought a convertible. He’s always doing “passive-aggressive” 
things like this. Like once, after I had all my teeth pulled, he bought a big box 
of Cracker Jack. Another time, when I had very serious burns over 90 percent 
of my body, he tricked me into getting a hot oil massage, then tripped me so 
that I fell into a vat of hydrochloric acid. I’ve long since forgiven him for these 
“misunderstandings,” but tell me, is there a way I can be “optimistic” about this 
“bonnet” situation? (103) 
The humour here is surreal and witty as it describes what is a rather unusual situation. 
Although the writer is seeking an optimistic outlook, she is doing so in the face of situations 
that, despite her saying so, are most certainly not “passive-aggressive.” Additionally, the advice 
she seeks is not for the grotesque hydrochloric acid situation, but her disappearing bonnets. 
The response from the “Optimist” is equally irrational and serves to fulfil the writer’s request 
in nullifying the issue through positive thinking: “What I recommend? Buy a large number of 
bonnets, place them in the car, begin driving! When one blows off, put on another from your 
enormous stockpile!” (104). In facing the prospect of losing her bonnets, the response is to 
have more—not so much a solution as a digression of thought; and, perhaps, a way of refusing 
to address the situation. The optimist is Saunders’ satirical voice, offering hyperbolic advice 
that becomes increasingly ridiculous. 
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These short columns continue with regular letters from “Small-Penis”, a man seeking 
advice after his wife has left him for another man. Initially, Small-Penis admits to “feeling 
somewhat ‘pessimistic’” but, in repeated replies with the “Optimist”, it appears that Small-
Penis has reasons for his optimism, noting that his ex-wife’s new man “speaks five languages 
[including] Sanskrit” (107). The response from the Optimist is one of frustration:  
You know, Small-Penis, you don’t seem to understand Optimism at all! What is 
the essential quality of the Optimist? He is non-Pessimistic! What is the essential 
quality of the Pessimist? They think too much … If something is bothering me, 
I think of something else! If someone tells me some bad news? I ignore it! Like, 
I knew this one guy, very Optimistic, who was being eaten by a shark and did 
not even scream, but kept shouting, “It’s all for the best!” (107-108) 
Like Quimby and Emerson, the “Optimist” has contempt for Small-Penis’s perception that, 
although not essentially pessimistic, is most certainly not wholly optimistic. Worth 
consideration is Saunders’ distinctive capitalisation of both ‘optimism’ and ‘pessimism’. No 
longer merely nouns and adjectives, they have instead become proper nouns, serviceable as 
unique entities and branded states of being. Every personal problem in the story is wildly 
different, swerving from the absurd, to the mundane, and the downright tragic. However, this 
serves Saunders’ purpose to assert that optimism will not solve every problem. Even as the 
“Optimist” receives a letter from Satan written from Hell, the optimist ignores all evil in order 
to alleviate Satan’s loneliness (112). “Ask the Optimist!” most succinctly speaks directly to an 
American culture that is not only contemporary; instead it addresses an optimistic mode of 
thinking that is evident from the very beginning of the country’s founding through America’s 




Optimism and Neoliberalism 
“Ask the Optimist!” presents Saunders’ frustration with optimism, but this frustration is 
further refined in stories such as “Pastoralia” and “Exhortation”, which illuminate how 
destructive such optimism can be in a neoliberal landscape. Saunders pointedly proves that 
positivity is not happiness. Although the postmodern fascination with irony led many to 
believe in a world without conviction and meaning, the one American sensibility that remains 
steadfast is positive thinking. Americans are still viewed as positive thinking and optimistic. 
The aforementioned roots of American’s optimistic thinking have many Americans believe 
that regardless of their situation they will, at some point, be prosperous; but such thinking 
feeds into neoliberal ideology. Neoliberalism’s effect is its application of market logic to 
personal and social life, viewing human subjectivity through an entirely economic perspective. 
As Wendy Brown explains: 
Neoliberalism normatively constructs and interpellates individuals as 
entrepreneurial actors in every sphere of life. It figures individuals as rational, 
calculating creatures whose moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for 
‘self-care’ – the ability to provide for their own needs and service their own 
ambitions. (Brown n.p.) 
Not unlike the Protestant settlers in the New World, the neoliberal individual is one whose 
future self is predominantly viewed in terms of investment and possible outcomes. In this 
manner, neoliberalism demands people to be like products or capitalist corporations—in 
pursuit of endless growth. Positive thinking and reliance on self-care contributes to this market 
logic. Barbara Ehrenreich argues in her book Bright-sided (2009) that positive thinking has 
compromised America, threatening one’s ability to respond adequately to health concerns, 
employment issues, and even terrorist threats. This may appear a generalised claim correlating 
positive thinking with a certain type of optimistic delusion (there are certain aspects of such a 
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correlation that do warrant inspection) but Ehrenreich’s central claim is worthy of exploration, 
especially with regard to the tribulations faced by many of Saunders’ characters. In response 
to the argument that Americans are “positive” whilst not being the happiest people, 
Ehrenreich states: “positivity is not so much our condition or our mood as it is part of our 
ideology—the way we explain the world and think we ought to function within it” (Ehrenreich 
4). Positive thinking has permeated the corporate and business world, significantly affecting 
employer-to-employee relations. This, coupled with the effect of neoliberalism and one’s ever-
burning desire to achieve the American Dream, is the central topic of Saunders’ satire and the 
world in which many Americans find themselves in: idealism fraught with insecurity. 
Financial security, for some, is possible. For others, due to any number of other factors 
and circumstances, it is not. This runs contrary to the American Dream which is idyllic and 
idealistic though ultimately impractical and a rather simplistic way of viewing the world. 
Americans are fundamentally optimistic people. But this is problematic when material 
prosperity is considered the new Eden. In John Oliver and Andy Zaltzman’s satirical podcast, 
The Bugle, Oliver had this to say regarding the ever-widening wealth gap in the United States: 
There is an interesting psychological relationship that Americans have with 
money or, more specifically, the lack of it. The problem is: Americans are 
inherently optimistic people. And that can be a problem. Americans in the top 
fifth make 16.7 times the income of those in the bottom fifth. And yet, less than 
half of American think that wealth gap is a problem. The simple psychological 
explanation, Andy, is that everyone—even the poorest Americans—have the 
tendency to assume that one day they will be the richest Americans, and they 
don’t want their hypothetical wealth to be taxed in the future. They’re protecting 
income that doesn’t even exist yet! … ⁠ Americans are suicidally optimistic. Hope 
is their Kryptonite. (Oliver, n.p.) 
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Attesting to Tocqueville’s observation of America’s “charm of anticipated success,” Oliver is 
funny here, but he also quite cogently connects tenets of the American Dream that eventually 
become self-destructive in a country of neoliberal agendas and an ever-widening wealth gap 
(Tocqueville 474). People who forever see themselves as future billionaires have little regard 
for realistically assessing their current situation. Oliver later makes mention of a “great John 
Steinbeck quote,” which states that: “Socialism never took root in America because the poor 
see themselves not as an exploited proletariat, but as temporarily embarrassed millionaires,” 
which rather succinctly exposes the impossibility of a dream that, for some, can only be 
imagined (qtd. in Oliver n.p.). This is because if a person does not achieve the American 
Dream (or fails to believe in it) then they are the problem; their work ethic has failed to keep 
them on the path of prosperity. Positive thinking drives the American consumer to think that 
the American Dream is not earned but purchased; freedom isn’t a state but a commodity; and 
that companies, like individuals, will always have room for growth. Ehrenriech writes that: 
“Perpetual growth, whether of a particular company or an entire company, is of course an 
absurdity, but positive thinking makes it seem possible, if not ordained” (8). This strand of 
positive thinking’s relentless promotion in consumer culture is ubiquitous and controlling, 
evidenced in workplace policies and workplace communication. 
 
“Pastoralia” 
With this understanding of optimistic thinking in American culture, it is of interest as to how, 
and why, it appears to subtly determine the mindsets of Saunders’ characters. Americans are 
working now more than they ever have in the last century; and for less, too (Schor 4). In 
“Pastoralia” the unnamed narrator is forced to stay at work in an amusement park as kind of 
live-in arrangement with management. There are no explicit details as to when he visits his 
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family; the only communication the narrator has with those outside of the workplace is 
correspondence via fax with his wife. The story is a satire of America’s fascination with the 
spectacle, re-enactment of history, and also a satire of the treatment of the human body and 
mind under neoliberalism and corporate agendas. Abundant in absurdity and exaggeration, 
the piece is ripe for critique and humour: the conditions the narrator works in; the job 
required; the method by which he is asked to dispose of his bodily waste. All these show 
Saunders’ satiric vision of dehumanising an individual for comic effect. The narrator is acting 
as a caveman fighting for his survival through barbaric means. Yet the truth in this satire is 
that he is, quite literally, fighting for his social and economic survival in a workplace that, 
although dystopian, bears much resemblance to common practices in America since the 1970s. 
It is a traditional distorted reality, whereby the “fiction represents reality far better than the 
nonfiction does” (Pogell 466). Locked in a cave and treated like an animal, the narrator and 
his colleague, Janet, are made to work to survive but no more—nothing points to the 
fulfilment of their respective American dreams. The reader is graced with the knowledge that 
this absurd world told in a realist mode by Saunders is, quite explicitly, funny. But there is no 
hiding that if such a setting is changed, there would be a striking resemblance to many current 
workplace practices, particularly those of one of the most popular stores in American, Wal-
Mart. 
Wal-Mart, writes Ellen Rosen, has come to practise and has essentially perfected a 
robust control of the contemporary retail workplace which she has called “management by 
intimidation” (Rosen 63). Managers, she argues, are faced with imperatives to reduce costs, 
often resulting in understaffing. As a consequence, workers—who are part of what is called 
the “Wal-Mart Family”—are constantly time-poor and adjust their lives around a manager’s 
wishes. In “Pastoralia”, Saunders uses language to show the employer’s power over the 
workers: “Please,” the letter says, “only let’s remember that we are a family, and you are the 
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children, not that we’re saying you’re immature, only that you do most of the chores while we 
do all the thinking” (Pastoralia 48; emphasis mine). Moreover, poor employment relations 
results in a lack of experienced workers due to insufficient and subpar training. If a mistake is 
made by a worker, then it is they who take the blame: “Managers ‘delegate out’ jobs, and 
workers ‘take the fall.’ They can be fired when something goes wrong” (Rosen 36). This 
abusive management style may trickle down to the most mundane aspects of one’s 
employment. Women in Milwaukee have shared stories of these harsh management practices. 
One woman, a claims manager who had been working for Wal-Mart (part of the “family”), 
said: “I ended up getting fired for taking my break fifteen minutes early because I had to use 
the restroom. And I was pregnant, mind you. They called it time theft because it wasn’t my 
scheduled time to take my break” (Collins 105). This type of micro-management of the 
employee is described by Saunders in “Downtrodden Mary’s Failed Campaign of Terror”, 
wherein the narrator, after having to listen to her manager in his office, says: “When he’s done 
I tell him it was excellent and he reminds me to subtract the time spent listening to him from 
my time sheet so I don’t inadvertently get paid for it.” (CivilWarLand 80). Here, Mary, like 
Wal-Mart employees, is reminded that her worth is determined and influenced by time, the 
controlling clock of capitalism.  
Furthermore, it has been reported that Wal-Mart workers have been locked in when 
working overnight in situations where not one of the employees has a key to exit. The New 
York Times released an article exposing the plight of many who were victims of this practice. 
Michael Rodriguez, a worker in Corpus Christi, Texas, explains how he was unable to get to 
a hospital after heavy machinery had crushed his ankle, leaving him in terrible pain and unable 
to do his job. No other employee possessed a store key, and “[t]he fire exit … was hardly an 
option—management had drummed into the overnight workers that if they ever used that 
exit for anything but a fire, they would lose their jobs” (Greenhouse n.p.). The narrator’s 
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objective in “Pastoralia” is to care for his family and his sick son, yet none of his family 
members are present in the story as the whole narrative takes place at work. He is, like many 
working night-shifts at Wal-Mart, ‘locked in’, suffering erasure of personal space. Indeed, 
Saunders—through his distinctive style of treating regular places and things as commodified 
proper nouns—highlights this restriction of movement and space, directly: “I go into my 
Separate Area and put on my footies. I have some cocoa and take out a Daily Partner 
Performance Evaluation Form” (4). Personal space is granted to the employee like that of a 
prison cubicle. The threat of losing his job is his greatest anxiety, one that is intrinsically 
connected to his ability to care for his family. However, there is an argument that his own 
adherence to America’s ideology of positive thinking is quite possibly the only thing keeping 
him focused and employed; and, to the same degree, keeping him subjected to corporate 
cruelty by intimidation.  
From the outset, the narrator is not well: “Not that I’m doing so bad. Not that I really 
have anything to complain about. Not that I would actually verbally complain if I did have 
something to complain about. No. Because I’m Thinking Positive/Saying Positive” (1). The 
narrator, however, has clearly been silenced to a certain degree—intimidated into not being 
able to complain, instead forced to adopt the mentality of positive thinking and a Puritan work 
ethic. He, along with his co-worker Janet, share a cave in the amusement park wherein their 
daily task is to live like cave people, and to eat recently killed goats which come through a slot 
in the cave wall. Interestingly, despite their performance and dedication to the verisimilitude 
of the diorama, they have no direct, unmediated interaction with management. Instead, fax is 
the medium of choice for both characters to communicate with people who all exist outside 
of the cave. The outside world only enters into the cave through the slot or the fax machine. 
The voice of such corporate speak via fax is most typically a satire of the rhetoric of corporate 
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manipulation found in many office environments. The following example is a memo from 
management that appears through the slot with a goat: 
Please know that each one of you is very special to us, and are never forgotten 
about. Please know that if each one of you could be kept, you would be, if that 
would benefit everyone. But it wouldn’t, or we would do it, wouldn’t we, we 
would keep every one of you. But as we meld into our sleeker new organization, 
what an excellent opportunity to adjust our Staff Mix. And so, although in this 
time of scarcity and challenge, some must perhaps go, the upside of this is, some 
must stay, and perhaps it will be you. Let us hope it will be you, each and every 
one of you, but no, as stated previously, it won’t, that is impossible. So just enjoy 
the treats provided, and don’t worry, and wait for your supervisor to contact 
you, and if he or she doesn’t, know with relief that the Staff Remixing has passed 
by your door. (13-14) 
This is the first of a number of memos that interrupt the story. However, amidst the other 
subplots—the narrator’s relationship to Janet; the narrator’s sick child at home; Janet’s 
troubled son—it becomes difficult to ascertain just which conversation is being interrupted. 
The various elements of discourse in the story all used through different parties construct a 
simultaneously social and commercial ‘pull’ to the story; a structure that, like the characters’ 
work-life balance, is increasingly entangled. In “Pastoralia,” the ‘balance’ is quite purposefully 
an imbalance. The ‘life’ of the narrator is work; but Saunders shows that to not complain and 
think positively is paralysing and thus isolates the individual from others, slowly becoming 
dehumanised in the working environment. 
This paralysis by corporate rhetoric is subtly exaggerated throughout the piece, to the 
point where management feel confident enough to not provide a goat for the narrator and 
Janet to consume, instead leaving them with a memo detailing them to pay for the disposal of 
their own faeces: 
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Hence this note about a touchy issue that is somewhat grotesque and personal, 
but we must address it, because one of you raised it, the issue of which was why 
do we require that you Remote Attractions pay the money which we call, and 
ask that you call, the Disposal Debit, but which you people insist on wrongly 
calling the Shit Fee. Well, this is to tell you why, although isn’t it obvious to 
most? We hope. But maybe not. Because what we have found, no offense, is 
that sometimes you people don’t get things that seem pretty obvious to us, such 
as why you have to pay for your Cokes in your fridge if you drink them. Who 
should then? Did we drink your Cokes you drank? We doubt it. You did it. 
Likewise with what you so wrongly call the Shit Fee, because why do you expect 
us to pay to throw away your poop when after all you made it? Do you think 
your poop is a legitimate business expense? Does it provide benefit to us when 
you defecate? No, on the contrary, it would provide benefit if you didn’t, because 
then you would be working more. (46-7) 
[…] 
So therefore please stop saying to us: I have defecated while on the clock, 
dispose of it for free, kindly absorb my expense. We find that loopy. Because, as 
you know, you Remote Locations are far away, and have no pipes, and hence 
we must pay for the trucks. The trucks that drive your poop. Your poop to the 
pipes. Why are you so silly? It is as if you expect us to provide those Cokes for 
free, just because you thirst. (47) 
This extract mirrors the earlier example of the pregnant worker at Walmart who was accused 
of “time theft” for using the restroom when it was her scheduled break time (Collins 105). 
This language, whereby management explicitly employ depthless rhetorical questions (“Did 
we drink your Cokes you drank?”) coupled with an artificial sense of their ‘helping’ their 
employees, constructs a language predicated on influence and the power of persuasion. Alex 
Millen notes that Saunders’ “calculated manipulation of questions … is a rhetorical stroke 
[and] is an example of how language is used to construct consent by massaging affirmation” 
(Millen 9). And it conducts such manipulation with assistance from the form—the memo—
as a text within a text: a medium in which Saunders can playfully manipulate corporate speak 
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with satiric distortion. Sarah Pogell notes that the memo’s “robotic prose” makes it “the 
perfect medium for saying outrageous and inhumane things with a semblance of reasonability” 
(467). Moreover, Pogell notes a difference in the memoists and metafiction: 
Like postmodern writers who metafictionally enter their texts, the memoists 
intrude upon the fiction of Neanderthal life that they helped create, yet unlike 
the postmodernists, they question neither their authority nor their capacity to 
control the “characters” who, in this instance, work for them. (Pogell 467) 
While Saunders’ fiction does occasionally contain metafiction, such self-referentiality is 
contained through his characters and their voices. Rather than enter himself in the text, 
Saunders’ exaggerated corporate voice commands the story’s satire, often through the use of 
a memo. One may also read Pogell’s distinction as a revealing a key differences between 
‘generative’ and ‘degenerative’ satire. This use of the memo, and its appropriately satirised 
corporate voice, constitutes the whole of Saunders story, “Exhortation”. 
 
“Exhortation” 
In Voltaire’s Candide (1759), we meet a young boy named Candide who is indoctrinated by his 
tutor, Professor Pangloss, who espouses a philosophy of optimism. As a representation of 
unrestrained optimism, Pangloss believes that everything that happens is always for the best. 
Repeated refrains of optimism extend throughout the story: “all will be well” (24); “All is for 
the best” (86) in the “best of possible worlds” (96). Similarly, “All will be well and all will be 
well, etc., etc.” is the ending of Saunders’s story “Exhortation”, the most explicitly satirical in 
Tenth of December (89). In a memo, Todd—who seems like a nice guy caught in a morally 
ambiguous situation—addresses his staff, asking them to remain positive in their work in 
order to enjoy it. This sentence that closes the story before the signing of Todd’s name— “all 
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will be well”—cripples the reader whereby the irony destroys all hope that things really will be 
well. After reading Todd’s memorandum about “March Performance Stats”, the reader is 
thrust into the paralysing world of working in a system that does not wish to understand them, 
when positive thinking is amplified to conceal the inner workings of neoliberalism and the 
abuse of employer-to-employee relations. The memo begins in a very distinctive, satirical 
Saunders voice:  
“I would not like to characterize this as a plea, although it may start to sound 
like one (!). This fact is, we have job to do, we have tacitly agreed to do it (did 
you cash your last pay check, I know I did, ha ha ha)” (Tenth of December 83).  
Like the managers of the pre-history amusement park in “Pastoralia”, Todd has an 
exaggerated, amusing corporate voice, exposing the malevolent intentions of those in 
management positions. The voice connects literature to business. Just as employees are 
exhorted to satisfy their corporate bosses and those in management positions, so too is the 
reader. Despite the story being written in Todd’s voice, the reader is positioned to identify 
with the unnamed employees simply addressed as “Staff.” The story, like the memo, is binding: 
“all is well” is intentionally repeated in order to sustain the notion of Panglossian positive 
thinking in the face of almost anything else. Unlike Pangloss’s optimism, which is confronted 
throughout the story by way of natural disasters and cruel human behaviour, Todd’s ‘friendly’ 
tone and personal attitude is used to a deliver a corporate message that is used toward 
justifying and sustaining cruel human behaviour. 
Todd urges his staff to do their job well and he explains how to do this in three ways: 
the first is not be negative about it; the second is to express a positive mental attitude (even a 
‘natural’ attitude is discouraged); and, most importantly, not to think with regard to morals. 
Two examples are provided, the first detailing the correct mental state to clean a shelf: 
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Do I want to clean it happy, or do I want to clean it sad? … And what mental 
state helps me clean that shelf well and quickly? Is the answer: Negative? A 
negative mental state? You know very that it is not. So the point of this memo 
is: Positive. The positive mental state will help you clean that shelf well and 
quickly, thus accomplishing your purpose of getting paid. (84)  
Further, to not do so is to emulate Andy, who Todd shames for being “depressed … neurotic, 
and second guessing his actions” (87). Todd’s second example tells us he and his two friends 
had to lift a dead whale carcass onto a flatbed (84): “Now we all know that is hard. And what 
would be harder is: doing that with a negative attitude. What we found—Timmy and Vance 
and I—is that even with only a natural attitude, you are talking a very hard task” (85). The 
reader is outnumbered, with Todd mentioning other people who are part of his anecdote and 
supposedly agree with him. They were able to move this whale not with the mental fortitude 
of a natural or negative thinker, but with help of a former Marine whose wisdom is that the 
task is “mind over matter” and simply requires “getting psyched up” (85). Anecdotes like 
these, as mentioned, serve as the basis of Saunders’ criticism of  positive thinking and self-
improvement. According to Saunders, the destructive nature of thinking positively is that it 
removes deliberation, subjectivity, and circumstance, replacing these with unreflective 
compliance and moral aimlessness.  
Certainly, Todd enforces an overly instrumentalist (and manipulated) view of the 
world: “I’m saying let’s try not to dissect every single thing we do in term of ultimate 
good/bad/indifferent in terms of morals. The time for that is long past” (85). The omission 
of morals from directed action comes into conflict with regard to a “Room 6” (88). While the 
specific happenings of the cleaning that occurs is Room 6 is unknown, it is implied the work 
is sinister. “No one is walking out of Room 6 feeling perfectly okay,” Todd writes: “Even you 
guys, you who do what must be done in Room 6, don’t walk out feeling so super-great, I know 
78 
 
that, I’ve certainly done some things in Room 6 that didn’t leave me feeling so wonderful” 
(88). This is how Saunders describes his process regarding this story: 
It was just this idea, having worked in corporations, if your corporation was in 
charge of some sort of nefarious thing (which in America there certainly are 
already, like those mercenaries—the private military companies), you would 
manage that thing with jovial memos. So that was the premise. (Lee 2017: 81) 
Saunders picks the memo as the perfect medium for his satiric voice, where manipulative but 
cheerful letters are accentuated and exchanged as a front for some unethical activity; perhaps 
metaphorical for many corporations today. John Guillory explains that the memo, “gives 
directions, makes recommendations, but, above all, it is a means of transmitting information 
within the large bureaucratic structures organising virtually all work in modernity” (Guillory 
112). He concludes that although documents existed before modernity is it the dominion of 
the document that is a “feature of modernity” (113). As a replacement for the business letter, 
the memo was a form composed by intentionally “eliminating the polite but wordy 
conventions of the letter-writing tradition” (Yates 489). Todd’s memo, however, is personal, 
informal, and couched with a textual laughter: “I know I did, ha ha ha” (84); “Janice should 
have a new baby every week, ha ha” (87). This insertion of chatty qualities blurs the divide 
between Todd’s personal and professional roles, allowing him the personal rhetoric to conduct 
professional matter with an ulterior motive. As such the reader is aware of Todd’s insincere 
remarks about his staff’s well-being, comments that proffer the idea of self-exertion through 
self-improvement through positive thinking. If we are to follow Saunders’ belief that satire 
inversely praises what it depicts, then, in this case, Saunders demands sincerity and honesty. 
Entwined with thinking magically, Americans are reminded that “all will be well,” even if all 
is not well, even if all is orwellian, it will somehow still be well. Above all, such magical thinking 





While Saunders’ satire evidently addresses real world referents, such as positive thinking and 
neoliberalism, he is more specifically focused on how the manipulation of language is used to 
obfuscate reality and dehumanise the individual. The effectiveness of Saunders’ satire is 
heavily dependent on his awareness of modernity’s bureaucratic language and its ability to 
conceal truth. Robert McLaughlin writes: 
Franzen and Wallace agree that literature has been and continues to be valuable 
as a way of critiquing our social world, of finding ways to be human in it, and of 
truly connecting with others. This is a good way to think about the agenda of 
post-postmodernism, but only if we understand that all these things are 
mediated through language (McLaughlin 67).  
Saunders idiosyncratic corporate voices operate with this understanding, whereby he playfully 
turns everyday verbs and nouns into corporate speak. Writing in 2010, David Graeber notes 
that while “neoliberalism is a household word” few in the United States have heard of it (80). 
However, Graeber elucidates the language used in replacement of the term: “If you want to 
talk about the same issues, in fact, you are forced to reply on obvious propaganda terms like 
free trade, free-market reforms, or globalization. The bias in the first two is pretty obvious. You don’t 
put the word free in front of a name if you’re trying to be neutral about it” (80).  
Graeber’s observation indicates the ubiquity of the financialisation of language 
whereby previously understood terms become buried under corporate jargon in non-neutral 
ways. Writing of the “financialisation of public discourse,” Rojhat Avsar observes that “we 
refer to language favourable to the interests of the financial industry,” a shift accompanied by 
neoliberal policies in the 1970s (240). Avsar begins with the question, “What happens if we 
substitute the word ‘death tax’ for ‘estate tax’?” (239). Whilst both refer to the same thing, 
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each have varying connotations to elicit different responses. To borrow George Carlin’s term, 
we can refer to this as “soft language”—euphemisms that “[take] the life out of life” to 
“conceal sins” (Carlin, 1990: n.p.). According to Carlin:  
American English is loaded with euphemisms, because Americans have a lot of 
trouble dealing with reality. Americans have trouble facing the truth, so they 
invent a kind of a soft language to protect themselves from it. And it gets worse 
with every generation. (n.p.) 
Providing whimsical examples, such as when “toilet paper became bathroom tissue” or 
“constipation became occasional irregularity,” Carlin details the evolution of “shell shock” 
from its concise two-syllable origin to “battle fatigue” then “Operational Exhaustion” then 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, where “pain is buried under jargon” (n.p.) People are no 
longer “broke” but have “have a negative cash flow position”; not “fired” but “management 
wanted to curtail redundancies in the human resources area” (n.p.).  
 Carlin’s stand-up bit was perhaps influenced by Orwell who, in his essay “Politics and 
the English language”, provides similar examples of euphemism: 
Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads 
with no more than they can carry: this is called transfer of population or 
rectification of frontiers. People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot 
in the back of the neck or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber camps: this is 
called elimination of unreliable elements. (Orwell 136) 
According to Orwell, “political language [consists] largely of euphemism, question-begging 
and sheer cloudy vagueness” (136). The point here is that this type of language, so heavy in 
euphemism, is intentionally vague in order to direct attention from what it is supposed to be 
signifying. The outcome of this “cloudy vagueness” is insincerity, as Orwell further explains:   
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The inflated style itself is a kind of euphemism. A mass of Latin words falls upon 
the facts like soft snow, blurring the outline and covering up all the details. The 
great enemy of clear language is insincerity. When there is a gap between one’s 
real and one’s declared aims, one turns as it were instinctively to long words and 
exhausted idioms, like a cuttlefish spurting out ink. (137) 
Saunders has stated that “acronyms and euphemisms [are] elaborate ways of talking around 
unpleasant realities or hiding agendas” (Saunders and Derby 90-1). As if to continue the attack 
on euphemism following Orwell and Carlin, Saunders satirises this propaganda-like language 
to “inverse[ly] praise” a language of sincerity (Z. Smith, 2017). Saunders’ comical adoption of 
capitalised nouns allows political language to be infused in the minds of his characters, who 
are forced to believe and repeat such euphemisms.  
The ‘soft language’ of corporate rhetoric and power are essential devices in 
“Pastoralia” that help management obscure and misrepresent reality. Sarah Powell has written 
of Saunders’ “fascination with corporate discourse and its misrepresentations of reality” 
(Pogell 461). Indeed, Saunders’ attention to language, tone, and register are essential to the 
creation of his dystopian landscape. The vernacular of the managerial characters in his stories, 
particularly in “Pastoralia”, parodies the corporate register by way of distortion, exaggerating 
its influence so as to appear as part of everyone’s native vernacular. Clare Hayes-Brady 
appropriately notes that: “those who control the theme park’s vocabulary control its running” 
(Hayes-Brady 28). In the Neanderthal theme park, the workers are required to complete a 
“Daily Partner Performance Evaluation Form” (58). When the narrator, at the urging of 
management, correctly files an unfavourable report on his partner Janet after she breaks 
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character in front of visitors, the form is later used to complete her dismissal.6 Janet is replaced 
by a woman named Linda who refuses to risk her job security by breaking protocol, even so 
far as refusing to shake the narrator’s hand upon introduction: “She frowns at my hand, like: 
Since when do cave people shake hands?” (65). Where Linda refuses to speak, Janet spoke too 
often and in ways that were disruptive to the environment. Hayes-Brady asserts that: “By 
reason of her uncontrolled vocabulary, Janet occupies the position of Foucauldian madman 
in the oppressive linguistic system of the theme park: the content of her speech is irrelevant 
because it disrupts the embedded communicative structures of the theme park system” (29). 
In the memos sent from management, the language is largely imperative, used to persuade and 
command subordination. Yet, the very act of speaking in “Pastoralia”, even in a non-
antagonistic manner, is considered insubordination and a threat against the employer.7 
Language is thus intrinsically linked to job performance which, by way of suppression, 
provides a contemporary critique of the American workplace. Furthermore, in the last memo 
from management, the narrator is given instructions: “[W]hat you’d want to ask yourself is: 
Am I Thinking Positive / Saying Positive? Am I giving it all I’ve got? Am I doing even the 
slightest thing wrong?” (63). The capitalisation, so very common in Saunders’ stories, is an 
extension of the corporate rhetoric where marketing language and its repetition become 
 
6 With respect to the precariousness of the role the narrator is employed in, it is most evident that the 
overarching tension within the story are feelings of complicity and uncertainty. The other characters who 
feature in the text have all left by the story’s end; and Janet’s removal from her position is prominent in 
the story’s arc as the narrator is forced to step up in ‘acting’ to match that of his over-enthusiastic new 
cave partner. Those who survive in “Pastoralia” are not those who succeed at thinking positively, but 
those who are willing to sacrifice their own subjectivity. 
 
7 It must be noted that the managers of the park do not appear in person at all in the story—their existence is 
solely through the written text of their memos. 
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mantras—a business-like survival tool rooted in American optimism, situated within 
“corporate discourse” (Hayes-Brady 31), and used toward effective persuasion. 
The self-help genre consistently uses soft language as a means of persuasion, 
particularly those concerned with helping people live their lives prosperously, both socially 
and financially (the two are usually inseparable, as one often is understood to impact the 
other.) Saunders’ satirical criticisms of positive thinking extend to both older and 
contemporary works in the genre. Dale Carnegie’s How to Win Friends and Influence People (1936) 
was seminal in paving the way for similar self-help books both in the United States and around 
the world. Carnegie was born Carnegy but later changed his name to resemble the same 
spelling as Andrew Carnegie, the industrialist and philanthropist whose company extended 
the steel industry in the late-nineteenth century. This change of name is perhaps the first 
marker of Dale Carnegie’s adherence to the ‘benefits’ of deception, not necessarily deception 
of the self, but of others. How to Win Friends is comprised of four parts with each chapter of 
each part detailing certain principles that the reader should heed in order to accomplish the 
‘winning’ of friends and the ‘influencing’ of people. However, nowhere does the book pay any 
attention to morals. Rather, the wielding of influence is all about the manipulation of another 
person, and it does this through a strong acceptance of anecdotes provided as ‘evidence’ to 
believe Carnegie’s principles are effective. In the chapter “Making People Glad to Do What 
You Want,” Carnegie uses an example of getting a person to clean a stockroom:  
When you make your request, put it in a form that will convey to the other 
person the idea that he personally will benefit … Will John be happy about doing 
what you suggest? Probably not very happy, but happier than if you had not 
pointed out the benefits. (Carnegie 272) 
Carnegie’s chapter closes with “Principle 9”, which declares: “Make the other person happy 
about doing the thing you suggest” (279). This passage would be equally fitting in  
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“Exhortation,” as Todd states by complaining about a job, or doing it poorly, makes the job 
“more difficult than it really is” (84), thus insinuating that by removing moral concerns, one 
removes problems altogether. Carnegie’s book and Todd’s memo operate on this formula: 
bold opinion, anecdote, and more bold assertions for communication with other people 
(through a mode of manipulation).  
The memo sent to the employees in “Pastoralia” operates with a similar formula 
regarding the “Shit Fee”: 
And so help us help you, by not whining about your Disposal Debit, and if you 
don’t like how much it costs, try eating less. … And by the way, we are going to 
be helping you in this, by henceforth sending less food. We’re not joking, this is 
austerity. (48) 
Saunders is having fun with an absurd idea, but he, too, is not joking. In spite of such 
treacherous working conditions, it appears to have had little impact on the narrator’s positive 
outlook, which is so rooted in American optimism and the New England Way. Amidst the 
anxieties of the narrator’s working life there is also his ongoing concern for his sick son, 
Nelson, who we are told—via a fax from his wife Louise—has swollen legs but stands staring 
out the window saying “where is Daddy, why is he never here?” (35). Kasia Boddy proposes 
that the fact the narrator imitates a caveman to afford his son’s medical costs “is perhaps a 
comment on the stone-age condition of the American health-care system” (Boddy 4). By the 
story’s end, the reader is reminded of the story’s beginning, with a committed positive outlook 
toward all things (“Thinking Positive/Saying Positive”) (1). Upon hearing earlier news that 
Nelson was suffering from a complete loss of mobility, and the fact that the narrator has to 
wait another five hours before retreating to his Separate Area, the narrator remains positive. 
The reason is because he has to make a good impression on Linda, his new co-worker, so as 
not to jeopardise his own employment like Janet did, by letting personal problems interfere 
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with work. The separation and firing of workers in the cave point to a fragmented working 
class in the neoliberal landscape. Yet, despite all adversity, he appears unworried: “[It’s] not a 
problem. Because I’m Thinking Positive / Saying Positive” (66). There is a certain amount of 
self-deception at work in order to remain positive despite all adversity. What is ‘real’ is 
irrelevant if all one needs to do in order to think positive is to believe, or force oneself to behave 
as if one believed. 
Indeed, the verisimilitude of “Pastoralia”, where the employees are pretending to 
accurately depict a diorama of a pre-historic time, is also at work in the minds of the characters 
via the manipulation of language. Where the beginning of the story sees the narrator feast on 
a goat, the ending shows the shallow nature of reality in an environment guided by selfish 
direction. Rather than giving less food, management send literal fake food. Upon hearing a 
“huge clunk in the Big Slot”, Janet feels relieved and hopes it is “a big thing of Motrin” (49). 
However, rather than medication to alleviate the pains of hunger, management have sent a 
plastic goat with a predrilled hole where the spit is able to be placed through: 
In terms of austerity, No goat today. In terms of verisimilitude, mount this fake 
goat and tend as if real. Mount well above fire to avoid burning. In event of 
melting, squelch fire. In event of burning, leave area, burning plastic may release 
harmful fumes. (49) 
It is a simulacrum, the beginnings of a path toward hyperreality where language is attuned to 
a voice of directives. This satire of corporate psychobabble with the repetition of “in terms 
of” and the sentence beginning with “in event of” detail commands like the abbreviated, 
concise directions in an instruction manual or self-help book.  
David Huebert, writing in the context of animal studies and post-humanist thinking, 
classifies “Pastoralia” (along with “CivilWarLand in BadDecline”) as a “biopolitical dystopia” 
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where its most important aspect is the “prominent play of spectacle and spectatorship” 
(Huebert 106). Huebert reads “Pastoralia” as a “human zoo” with specific emphasis on the 
consumption of meat, asserting: “The politics of meat consumption is not simply a sub-text 
of ‘Pastoralia’ but a central aspect of Saunders’s critique of modern human life” (113). In this 
scene, when our naive narrator places the fake goat above the fire, Hubert remarks that this 
is where the “bureaucracy of human meat-consumption reaches an apex of inanity” (113). He 
concludes that, “[t]he task of making the prosthetic goat appear real simply makes explicit 
what had been implicit all along: the absolute lack of reality in this performance” (113). Even 
beyond the human-studies context, this comment holds true with regard to persistent binaries 
between expectations and reality.  
Indeed, in attempting to think positive to alleviate troubles, the narrator has believed 
in a positive thinking experience that has culminated in his further immersion into a 
simulacrum. These dichotomies between life and work, real and fake, truth and lies, reach 
their completion in a sentence from management explaining that, “Truth is that thing which makes 
what we want to happen happen.” (62). Such a philosophy offers self-deception and mimics 
Puysegur’s definition of mesmerism and the self-help tactic espoused by Dale Carnegie. 
Furthermore, the stories of “Sea Oak” and “Pastoralia”, like many of Saunders’ stories, begin 
with ethos of a Horatio Alger novel; but, unlike maintaining Alger’s rags-to-riches narrative 
predicated upon a Puritan work ethic, Saunders’ protagonists stop short of any riches or 
security, thus laying bare the precarious nature of contemporary America under neoliberalism. 
The ethos these characters possess—that of thinking positively and working hard—is revealed 
to be remarkably inadequate, and even destructive. Saunders’ satire exists largely through 
strong elements of surrealism, humour, and satiric targets with real-world referents; but, he 
does not stop short of supplementing his satire with compassion and empathy, defining 
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characteristics of his satire that I will discuss in the following chapter. Further, such 
compassion appears to offer hope for a better world. 
There are utterances throughout Saunders’ stories of this sincere hope that things will 
get better. In “Puppy,” Marie, a wealthy woman who was once poor, visits a home to purchase 
a dog. The seller, Callie, by contrast, is not wealthy; objects like a “spare tire on the dining-
room table” and a “crankshaft on a cookie sheet” indicate domestic disorder and a work-life 
imbalance (Tenth of December 38; 41). In addition, Marie notices Callie’s son, Bo, tied to a tree 
in the backyard and forced to drink water from a dog’s bowl. Whilst the story hints at a reason 
why this is the case, Marie yearns to tell Bo that: “Life will not necessarily be like this. Your 
life could suddenly blossom into something wonderful. It can happen. It happened to me” 
(41). Ambrose Bierce, in his The Devil’s Dictionary (1906), defines “FUTURE, n.” as: “That 
period of time in which our affairs prosper, our friends are true and our happiness is assured” 
(Bierce 112). However, unlike Bierce, Marie is sincere in her evocation of hope for Bo. It is a 
hope inherited from America’s fascination with optimism, of rags-to-riches and the American 
dream—a hope no longer adequate, and not applicable to everyone. Marie, spooked by Bo’s 





Chapter Three: “A Radical Defense of Tenderness”: Saunders’ Affective 
Amendment 
In spite of everything, I still believe people are really good at heart 
Anne Frank 
We are obviously a disease … Like syphilis with a conscience, we should stop reproducing 
Kurt Vonnegut 
Introduction 
By way of returning to criticism of “Sea Oak,” David Rando writes of the ability of Saunders’ 
fiction “to undermine class ontologies” (438). Rando continues by stating that this is “often 
through powerfully affective moments of formal collision” (438). Indeed, these “powerfully 
affective moments” of Saunders’ fiction have been described as a “radical defence of 
tenderness” in a television interview with Stephen Colbert (“George Saunders Has a Nun in 
His Head”). On the dustjacket to Tenth of December Saunders quotes Anton Chekhov’s belief 
in the purpose of art, one that embodies the modernist notion of the short story: “It should 
... prepare us for tenderness. And in this regard it starts, I think, with intention … Our 
intention is to crack life open for just a second.” In this chapter, I argue that despite the joyless 
settings and environments that Saunders depicts in his stories, such bleak settings are used 
toward provoking empathy and hope—Saunders’ own optimism—through their persuasive 
creation of affect. In its simplest form, this may seem to offer the reader a way out of the 
darkness of the absurd and twisted worlds he has us inhabit, but it may also come by way of 
contradiction given that, as previously discussed, Saunders’ stories often criticise America’s 
optimism and history of thinking positively. Certainly, Saunders satirises optimism founded 
on consumerism and financial prosperity, but he appears reluctant to cast all manners of 
thinking positively aside. Instead, Saunders presents a version of his own hopeful thinking 
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which—whether delusional or not—proffers hopefulness in the individual and human spirit, 
if one is to explore their empathetic side. In spite of his biting satire, Saunders frequently 
suggests that even the voices being satirised are worth being properly understood with context; 
his empathetic reform, however, is no sure resolution to society’s ills. “In general,” writes 
Leonard Feinberg, “satirists are much more skilful at pointing out weaknesses than in 
defending … When satirists go in for therapeutics, they usually botch up the job.” (1963: 287). 
Vonnegut, for example, has stated that he has been criticised “for pointing out the weaknesses 
of society without offering solutions” (Conversations 60). Observing incongruities is a different 
task to providing a solution to them. Certainly, satire should not be expected to resolve 
society’s ills; but it is clear that Saunders’ satire differs from his predecessors because his 
attempt at encouraging transformation through narrative empathy is, rather, a positive and 
optimistic alternative. Saunders’ approach to satire expands upon simpler understandings of 
generative and degenerative satire by utilising their characteristics toward a moral, 
compassionate, and empathetic engagement with his reader. 
 Joshua Ferris, in his introduction to the 2016 edition of CivilWarLand in Bad Decline, 
writes of the “all-too-common mistake critics make when talking about Saunders, which is to 
call him a satirist in the early style of Mark Twain” (Ferris xiv). Indeed, the many reviews and 
testimonials of Saunders, as quoted in the first chapter, all contain two similar themes: 
Saunders’ undoubted originality, and his work as a continuation of Twain, Pynchon, and 
Vonnegut—all notably either generative or degenerative satirists. In rectifying this comparison 
to satirists of the past, Ferris argues that Saunders’ fiction goes beyond satire:  
[W]hile Saunders does satirise, or, in other words, render the real absurd, he also 
carefully and lovingly and artfully renders the absurd real, which is a much harder 
trick to pull off and, once done, moves the so-called satirist out of the 
pigeonhole and in to the open air of the first-rate artist. (xiv) 
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The adverbs “lovingly and artfully” distinguish Saunders’ satire from Juvenal’s anger, or much 
satire of the nineteenth century. In stories which depict the utter dehumanisation of the 
individual under neoliberalism, as in “Pastoralia,” Saunders “renders the absurd real,” by way 
of writing compassionate fiction that attempts to humanise and familiarise another person 
through empathy. Satire is one part of Saunders’ art, and as a consequence, does not constitute 
its whole. 
Ferris is not the only writer to refrain from reading Saunders as a satirist. There is, as 
critics often suggest, something more to Saunders’ satire, which, unsurprisingly, is what 
Saunders himself appears to hope for. Yet, like satirists before and after him, Saunders is not 
necessarily comfortable with the description, stating: 
I’ve just learned to accept it, inaccurate as I feel it might be. To me, satire is 
more one-dimensional and sure of its relation to its subject. I’ve always – always 
– thought of myself as a fiction writer with comic inclinations. So this recurring 
identification as a satirist doesn’t really bother me but I can’t do much with it. 
(Saunders, The White Review, n.p.) 
His indifference to the term, like any classification, derives from what he perceives to be the 
limitation it imposes on the reading of a text: “[If] someone feels that’s all I’m doing [satire] – 
that that’s the primary mission – then I’ve failed” (n.p.). Sam Lipsyte is perhaps the only writer 
who has explicitly sought to displace Saunders from the continuing classification, writing in 
his testimonial for The Brief and Frightening Reign of Phil:  
Many critics refer to Saunders as a satirist, and though the term is often used in 
conjunction with names like Swift and Twain, it can also be a trap. The world a 
satirist creates, some charge, is only a prediction or, at best, a distortion, as 
though all successful art isn’t about distorting, or bending, reality. Another word 
that gets fastened to Saunders is moralist. These two terms are often intertwined, 
of course. At the core of much satire is some kind of prescription. Still, even if 
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correct, these two labels, the limitations of the first and the taint of the scold in 
the second, don’t do justice to Saunders. His bleak but merciful stories contain 
a great deal more than satire, or at least the toothless send-ups that often stand 
in for satire … (Lipsyte n.p.)  
Here, Lipsyte—perhaps channelling his own personal frustration with artistic classifications—
uses his review of The Brief and Frightening Reign of Phil to contest the restriction of the term, 
simultaneously arguing that Saunders’ satire, even if an apt description, must be understood 
to operate outside of its conventional use. Whilst few of Saunders’ works reveal themselves 
strictly as satires, mainly because of their brevity and limited perspectives—“Ask the 
Optimist!”, “My Amendment”, “Exhortation” to name a few examined in this thesis—the 
majority of Saunders’ fiction  attempts something beyond the humorous exposure of vice and 
folly, and thus provides more than a “one-dimensional” approach to its subject and theme. In 
doing so, it not only possesses an identifiable moralism, but also a prescription laced with 
emotion—an intensely affective aesthetic component to Saunders’ satiric critique. The effect 
of Saunders’ satire is its production of affect. For Saunders, his reputation as a satirist is a 
thorn in his side (Ward n.p.). Despite this, it is unjust to encapsulate Saunders’ affective, 
compassionate fiction as still within satire’s protean nature, nor view Saunders’ satire as 
representative of certain post-postmodern poetics, just as theorists have challenged definitions 
of satire. 
 
The Results of Satire 
While John Dryden stated that “the true end of satire is the amendment of vices by correction” 
(93), the effects of satire, particularly its ability to transform and provoke change, have 
consistently been questioned by scholars. Dustin Griffin writes that satire is “open-ended” 
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and “more inclined to ask questions than to provide answers” (5). Ruben Quintero, on the 
other hand, addresses the question of satire’s responsibility in resolution:  
[The] satirist is not obligated to solve what is perceived as a problem or replace 
what is satirically disassembled or unmasked with a solution. It is missing the 
mark to claim, as some have done, that Joseph Heller’s World War II novel 
Catch-22 (1961) is not satirical because it offers no alternative to the self-
defeating logic of an inescapable Catch-22. (3) 
Evidently, the satirist is not required to solve dissimulation, vice, and folly, for wars still exist 
after Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five (1969). Furthermore, in an interview with The Library of 
Congress, musician Randy Newman—famous for his heavily satirical and ironic songs—
sarcastically expresses this sentiment:  
The amount of songs I’ve written about race—y’know the racial divide in the 
country—uh, I would’ve never dreamed I would have written so many of them, 
and I think I’m all done. I mean, my songs have pretty much solved the problem, 
and I don’t have to do it anymore. Everyone gets along now. (Newman n.p.) 
The satirist’s responsibility is, as previously mentioned, that of raising awareness and exposing 
vice and folly. As Newman sarcastically suggests, the satirist’s job is not in the practical nature 
of resolution, thus Newman’s art should not be expected to resolve the themes his music 
addresses, whether that be slavery, racism, or financial inequality. Likewise, Saunders’ stories 
are clearly not policy-making documents that will subsequently overthrow the ills of late 
capitalism and mass consumerism. Like that of a smoke detector, the satirist’s alarm is loud in 
their claims of human and societal degradation. Certainly, just as it is unjustifiable to expect a 
smoke detector to also eradicate a fire’s blaze, it is equally unfair to anticipate immediate 
transformation at the conclusion of a satiric work.  
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 However, in spite of satire’s (or the satirist’s) abdication of the requirement to resolve 
its complaints, generative satire’s function can be understood to be transformative, even 
though it may not afford either society or the reader with any objective resolution. David 
Worcester sees this resolution as laughter with purpose, stating that the laughter of comedy is 
rather “purposeless,” whereas the “laughter of satire is directed toward an end” (37). Likewise, 
M. H. Abrams elucidates this sense of satire’s purpose in his Glossary of Literary Terms: “The 
diverse types of satire are didactic in that they are designed, by various devices of ridicule, to 
alter the reader’s attitudes toward certain types of people, institutions, products, and modes 
of conduct” (65). Abrams uses the words “designed” and “alter”, but what he is writing about 
is intentional persuasion, comparable to the “consensus-building” approach that 
Weisenburger discussed with regard to generative satire’s rhetorical nature (2). Moreover, 
Edward Allan Bloom and Lillian D. Bloom title their study of satire, Satire’s Persuasive Voice 
(1979), wherein they suggest the “capacity of some satire to effect a gradual moral 
reawakening, a reaffirmation of positive social and individual values” (16). “If we are moved 
positively by satire,” they write, “we respond to a plea for a return to our senses, moral, 
intellectual, and aesthetic” (Bloom and Bloom 16-19). This is a grand description of 
transformation that favours satire’s rhetorical nature by way of assuming that “some satire” 
can provoke a “moral awakening” (19). Interestingly, this image of the satirist as a custodian 
of virtue is evidenced in a seventeenth-century theory of satire, which depicts the satirist as a 
physician who administers a “medicinable morall”, a rather apt description for many satirists 
(Randolph 143). Likewise, by keeping his books short, Kurt Vonnegut strived to have his 
stories read by people in political power, simply because he was aware that those in politics 
have little time to read larger works of fiction. “I’ve worried some about why write books 
when Presidents and generals do not read them,” Vonnegut said, “and the university 
experience taught me a very good reason: you catch people before they become generals and 
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Senators and Presidents, and you poison their minds with humanity. Encourage them to make a 
better world” (Vonnegut 5; original emphasis). Saunders, too, is trying to make a better world. 
“He is trying to change the way people think,” says Professor Richard Mills, “in a very subtle 
fashion” (Mills n.p.). Indeed, the transformation and resolution here is not that of resolving 
the satiric target, but of rousing awareness in the audience. It is mental not physical. As such, 
satiric reform must be considered as “conceptual and figurative” rather than a literal 
proposition” (Bloom and Bloom 18). There is no doubt that Saunders’ intent is to provoke 
change, but his method of persuasion through affect is of peculiar interest. 
“The final test for satire,” asserts Gilbert Highet, “is the typical emotion which the 
author feels and wishes to evoke in his readers. It is a blend of amusement and contempt. In 
some satirists, the amusement outweighs the contempt” (Highet 21). Highet argues that 
satirists, by critiquing society, differ not just in tone, but in the emotion their audience is 
presumed to feel. Similarly, Arthur Pollard in Satire (1970) states that satirists move readers to 
“criticize and condemn” through “various emotions ranging from laughter through ridicule, 
contempt and anger to hate” (47). This sense of feeling is how scholars often explain the 
differences between Juvenalian and Horatian satire: Juvenal’s satire is rather indignant and 
personal, attempting to rouse anger in the reader, whilst on the other hand Horace’s satire is 
received in a more tolerant manner that seeks a wry smile with its ridicule, devoid of Juvenal’s 
harshness. Writing of Henry Miller, Highet likens Miller’s “passion for obscenity” with that 
of Aristophanes and Rabelais but stops short of aligning their satire any further: “The 
difference is that in spite of its absurdities and hypocrisies they love mankind. Miller, like Swift, 
believes that humanity is a filthy crime” (50). Here we have a difference not just of a satire’s 
rhetorical, linguistic, and literary components, but of satire’s effect; and, more importantly, of 
differing affect that is produced in the reader. Saunders, as I will explore, seeks to elicit love 
and empathy rather than condemnation from his reader. This focus on tenderness and readerly 
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engagement echoes the many sentiments of postmodern writers who sought, and still seek, a 
space beyond postmodernism, especially Saunders’ conception of the reader entering a “black 
box” where “something important … happens to the reader” upon entry and exit (Braindead 
Megaphone 78). In classifying satirists, Highet refers to Jonathan Swift and posits that, for Swift, 
“all reality … was debased,” saying that he: 
… could not believe that human beings would ever make use of their capacities 
for kindness, reason, and nobility; and, although outwardly a member of the 
Christian church, he believed so strongly in original sin and so little in the 
supernatural that he saw, neither in his own faith nor in its founder, any 
possibility of redemption. (Highet 160) 
In this vein, we may consider Swift’s work—particularly A Modest Proposal (1729)—to have 
the anger of Juvenal but little in the way of reformation or transformation. Unlike the works 
of Feinberg and Frye, Highet’s influential study reserves space for a brief discussion of this 
dissimilarity among satirists (and within their oeuvre), with Highet dividing satirists into two 
types: the “misanthropic satirist” and the “optimist” (235), primarily categorised with regard 
to their opinions of evil. The misanthropic satirist, he argues, “looks at life and finds it, not 
tragic, nor comic, but ridiculously contemptible and nauseatingly hateful” (235). On the other 
hand, the optimist, “believes that folly and evil are not innate in humanity, or, if they are, they 
are eradicable” (235); whilst laughing and sneering, they “persuade more than they denounce” 
(237). Furthermore, these two types of satirists indicate two rather divergent purposes for 
satire: “The optimist writes in order to heal, the pessimist in order to punish. One is a 
physician, the other an executioner” (237). Such a classification of satirists and their work is 
admittedly rather narrow, rejecting the many nuances abundant (which Highet does point out) 
and thus it is important to remember that a satirist may write one work as a misanthrope and 
the next as an optimist.  
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Saunders’ fiction, however, does not differ wildly from misanthropic to optimistic. 
Weisenburger notes that “despite all its surface disorder or its outright meanness, traditional 
satire was both written and read in hopes of a return to order and grace” (14)—a sentiment 
most obviously shared by Saunders, who situates grace as the antithesis of capitalism. “I ended 
up working for engineering companies,” says Saunders, “and that’s where I found my material, 
in the everyday struggle between capitalism and grace” (Solomon n.p.). While Saunders is 
vocal in his criticism of capitalism, his stories, like traditional satire, can be read to provoke a 
hopeful, emotional transformation. Those in CivilWarLand in Bad Decline (1997) are arguably 
more preoccupied with surrealism in his satire and a particular playfulness as a way to satirise 
capitalist structures. By comparison, Tenth of December (2010) is his most sentimental collection 
yet. The artifice, the reconstruction, and the amusing hyperreal worlds of CivilWarLand still 
remain in Saunders’ fiction, but only to a limited extent. As Saunders’ satiric setting and tone 
has changed, it has gradually been supplanted by a much stronger sentimental streak, and a 
hopefulness that is distinctively Saunders’—an advocation of moral being predicated upon the 
notion that empathy can provoke change for a better world. 
 
The Very Persistent Gappers of Frip 
This turn toward affect, and a continual advocation for human kindness in provoking change, 
is particularly evident in Saunders lesser-known novella, The Very Persistent Gappers of Frip 
(2000), a cautionary tale written for children.8 Centred around a young girl, Capable, the story 
tells of Capable and her father’s struggles to remain financially afloat as “gappers” continue to 
 
8 The fact that this book is written for children is perhaps reason for the story’s more pronounced and overt 
turn toward affect. However, while the story’s content is void of the crude language and violence in 
Saunders’ story collections, the satirical targets and affective intentions operate in a similar fashion.  
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attack their goats. Their situation is pitted against their neighbours, The Romos and the 
Ronsens, who, unlike Capable, possess a disposition of selfishness that is imbued by a puritan 
work ethic without regard to circumstance, a gesture toward the conservative politics of 
WASP America. “I believe we make our own luck in this word,” Sid Ronsen says (35). His 
luck, it is expressed, is symptomatic of his hard work; his hard work thus a sign of deserved 
privileges: “I believe that when my yard is suddenly free of gappers, why, that is because of 
something good I have done. Because … I have always been a hard worker” (35). Echoes of 
Calvinism and the Protestant work ethic are certainly evident. Put simply, the Romos and 
Ronsens do not believe in luck, for to do so would be an admission of circumstance that, 
perhaps, no two comparisons of hard work are identical, nor the benefits that such work 
yields.  
When Capable asks her more fortunate neighbours for assistance with her “gapper” 
problem, she is sent a letter, stating: “We regret to inform you that, although we are very 
sympathetic to your significant hardships, don’t you think it would be better if you took 
responsibility for your own hardships?” (36). This letter—a popular medium for Saunders’ 
idiosyncratic satire—could equally have come from any other Saunders story, particularly the 
corporate speak in “Pastoralia” or “Exhortation.” Moreover, it is notable how often Saunders 
uses the language of sympathy in such letters, which serves to show its difference from 
empathy, and also reveal the artificial nature of apology and regret in managerial speak. 
Capable, as a character, is also composed of the same subjugated characteristics that make up 
Saunders’ other oppressed, working-class characters, albeit younger for the book’s target 
audience. We learn that earlier, before the gapper problem worsened, “her mother had died” 
(8) and we are given a sympathetic observation: “It was a hard life, and it made her tired” (10). 
In response to Capable’s gapper problem, her closest neighbours, the Romos, physically move 
their house further away so as to not share Capable’s problem, simultaneously refusing to help 
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her. They do this under the belief that their lack of a gapper problem is the result of a 
“miracle,” openly “thanking God for giving us whatever trait we have that keeps us so free of 
gappers” (17, 49). The refusal to help Capable, even when moving their house is the other 
option, is humorously depicted in Saunders’ dialogue:  
“…Are those gappers our gappers? Are those goats our goats?” 
“They certainly are not. They are her goats and her gappers, as indicated by the 
fact that they are in her yard. Is her yard our yard? I think not.” 
“I feel that our yards are our yards,” said Bea Romo. (33) 
Here, there is a level of redundancy in the language which is tied to the notion of private 
property and possession, and the logic of affect. It does not make sense for Bea to say “I feel” 
with regard to the ownership of yards, yet this element of affect has crept into a discourse 
which emphasises individual responsibility, working against the idea of shared feeling. The 
repetition between these characters is comical, exaggerated to the point of being ridiculous, 
especially when Sid advises Capable to “work harder,” demanding her to: “Be more efficient 
than you’ve even been before. In fact, be more efficient than is physically possible. I know 
that’s what I’d do” (45). Interestingly, after receiving this advice, Saunders writes that Capable 
returns with a book called “How to Fish for Fish”—a subtle insertion of America’s 
aforementioned fascination with self-help and self-improvement in the face of struggle.9 It 
also echoes George Carlin’s comical statement that there is no such thing as self-help: “If 
you’re looking for self-help why would you read a book written by somebody else? That’s not 
 
9 Self-improvement does not even require struggle or adversity, as the path to improvement is endless, 
something often seen in self-help books where many are titled along the lines of ‘How to Get Richer’, 
thus depicting wealth as limitless—though I am sure no one, if questioned as to how they acquired their 
fortune, has responded that it came from heeding the advice of a financial self-help book. 
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self-help, that’s help. There’s no such thing as self-help. If you did it yourself you didn’t need 
help” (Carlin, 2001: n.p.). 
However, the Romo’s and Ronsen’s goats soon stop producing milk. In contrast, 
Capable’s path of self-improvement has taught her how to fish, and to provide for herself and 
her father. Yet, Capable is aware of a difference: “And she soon found that it was not all that 
much fun being the sort of person who eats a big dinner in a warm house whilst others shiver 
on their roofs in the dark” (70). In his 2005 commencement speech to Syracuse University, 
George Saunders had this to say: “What I regret most in my life are failures of kindness. Those 
moments when another human being was there, in front of me, suffering, and I responded . . 
. sensibly. Reservedly. Mildly” (Congratulations n.p.). Nowhere in this speech does Saunders 
hold himself up as a model to emulate, either through his literary success or human values, 
but instead he chooses to focus on a quality that he believes makes a more conscientious, 
empathetic person: to “err in the direction of kindness” (Congratulations n.p.). Capable, too, 
errs in the direction of kindness, inviting her neighbours over for dinner in spite of the fact 
that they had committed failures of kindness themselves. The Very Persistent Gappers of Frip does 
indeed, as briefly evidenced, represent various upstanding qualities—kindness, generosity, 
compassion and community—but it also furthers the progression of these qualities so that the 
story ends on a note that, upon closer inspection, is unlike the conclusions exhibited in the 
fiction of Vonnegut. “And life got better,” writes Saunders: “Not perfect, but better” (75-6). 
“If Saunders rejects the self-orientation of ‘classic’ self-help,” writes Kasia Boddy, “he is 
nevertheless committed to a form of self-culture. Working to become ‘our best selves,’ his 
stories insist, is possible, or perhaps even more likely, in the worst environments” (Boddy 9). 
Saunders, however, plays a part in this form of “self-culture” as author of the text, able to 
construct perspectives that, whether successful or not, are intent on arousing an emotional 
connection to a story through affect and empathy. The Romo’s and Ronsen’s privileged 
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position, and their refusal to empathise, are satirised by Saunders through hyperbole and ironic 
humour. This representation does not seek to condemn them for not being good Samaritans, 




Saunders’ satire is firmly grounded in empathetic connection with his reader, achieved by way 
of point of view, free-indirect discourse, and violence. This emotional capacity within satire is 
supported by Saunders’ view of his satiric target, an approach which he describes is a way of 
saying, “I love this culture” (Sacks n.p.). For Saunders, appreciation of the satiric target is 
paramount. “[I]t’s hard to be sufficiently involved in satirizing something you don’t like,” he 
says. Upon further explanation, Saunders relates such involvement as akin to love: 
Satire is, I think, a sort of bait-and-switch. You decide to satirize something, so 
you gaze at it hard enough and long enough to be able to say something true 
and funny and maybe angry or critical—but you first had to gaze at it for a long 
time. I mean, gazing is a form of love, right? (Sacks n.p.). 
In contrast to other satires which arouse criticism at the expense of the satiric target, Saunders’ 
understanding of satire’s target is entwined with compassion, which he explains by way of 
attention: “You are paying attention to the thing, spending your time on it, which is a form of 
… something. Love?” (Sacks n.p.). One can hear echoes of Simone Weil: “Attention, taken 
to its highest degree, is the same thing as prayer. It presupposes faith and love” (Weil 117). 
For Saunders, then, to satirise effectively, one must pay attention to that which is in need of 
correction, and such an engagement is a form of love. This emotional, compassionate aspect 
to his satire is one area which has been written about countless times, and it is one that, I 
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believe, demarcates Saunders’ satire from that of his predecessors and contemporaries. In an 
interview with VICE, Saunders says that: “When we imagine a character, we’re basically 
having a conversation with somebody other than ourselves” (Yeh n.p.). This interview is 
appropriately titled, “George Saunders Thinks Empathy Can Still Save Us.” Indeed, Layne 
Neeper believes that: “[Saunders] is not a traditional satirist … We are asked to understand, 
not condemn; the satirist’s intent has been redirected away from correction toward empathy” 
(295). Consequently, it appears that Saunders is not a “misanthropic satirist” (Highet 235) at 
all. Rather, his satires—which attempt to raise awareness and a moral awakening of sorts—
are firmly grounded in the psychological states of his characters used toward eliciting empathy 
in his reader. 
 Indeed, empathy, a term almost as troublesome to define as satire, is sustained 
throughout Saunders’ fiction. His characters are constantly faced with moral dilemmas and 
emotionally difficult situations which are used to induce in the reader a state of empathy. 
Charles Yu views Saunders’ approach to language as merging words and feelings together 
“until they reach some kind of thermodynamic phase change, a critical point in the empathy 
of the system, near which the distinction between self and other starts to melt” (Yu n.p.). In 
this context, Michael Basseler analyses how emotion in Saunders’ stories engages the reader 
into a “compassionate relationship with the characters” (Basseler 153). Basseler writes: 
“Despite all satire … there is always Saunders’ deep humanism serving as a counterbalance 
and, perhaps, constituting something like the aesthetic and ethical core of his writing” (153). 
However, rather than view Saunders’ pronounced humanism as separate, or even antithetical 
to his satire, I view it as a critical component of the satire itself. 
 Therefore, to understand this “ethical core” within Saunders’ stories, it is necessary to 
conceptualise a working understanding of empathy and its function in literary fiction. Like 
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Basseler’s conceptual framework, which follows the theoretical groundwork established by 
Suzanne Keen and Fritz Berithaupt (155), I too will draw on recent theories in empathy studies 
to provide a contemporary understanding of empathy. In a recent publication in the field of 
empathy studies, editors Meghan Hammond and Sue Kim state that: “literary empathy studies 
investigate how ‘thinking with’ or ‘feeling with’ another happens within literary texts or 
because of literary texts, how writers represent empathetic experience and how they provoke, 
promote, or prevent it in readers” (1). Indeed, although empathy and its precursor sympathy 
have varied histories and theories, notably in David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1736) 
and Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), this ability to think and feel with another 
exists in many contemporary understandings of empathy. By the 1960s, to sympathise began 
to signify “to feel for” or “to pity” (Hammond and Kim 7) as opposed to empathy’s meaning 
of feeling and thinking with. This prepositional change infers empathy’s closer connection in 
response to another person and/or their situation, which Nancy Eisenberg cogently expands 
upon, defining empathy as: “an affective response that stems from the apprehension or 
comprehension of another’s emotional state or condition, and which is similar to what the 
other person is feeling or would be expected to feel” (Eisenberg 72). Sympathy, in contrast, is 
centred more upon understanding an imaginative connection than mutual experience alone—
“an emotional response stemming from the apprehension of another’s emotional state or 
condition that is not the same as the other’s state or condition, but consists of feelings of 
sorrow or concern for the other” (72). Empathy, feeling with rather than for, is imperative in 
understanding another person’s situation insofar as it requires one to imagine and feel joy and 
suffering of those who are different from themselves. It is no wonder so many scholars are 
interested in the imaginative experience of reading. 
Indeed, in defining empathy within contemporary contexts, the idea of perspective 
shifting, of adopting the position of another person in order to understand them better, 
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extends throughout scholarly literature. As such, I believe it is beneficial to borrow Amy 
Coplan’s account of empathy, which requires the following conditions: 
(1) the empathizer experiences psychological states that are either identical or 
very similar to those of the target, (2) perspective-taking—the empathizer 
imaginatively experiences that target’s experiences from the target’s point of 
view, (3) (1) is the case by virtue of (2), and (4) the empathizer maintains self-
other differentiation. These four features are essential to empathy and help to 
distinguish it from related psychological processes that are often confused or 
conflated with it, such as emotional contagion and sympathy. (Coplan 144) 
It is significant that empathy, in this context, maintains a differentiation between self and the 
other, which distinguishes it from many simulation theories that propose the removal of the 
self in the process of empathising. More importantly, however, is how these four features of 
empathy relate to literary fiction, and, of course, Saunders’ satire. This understanding of 
empathy illuminates an obvious affective streak in Saunders’ satire that attempts to go beyond 
generative satire’s engagement with its reader. 
 As Michael Basseler has explored, one way of examining empathy and compassion in 
Saunders’ fiction is by way of narratology. Suzanne Keen’s prominent work in narratology and 
literature led her to develop a definition of ‘narrative empathy,’ which is defined as: “the 
sharing of feeling and perspective-taking induced by reading, viewing, hearing, or imagining 
narratives of another’s situation and condition” (Keen, 2006: 7). This type of empathy is 
indirectly explained in Saunders’ essay “Thought Experiment,” wherein Saunders has his 
reader ponder the projected life journeys of two babies from their situation at birth, born “at 
precisely the same moment”: 
Baby One is healthy, with a great IQ and all its limbs and two kind, intelligent, 
nondysfunctional parents. Baby Two is sickly, not very bright, is missing a limb 
or two, and is the child of two self-absorbed and stupid losers, one of whom has 
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not been seen around lately, the other of whom is a heroin addict. (Braindead 
Megaphone 169) 
This illustration provides the context for the essay’s argument, which begs the questions: 
“What did Baby One do to deserve this fortunate birth? Or, conversely, what did Baby Two 
do to deserve the unfortunate birth?” (170). These questions are not answered in Saunders’ 
fiction, but his characters are very rarely situated between the two babies’ situations; they are 
either privileged in terms of power or money, or are the product of unfortunate circumstances, 
like Baby Two, or Aunt Bernie (“Why do some people get everything and I got nothing?”). 
With regard to Baby Two’s situation, Saunders asks: “Why is it … so natural for us to blame 
a person for being the person she is, to expect her to autocorrect her shrillness, say, or to will 
herself into a perkier, more efficient person?” (171). Those who struggle are not necessarily 
the victims of a “failure of intention,” (172) as they are the victims of circumstance. No 
amount of self-improvement can “autocorrect” the life journey for someone whose “innate 
level of pluck” begins at life’s conception (172). 
For all its recognisable objections to capitalism’s worship of willpower, however, 
“Thought Experiment” resolves itself on the idea of unchangeable circumstance. However, 
Saunders uses this idea of unchangeable circumstance as an argument for empathising with 
others, noting that the “upshot of all of this is not a passive moral relativism that makes the 
bearer incapable of action in the world” (172). This focus is not defeatist, but optimistic—a 
sincere belief in the possibility of change. By way of example, Saunders composes a situation 
where someone continually comes to his house and drives over his chickens—a 
straightforward and simple example: murdering someone else’s chickens is bad. However, in 
seeking resolution, Saunders proposes that his situation “actually improves” as he realises “that 
your desire to flatten my chickens is organic” and is not “objectively evil” (172) as, like the 
example of babies at birth, it is innate and the product of circumstance. Here we have change 
105 
 
occurring not within the mind and actions of the aggressor, but of the victim—the person 
whose emotional framework is more empathetic. This is one reaction to the situation. As 
Saunders continues, he argues that one’s harmful desires “can be changed”: 
[By] dropping the idea that your actions are Evil, and that you are Monstrous, I 
enter a new moral space, in which the emphasis is on seeing with clarity, rather 
than judging; on acting in the most effective way (that is, the way that most 
radically and permanently protects my chickens), rather than on constructing 
and punishing a Monster. (172) 
Herein lies a rather concise example of Saunders’ optimistic outlook. “By resisting the urge to 
reduce,” he concludes, “in order to subsequently destroy, we keep alive—if only for a few 
seconds more—the possibility of transformation” (173). Saunders’ project of self-
improvement is concerned not with financial prosperity or to influence people, but rather to 
understand—to act more effectively by engaging in a project of cultivated empathetic 
connection with others. Layne Neeper, in his article on Saunders’ postmodern satire, 
appropriately notes that “Saunders’ stories intend only one development: the empathetic 
improvement of his audience” (284-5). Indeed, “Thought Experiment,” despite not 
mentioning the word once, is primarily an argument for empathy, that which is “other-
directed” and “involves the comprehension of the other in the other’s circumstances” 
(Gallagher 376). Saunders’ use of narrative and point of view is thus an essential component 
in constructing the perspective of the other. 
 
Point of View 
In attempting to elicit empathy from the reader, Saunders meticulously conveys his characters’ 
inner thoughts and feelings by way of carefully constructed points of view. Saunders’ use of 
narrative point of view allows his readers to feel personally involved with the ethical choices 
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a character is forced to make and is crucial for narrative empathy. In “Escape from 
Spiderhead,” one of the more disturbing stories of Tenth of December, a murderer named Jeff 
serves his time in a research facility which tests drugs that control human emotions and 
feelings using a “MobiPak”—a type of surgically appended device attached to one’s back. 
Saunders’ trademark humour is apparent in this story, and so too is the satire, which criticises 
power relations and big pharma. However, the story can be read as a meta-text of Saunders’ 
narrative technique and as a metaphor for the way his fiction functions and what it seeks to 
achieve. In a story which focuses on the manipulation of strong human emotions, it is 
Saunders’ obvious guidance and control of the reader’s own emotional capacity that warrants 
interest.  
The story begins with Jeff, our first-person narrator, under the influence of 
“Verbaluce™,” a drug which controls one’s diction and linguistic capability, allowing one to 
narrate one’s experience under the drugs in a more eloquent, sophisticated manner: “He added 
some Verbaluce™ to the drop, and soon I was feeling the same things but saying them better” 
(46). Later, Jeff is subjected to a combination of drugs which have him repeatedly make love 
to two women, Heather and Rachel, one after the other, in spite of the fact that before dosing 
Jeff does not find either woman attractive: “Dark hair. Average build. Nothing special, just 
like, upon first entry, Heather had been nothing special” (52). Jeff’s first-person narration 
increases the reader’s understanding of his manipulated mood swings, from high doses of love 
to immediate come-downs. “I guess I was sad love was not real?,” ponders Jeff. He continues: 
“…I guess I was sad that love could feel so real and the next minute be gone, and all because 
of something Abnesti was doing” (55). However, the story takes a dark turn—from love to 
despair—when Abnesti, the prison warden, forces Jeff to induce either Heather or Rachel 
with “Darkenfloxx™,” a drug that makes you feel the worst you have ever felt—“times ten” 
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(56). Jeff expresses concern for an Other, either real or imagined in his opinion of the 
experiment: 
But, having once been Darkenfloxxed™, I just didn’t want to do that to anyone. 
Even if I didn’t like the person very much, even if I hated the person, I still 
wouldn’t want to do it. (56-7) 
Jeff, however, is then forced to watch Heather be Darkenfloxxed™ even after his firm 
protestation against it (67). Jeff describes his feelings in the face of such a horrific act: 
Basically, what I was feeling was: Every human is born of man and woman. 
Every human, at birth, is, or at least has the potential to be, beloved of his/her 
mother/father. Thus every human is worthy of love. As I watched Heather 
suffer, a great tenderness suffused my body, a tenderness hard to distinguish 
from a sort of vast existential nausea; to wit, why are such beautiful beloved 
vessels made slaves to such pain? (69) 
In the midst of a gruesome suicide, Saunders’ uses Jeff’s ethical dilemma as a vessel for 
empathetic concern, as a way of reinforcing the capacity for love, even for those whom we do 
not personally know. However, Saunders’ own authority in this piece is not unlike the control 
Abnesti has over Jeff. The complexities of the author-character-reader relationship are on 
display here, as Saunders acts as the reader’s own experimenter—forcefully dosing the reader 
with varying tone, register, point of view, and contextual information about other characters. 
It is thus a meta-text commentary of Saunders’ own literary style and technique. Unlike the 
metafiction of the twentieth century, Saunders uses this commentary toward engagement with 
his reader, not merely a “knowingness that dissolves commitment into irony” (Gitlin 100). 
The point here is that our own empathetic concern for others should not be restricted 
by not having a personal connection to them. Abnesti attempts to persuade Jeff that the 
experiment is not ethically deficient, detailing that dosing Heather with Darkenfloxx™ can be 
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interpreted as a moral action: “Can I suggest that, if you knew what I know about Heather’s 
past, making Heather briefly sad, nauseous, and/or horrified might not seem like the worst 
idea in the world? No, I can’t” (67-8). Abnesti’s speech is deliberately evasive and includes the 
use of back slash—a feature used in other voices of Saunders’ fiction. Rather than provide 
sincere, direct language, Abnesti uses the backslash and negative questions to restrict options 
and confuse Jeff. Despite the fact the Abnesti says he cannot make such a suggestion, all 
dialogue here that precedes Heather’s dosing is a strong coercion of Jeff’s will in which Jeff’s 
privileges are threatened (69). Additionally, his questions “Can I suggest?” and “Can I imply” 
are evasive. The rhetorical nature of his questions (“Am I a monster?”) linguistically increase 
persuasion and dampen the severity of Heather’s situation, positioning Jeff as the subject, not 
Heather. This persuasion makes the idea of empathising with another seem like an 
unjustifiable position, as Abnesti argues that Heather’s pain is not only legitimate but 
warranted and deserved. Heather’s death, described as a utilitarian sacrifice in a scientific 
exploration of “the unknown” (72), is followed by the death of Rachel. On this occasion Jeff 
presents the rationale: 
Per Rachel’s file, she had stolen jewellery from her mother, a car from her father, 
cash from her sister, statues from their church. She’d gone to jail for drugs. After 
four times in jail for drugs, she’d gone to rehab for drugs, then to rehab for 
prostitution, then to what they call rehab refresh, for people who’ve been in 
rehab so many times they are basically immune. But she must have been immune 
to the rehab refresh, too, because after that came her biggie: a triple murder—
her dealer, the dealer’s sister, the dealer’s sister’s boyfriend. (74) 
Upon reading Rachel’s file, Jeff is no more morally comfortable than before: “I still didn’t 
want to kill her,” he comments (74). This remark, coupled with the surreal context of the 
story, is delivered in an almost naïve, deadpan manner. This is in spite of the grotesque life-
or-death nature of the scene. As Basseler notes, “[Saunders’] central characters have no choice 
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but to acknowledge another’s pain” (159). Jeff is conspicuously placed in an ethical dilemma 
which requires action or some type of protest. John Hawkins remarks of this moral dilemma 
in response to the stories in In Persuasion Nation: 
Saunders primarily transcends satire in these stories by placing a conscientious 
objector within the text itself, a person or persons for whom the absurdity 
carries real emotional weight … These stories depend upon the human to place 
the inhumanity of the landscapes in context, almost as a kind of internal 
accountability. (Hawkins 72) 
Saunders does not, I contend, transcend satire as such; instead this aspect of his fiction 
constitutes his own mixture of satire’s makeup. More importantly, it is the reader, not 
Saunders’ character subjects, who is the real subject of the ‘Spiderhead’ experiment. Saunders’ 
manipulation of the reader to empathise with the author’s desired target through intense first-
person narration and stream-of-consciousness storytelling is, interestingly, what the story is 
about; but it also provides a meta-textual commentary on Saunders’ own attempt to alter the 
minds of his readers. Furthermore, in an era dominated by neoliberal corporate speak, 
Saunders’ fiction also points toward the complexities of authority and persuasion, reminding 
us about neoliberalism’s invasion of privacy, and the ways in which all sorts of information 
and values can occupy our mental space and pervert our attitude of the world. 
One of the targets of Saunders’ satire in “Spiderhead” is the unethical tendencies of 
the drug testing industry, yet Saunders is not averse to using drugs as a tool for furthering his 
own ethical agenda.  Moreover, “Spiderhead” is not the first time Saunders has used drugs as 
a plot device to gain further access to his characters’ mindsets, either to reveal their true 
expression, or their inability to freely express themselves. In “Jon,” the title character is one 
of many teenagers called “TrendSetters & Tastemakers” who reside in a facility where their 
task is to test products for advertising companies. The characters of “Jon” are happy 
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consumers first, human beings second. Saunders’ stories, so finely tuned toward empathy and 
affect, reveal the gruesome underside of this type of managed feeling through satire. In the 
instance that these workers lose positivity and/or become disaffected with the grotesque 
working environment, they are given a dose of “Aurabon®”, which acts as an anti-depressant 
to “makes things better” (In Persuasion Nation 43); it is also referred to as “Mr. Slippen’s Facility 
Morale Initiative” (29) and acquired by filling out a “Work-Affecting Mood-Problem 
Notification” (43). Like the rest of the stories in In Persuasion Nation, “Jon” is concerned with 
the dangers of technology and mass consumerism: the teenagers are stuck within a type of 
commercial prison, entirely subservient to completing the work of marketing companies—
even their memories are told through the medium of infomercials:  
I was feeling, why is she looking so frantic with furrowed anxious brow like that 
Claymation chicken at LI 98473 who says the sky is falling the sky is falling and 
turns out it is only a Dodge Ramcharger which crushes her from on high and 
one arm of her or wing sticks out with a sign that says March Madness Daze? 
(41) 
Like their drug-induced, regulated emotions, their memories are likewise curated and 
controlled. With this understanding, one can view affect as both a problem for Saunders’ 
societies, but something Saunders also believes is the solution. Thus, Saunders satirises 
emotion in order suggest something different—a praise for empathy. Jon’s recollection of the 
past cites advertisements as the origin of human emotion and dialogue. His ability to 
understand human interaction and feeling is via the commercials he is forced to assess, not 
the other way around. Kasia Boddy likens this manipulation of affect in the workplace to 
labour that is as equally emotional as it is physical, as many of Saunders’ characters are required 
to perform roles rather than work as their own selves (think of the narrators of “Pastoralia” 
or “Sea Oak”) (Boddy 5). Boddy references the work of sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild, 
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whose study into the “commercialization of human feeling” asserts that one of the central 
problems of emotional labour is “emotive dissonance,” which is the struggle to maintain “a 
difference between feeling and feigning” in the workplace (5). Hochschild’s study details how 
corporate logic asks employees to take part in a “market for emotional labor” whereby a 
worker’s “put-on smiles” became “an instrument of feeling”  and policed by their supervisors 
who were akin to “paid stage managers” (Hochschild 119). In this account, the dissonance 
between real and actual feelings is more precisely achieved and enhanced by the narrator’s 
point of view. 
Notably, “Jon” is a monologue—a trope of much of Saunders’ fiction—which  
Gilbert Highet asserts is the “first main type of satire” (40), and is complete with a carefully 
constructed syntax consisting of grammatical errors: “Back in the time of which I am speaking, 
to our coordinators had mandated use, we had all seen that educational video of It’s Yours to 
Do With What You Like! In which teens like ourselfs speak on the healthy benefits of getting 
off by oneself” (23). Here, Jon’s diction exhibits his lack of self-awareness, and this deficiency 
becomes almost our own as to read Jon’s first-person narrative is to be stuck inside his 
emotionally-managed mind, replete with product codes, drug names, advertisements, and a 
constrained diction. On the contrary, to tell this story in the third-person would certainly 
inhibit the story’s satirical intent, as our relationship to Jon’s naivety provides the basis for 
Saunders’ sardonic humour:  
At which point every cell of chromosome or whatever it was in my gonads that 
have been holding their breaths was suddenly like, Dude, slide through that gap 
no matter how bad it hurts, squat outside Carolyn’s Privacy Tarp whispering, 
Carolyn, it’s me, please un-Velcro your Privacy opening! (25) 
112 
 
Similarly, in “The Semplica Girl Diaries,” the narrator’s point of view is imperative in 
rendering the disposition of a person whose attempt at achieving affluence on par with his 
neighbours is at the forefront of his ambition: 
Note to self: Try to extend positive feelings associated with Scratch-Off win into 
all areas of life. Be bigger presence at work. Race up ladder (joyfully w/smile on 
face), get raise. Get in best shape of life, start dressing nicer. Learn guitar? Make 
point of noticing beauty of world? Why not educate self re. birds, flowers, trees, 
constellations, become true citizen of natural world, walk around neighborhood 
w/kids, patiently teaching kids names of birds, flowers, etc. etc.? (Tenth of 
December 129) 
The story is epistolary, told entirely through the narrator’s journal entries and, interestingly, 
contains almost no articles—a strict adherence to a realistic syntax within a mode that is 
heavily self-conscious and introspective. Such narration allows the reader access to a reflective 
narrator in a medium that exists almost separate to the prose. Adam Kelly believes Saunders’ 
first-person narration supports, “his New Sincerity aesthetic, allowing him to explore the 
limits of expressive subjectivity, ethical consciousness, and detached spectatorship under 
neoliberal conditions” (Kelly 2017: 49). In addition, letters, journal entries, and memos are 
omnipresent in Saunders’ fiction.10 “Escape From Spiderhead” does not contain a letter or 
memo, but Verbaluce™ is used to extract the inner-most thoughts of the characters to better 
explain the experience of being under the influence of the drug. For Saunders, the first-person 
narrative is his drug, and it is neatly given to characters—and, by way of point of view and 
diction, his readers—in order to greatly enhance his ability, as author, to conveniently have 
 
10 The Very Persistent Gappers of Fripp, “My Amendment,” “The Semplica Girl Diaries,” “I Can Speak!™,” Lincoln 
in the Bardo, “Exhortation,” “Pastoralia,” “The Barber’s Unhappiness” all exhibit these characteristics.  
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access to inner-selves. The access to such intimate perspectives is imperative for the reader to 
enable empathetic thinking. 
 Saunders’ ubiquitous use of the first-person is also characteristic of satiric authors.  In 
order to “flaunt their literary personalities,” Alvin Kernan states that satirists “manipulate their 
material in the most obvious fashion” (Kernan 1959: 4). For instance, all seven stories that 
comprise CivilWarLand in Bad Decline are written in the first-person perspective, as are most 
of his stories in other collections, including the popular “Pastoralia” and “Sea Oak.” In the 
case of “Escape from Spiderhead,” the first-person narration positions the reader into the 
same constricted state as Jeff: locked into a prison-research facility (or narrative) and subjected 
to emotional manipulation. Like a television gameshow where a contestant is faced with the 
difficult choice of two either equally attractive or unattractive outcomes, Jeff is forced into 
making life-changing decisions that directly affect other inmates as the audience watches on; 
the audience, in this case, is the reader. 
This case for Saunders’ favour of first-person narratives in his satire is given greater 
clarity when understanding the narration of his few third-person stories. When not in 
command of the first-person perspective, Saunders adopts a free-indirect third-person 
narrative style that, unlike strict third-person narrative, still permits him to reveal his 
characters’ inner thoughts as a backdoor toward constructing narrative empathy. Whilst third-
person point of view may potentially be more limiting in its character identification than first-
person, by representing multiple viewpoints of different characters through omniscient 
narration, the possibility of empathetic engagement remains just as effective. Indeed, Keen 
states: “direct description of a character’s emotional state or circumstances by a third-person 
narrator may produce empathy just as effectively as indirect implication of emotional states 
through actions and context” (Keen 2006: 218). “Victory Lap,” “The Falls,” and “Tenth of 
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December” are of the few stories of Saunders’ told in the third-person, but their narrative is 
free and indirect, and the consciousnesses of the focal characters are brought to the 
foreground. In both stories the narrative is notably non-linear and is told from the perspective 
of each character via an omniscient narrator; each character’s viewpoint is presented 
interchangeably until the stories’ end.  
Saunders has described this technique as “third-person ventriloquis[m],” where he 
presents what initially appears as a third-person story then quickly tries, “to get into the 
person’s thoughts, but then with the extra kicker of trying to use (or) restrict myself to his or 
her diction” (Interview, NPR). The outcome of such a restriction is to think in somebody 
else’s voice, and “sort of become them”—an aspect also seen in his first-person (NPR). By 
revealing the internal alienation of a character, Saunders reminds us of the external and public 
voices we carry around inside us. In a simpler illustration, Saunders refers to his Catholic 
upbringing as an influence on his creation of empathy through multiple perspectives: 
But I also was raised Catholic, and we did this intense thing called the Stations 
of the Cross, which maybe some of you did. And this was the 60’s, so we really 
did it. We did it for five straight days, naked in the desert being flayed. But the 
thing was, there were these images of the suffering of Christ around the room. 
And you sat so you looked at each one. So now it was the second station, and 
there was a little narration from the Bible. And then you were to sit, quietly, and 
think about it. And we had one nun who was wonderful, because she would say 
to think about what Jesus was experiencing and so on. And then she’d say to 
think about what the Roman soldier was experiencing … So that was early, like 
Novel Writing 101. (Saunders, “Talks at Google”) 
Whilst the generation of empathy is at the core of this statement, there is a great emphasis on 
point of view. Indeed, in the case of Saunders’ third-person stories, one may consider Saunders 
the nun, carefully guiding the reader toward specific narrative perspectives in order to increase 
affective engagement.  
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With regard to this “third-person ventriolquilis[m],” Robert Cameron Wilson 
brilliantly analyses such narration through Mikhail Bakhtin’s Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 
noting that the fiction of Saunders, “is fiction that is polyphonic, where human consciousness 
is constructed as dialogic and social, captured in rich microdialogues” (Wilson 222-3). Wilson’s 
study is focused on “Victory Lap” (In Persuasion Nation), a story which is told entirely through 
the interweaving perspectives of three characters in third person. These third person accounts 
feature an intimate relationship with the character through internal dialogues. Suzanne Keen 
states that many theorists and critics have: “singled out a small set of narrative techniques—
such as the use of first-person narration and the interior representation of characters’ 
consciousness and emotional states—as devices supporting character identification, 
contributing to empathetic experience” (Keen 2006, 213). Saunders uses free indirect style to 
gain inner access to these wildly different characters in order to enhance the possibility of 
empathetic experience with his reader by informing them of the experiences of all the story’s 
characters. In addition, each protagonist has a distinctive voice. “Tenth of December” and 
“The Falls” similarly adhere to a fragmented short story structure, whereby Saunders uses an 
omniscient narrator to illuminate the consciousness of multiple characters.   
Furthermore, Saunders has been shown to manipulate point of view to coincide with 
a story’s theme. For instance, in “Winky”—the story of Neil Yaniky who attends a self-help 
seminar in which the audience are required to chant, “Now Is the Time for Me to Win!”—
Saunders adjusts his narrative to mimic popular self-help books which address the reader in 
the second-person: 
Trumpets sounded from a concealed tape deck. An actor in a ripped flannel shirt 
stumbled across the stage with a sign around his neck that said “You.” 
[…] 




“Hey, You, come on over!” should a girl across the stage, who was labelled Inner 
Peace. “I bet you’ve been looking for me your whole life!” 
[…] 
But then from the wings sprinted a number of other actors, labeled “Whiny,” 
and “Self-Absorbed” and “Blames Her Fact on Others” and so on… 
[…] 
Oh, I can’t believe you love Inner Peace more than you love me, You!” said 
Insecure. “That really hurts.” 
[…] 
“Frankly, I’ve never been more disappointed in my life,” said Disappointed. 
[…] 
… “Is there no hope for me?” asked You. “If only someone had made a lifelong 
study of the roadblock people encounter on their way to Inner Peace! (Pastoralia 
69-70) 
Here, the point of view shifts quickly from third-person to second-person through the voice 
of a motivational speaker who, for the sake of this technique and the context of the story, is 
conveniently—and confusingly—titled “You.” Richard Lee skilfully notes that, in the last 
statement quoted, “Saunders moves from ‘me’ to ‘you’ to ‘someone’—first, second, then 
third-person pronouns, ending with the indefinite third-person ‘someone’ ” (Lee 2010: 87). 
Saunders’ implied readers are thus “linked to the collectivity of all indefinite pronouns and 
propelled back in his character stream-of-reflector consciousness” (87). Accessing the 
consciousnesses of his characters, regardless of first or third-person point of view, remains 
the imperative for Saunders, whose intention to elicit empathy from his readers is dependent 
on this shared experience of narrator and implied reader. 
This intent of revealing the emotion and thoughts of characters permits not only 
greater clarity as to their wants and needs, but requires participation on our part as readers. By 
entering the world of the character through the immersion and realism of the narration, we 
act as participants within the story, wherein we are privy to their oft-revealed lack of self-
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awareness, and can only seek liberation in the narrative’s end, by which time the character has 
either engaged empathetically in some way or has sought forgiveness, even after death in the 
form of a ghost. However, in doing so, Saunders restricts a reader’s choice. The reliance on 
first-person as a means to manipulate a reader’s emotional tendencies is connected to the issue 
of authorial voice. By crafting such intimate perspectives through carefully constructed 
narration, Saunders creates an intimacy between narrator and implied reader, and thus 
simultaneously increases the chance for empathetic engagement. However, in doing so, 
Saunders restricts a reader’s choice.  
 
Violence 
Observations that Saunders’ stories possess a high degree of empathy and moral engagement 
with his reader are popular in the many reviews of his fiction. However, what some critics 
have either overlooked, or refused to acknowledge is Saunders’ consistently, provocative, dark 
settings and plots, which may undermine the story’s moral endeavours. As aforementioned, 
James Yeh’s interview for VICE, for instance, is titled “George Saunders Thinks Empathy 
Can Still Save Us” (Yeh: 2017). This echoes Bloom and Bloom’s earlier remarks that if “we 
are moved positively by satire … we return to our senses, moral, intellectual, and aesthetic” 
(19). Yet, being “moved positively” (19) by Saunders’ satire appears to require one to endure 
a high degree of cruelty and inhumanity. Jurrit Daalder’s study of violence in Saunders’ fiction, 
“George Saunders’s Literary Darkenfloxx™,” focuses not on Saunders’ humorous language, 
nor his dignified optimism or moral awareness. Rather, Daalder takes aim at the methods 
Saunders uses in order to morally interrogate such affective responses from his reader: “[It] 
seems that Saunders’s art of cruelty, with its attempts to anticipate and micro-manage the 
effects of its shock treatment, is far from emancipating” (Daalder 184-5). Indeed, Saunders’ 
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stories often involve a central character stuck in a difficult financial or physical situation, like 
“Jeff” in the prison of Spiderhead, or our narrator in “Pastoralia”; but, one can justifiably 
question whether Saunders, too, uses cruelty and point of view to render his reader equally 
unmovable to the story’s violence. This shock treatment is evident in Tenth of December alone, 
a collection which consists of rape, abduction, violent rage, suicide, and consistent depictions 
of humans abusing, both physically and mentally, other humans. For Daalder, the acts of 
cruelty in Saunders’ fiction “all create the impression that Saunders can hardly write a single 
story without resorting to shock tactics” (175). In fostering a belief in human goodness for 
the other through empathy, Saunders relies upon an atmosphere of cruelty, of evil pushed to 
extremes in order to, by contrast, show the capabilities of an ethical good—empathy—
similarly pushed to its limits. 
In point of fact, “Escape from Spiderhead” does not close out with Jeff’s successful 
escape from the institution-like prison where he is held. On the contrary, Jeff achieves 
liberation only through death after self-inducing Darkenfloxx™ and consequently killing 
himself using the corner of a desk. Saunders, as he often does, continues Jeff’s narration by 
way of him as a ghost, with the concluding lines: 
From across the woods, as if by common accord, birds left their trees and darted 
upward. I joined them, flew among them, they did not recognize me as 
something apart from them, and I was happy, so happy, because for the first 
time in years, and forevermore, I had not killed, and never would. (81) 
Adam Kelly states that this ending has been controversial among readers, and thus asks: “Do 
the final lines signify that Jeff’s death absolves him of the murder that had him committed to 
the Spiderhead in the first place?” (Kelly 2017: 48). Jeff’s reliability is also questioned at this 
denouement as, prior to the final act, the reader is unaware of why Jeff is imprisoned in the 
first place—specifically that “fateful night” often alluded to (58). Despite the fact he is a 
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convicted murderer, we empathise with Jeff’s position since we have invested in his 
perspective, an engagement enhanced by Saunders’ refraining from explaining Jeff’s “fateful 
night” earlier on. Furthermore, as a ghost, Jeff empathises with the other inmates in a voice 
identical to the perspective-shifting of “Thought Experiment”: 
Here was Ned Riley, here was B. Troper, here was Gail Orley, Stefan DeWitt, 
killers all, all bad, I guess, although, in that instant, I saw it differently. At birth, 
they’d been charged by God with the responsibility of growing into total 
fuckups. Had they chosen this? Was it their fault, as they tumbled out of the 
womb? (79) 
The sympathy felt for Jeff by the reader is apparent as he is our focalising character (and 
narrator) in the story, yet he is also a convicted murderer. Thus the earlier reflections of Jeff, 
that “every human is worthy of love” (69) sees out its resolution as Jeff, a murderer, absolves 
himself via suicide in order to save Rachel. To advocate empathy for another comes at the 
cost of a macabre act, that of Camus’ “one truly serious philosophical problem”—suicide 
(Camus 1). However, through the powers of fiction, Saunders permits the afterlife as an 
actuality, as Jeff’s narration is uninterrupted as his body turns to spirit.  
 This self-reflective consciousness of Saunders’ narrators is typical, and, in the case 
where violence is intensified, it is expected some great act of empathetic concern will follow. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the closing paragraph to “CivilWarLand in Bad 
Decline,” in the collection of the same name, where our unnamed narrator—who has killed a 
child earlier in the story—so eloquently adopts a compassionate voice for Sam, the vigilante 
who has been hired to protect CivilWarLand (a Civil War re-enactment theme park) from 
gangs, and who, at the moment of narration, is stabbing our narrator to death: 
Possessing perfect knowledge I hover above him as he hacks me to bits. I see 
his rough childhood. I see his mother doing something horrid to him with a 
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broomstick. I see the hate in his heart and the people he has yet to kill before 
pneumonia gets him at eighty-three. I see the dead kid’s mom unable to sleep, 
pounding her fists against her face in grief at the moment I was burying her son’s 
hand. I see that pain I’ve caused. I see the man I could have been, and the man 
I was, and then everything is bright and new and keen with love and I sweep 
through Sam’s body, trying to change him, trying so hard, and feeling only hate 
and hate, solid as stone. (26) 
This affective response to the closing scene is described by Ferris as “an almost irrational 
empathy” but one that is “the source of all humanity” (Ferris xviii). It is also the perspective 
of an omniscient author, providing a meta-moment for Saunders. Additionally, this passage 
supports Layne Neeper’s claim that Saunders’ satire “is not simply the ridicule of targets that 
results in reform but rather ridicule coupled with enough knowledge of the targeted character’s 
psychological motivations to allow the reader to empathize” (290-1). The reform is not of the 
physical but psychological—an attempt at establishing an empathetic norm as a response to 
hardship or tragedy. This epiphanic moment of our downtrodden narrator is clear in its 
authorial intent to provoke empathy. Certainly, the narrator’s ability to access his attacker’s 
mind and subsequently communicate Sam’s circumstances (“rough childhood”) removes our 
narrator’s own reflection during his death as entirely selfish, one consisting of his own failures 
and disappointments. However, by invoking Friedrich Nietzsche’s claim that, “[a]lmost 
everything we call ‘higher culture’ is based on the spiritualization of cruelty,” Daalder asserts 
that Saunders’ stories subject the reader to “cruelties as part of a shock treatment that promises 
to lead to greater empathy, deeper insight, and a richer interior life—though no one ever quite 
knows how” (175). This is most evident in “CivilWarLand in Bad Decline”. As our narrator 
is “hack[ed] to bits,” we are supposedly roused into a state of compassion and empathy, but 
only through an act of murder in which our narrator conveniently—and rather 
patronizingly—possesses “perfect knowledge” (26), a god-like omniscience. However, while 
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Saunders’ stories are undoubtedly violent, one must be reminded of the stories’ satire, and 
satire’s tendency to distort reality.  
 This distortion of reality is utilised by satire’s hyperbole of its satiric target, not that 
which is being promoted as morally good. “[T]he satirist views the world pessimistically” 
writes Alvin Kernan, “and sees little hope for reform unless violent methods are used to bring 
mankind to its sense” (Kernan 1965: 263). Through his ambitious project of empathy, 
Saunders almost certainly does not view the world pessimistically. Nevertheless, in hoping for 
reform, Saunders often uses violence and shock tactics to achieve his affective endeavours. 
Claire Colebrook writes of this reform-through-violence method with regard to Swift: 
The very style of satire—the capacity of human speech for invective, ridicule, 
disgust, distancing and elevation—is shown in both its positive effects and its 
risks. On the one hand, satire allows us to view the human condition: Gulliver’s 
travels present him again and again with the follies of human vanity and 
endeavour … On the other hand, we also see the violent tendencies of the 
satirical impulse, the capacity for misanthropy and disgust that ultimately leads 
Gulliver into abandoning human speech and dialogue altogether (202) 
While Saunders’ fiction is unlike that of Swift’s misanthropy, as earlier examined, the satire of 
both relies upon an irony that, if not understood, results in an art where violent tendencies 
run rampant without reason. Indeed, the moral intensity of Saunders’ fiction is evident, as are 
his characters’ potential for difficult empathy, but the risk of creating such settings invites 
violence and pity. “[F]or a story to show joy,” says Saunders, “it would have to have some 
anti-joy in it—something that would normally, in real life, impede joy.” (Weinstein 67). This 
statement by Saunders is, however, not entirely true. Anti-joy can indeed emphasise the 
goodness of joy, but it is not necessary unless, of course, one views such elevation of light 
through the satiric mode which, by way of its nature, is heavily dependent on irony and 
hyperbole in advocating a position.  
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Furthermore, pathos and “anti-joy” are equally overflowing in “Jon”. Carolyn and Jon 
are insistent on having a baby, but due to the oppressive management of the facility, this is 
near impossible. Foreshadowing this is Josh and Ruthie’s baby, Amber, who dies, though we 
are most certainly sure it is murder carried out by a senior member of the facility. Yet, this is 
a story which, in spite of the bleak and oppressive world in which it is set, is about love: “I do 
not want to only speak of my love in grunts!” says Jon, “If I wish to compare my love to a 
love I have previous knowledge of, I do not want to stand there in the wind casting about for 
my metaphor!” (In Persuasion Nation 30). Carolyn and Jon’s story is a love story, and it is one 
that is more pronounced given that the environment in which they reside is inimical to love. 
So too is Jeff’s action in “Spiderhead” concerned with love for another, embodying Constant’s 
remark in Vonnegut’s The Sirens of Titan that, “a purpose of human life, no matter who is 
controlling it, is to love whoever is around to be loved” (313). But this is precisely the wild 
contrast Saunders’ fiction adheres to in order to maintain what Basseler calls Saunders’ 
“aesthetics (and ethics) of compassion” (159). By inversely and ironically stating what is 
good—in these examples, love and freedom—satire requires the most grotesque depiction of 
what is evil, “the inverse praise of good things” (Z. Smith). This remains Saunders’ project: to 
engage the reader with intensely cruel content that forces her to view pro-social, ethically-
responsible behaviour through the consciousness of characters forced into making such 
decisions. In addition, it is worth noting that Saunders appears to exchange his narrative’s 
reliance on violence in his short fiction for a greater measure of sentimentality in his recently 
published first novel. 
In an article for Texas Monthly, Jeff Salmon remarks on the similarity between Saunders’ 
novel Lincoln in the Bardo (2017) and his first collection of short stories CivilWarLand in Bad 
Decline, remarking that in both publications (texts that currently bookend Saunders’ oeuvre), 
“a ghost of some sort enters someone else’s mind and body and feels an unexpected empathy 
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for that person” (Salmon 56). Saunders has always been committed to exploring this ability to 
feel and think with another person through narrative, or best to at least understand and 
contextualise where one’s insecurities and frustrations come from, as explained in “Thought 
Experiment.” Indeed, in response to Salmon’s remark, Saunders replies:  
If you could inhabit the secret thoughts of your enemy, they wouldn’t be your 
enemy. You would see their understanding of the world; what they were doing 
would make perfect sense. When you read a great book you’re lifted out of your 
consciousness and into someone else’s (Salmon 57-8) 
Saunders’ corrective is empathy; it is consciousness-raising. To not only empathise with 
another but to literally enter their consciousness, or something similar, is at work in Lincoln in 
the Bardo, a novel which borders on being maudlin. Composed of character dialogue and 
extracts from history books (approximately a quarter of which are Saunders’ own creation), 
the novel typifies Saunders’ favoured first-person storytelling, free-indirect discourse, 
unreliable narration, and his fascination with tone and diction by pushing these narrative 
characteristics even further. Saunders has made light of this dialogue-heavy novel, stating in a 
short story workshop that: “structure is setting the book up in a way that lets you do what 
you’re good at” (Saunders, Auckland Writers Festival). The dialogue favours his characters’ 
preferred state of being as all dialogue is shared by the deceased in the form of ghosts (thus 
allowing character reflection); but, more interestingly, the ghosts possess the unique ability to 
enter the bodies of the living. The deceased Willie Lincoln, for example, enters the body of 
his father, President Abraham Lincoln. In doing so, the ghost is able to access the person’s 
thoughts, feelings, and ideas—and so too can the reader. Regardless of structure, this element 
of the story is characteristically Saunders, mimicking the structure of his third-person stories 
which permit him to “run around to the other side of the idea see what another character 
sees” (Lee 84), evident in stories such as in “Victory Lap,” and “Tenth of December.” 
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Whatever techniques Saunders’ empathetic satire demands, he is as equally concerned with his 
characters’ inner-selves as he is the readers’—it is this fictional medium that persuades the 
reader to engage in introspection and perspective-shifting. 
In addition, it is of interest that Abraham Lincoln is the one character whose feelings 
are not transmitted to the reader by dialogue but through other characters via a ghost 
inhabiting his body. Abraham, the only character who does not speak is, due to the rules of 
Saunders’ surreal imagination, still able to be understood through this manipulation of 
narrative. Caleb Crain refers to this aspect of the novel as Saunders, “bend[ing] the rules,” the 
result of which is “anti-novelistic” (n.p.). “The fun of novels” writes Crain, “is that 
people can’t get in one another’s heads except by talking; the impediment multiplies the 
opportunities to mislead and misunderstand” (n.p.). Cain’s criticism is not indicative of the 
general critical reception of the novel, as Lincoln in the Bardo won the Man Booker Prize (2017) 
for its experimentality and innovation. However, according to Crain, Saunders’ move “beyond 
the stylized violence of his early stories seems to be the transmutation of a portion of his 
violence into schmaltz” (n.p.). Cain is not alone in this line of criticism. 
Peter Byrne, in his review for Saunders’ Tenth of December (2013), states that “[g]ood 
satire doesn’t weep for its victims” (Byrne n.p.). Examples of this, according to Byrne, are 
those considered some of the greatest satires: Jonathan Swift’s A Modest Proposal, Voltaire’s 
Candide, Evelyn Waugh’s The Loved Ones—works considered by Byrne to be grotesque and 
hilarious and, more importantly for Byrne, do not weep but intstead are scathing and 
unremorseful. Byrne is, like most critics, complimentary of Tenth of December collection, and 
remarks at Saunders’ “skill at shaping [his characters] and the perfect pitch of his prose” (n.p.). 
Yet, in closing out his summary of the collection’s stories, he does not refute his opening 
sentence that quality satire does not sympathise, instead asserting that by stripping Saunders’  
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stories it: “reveal[s] that satire isn’t his strongest suit. As dark as his palette may be, he can’t 
altogether escape the gaga optimism of his compatriots” (n.p.). There may very well be a point 
to Byrne’s annoyance at Saunders appearing “too mushy,” but this is not to say that the satire 
in Saunders’ work isn’t “good” for its detailed attempts to critique and uplift. As evidenced in 
the previous chapter, Saunders repeatedly attacks America’s “gaga optimism,” and rather than 
imitating it, replaces such optimism with a hope bound in awareness. Yet, in his closing 
statement, Byrne cannot withhold his disappointment: “Looking on the bright side is what 
the Jesus-lovers-and-savers do, likewise the deniers of climate change and the planner of 
costless invasions and no-problem regime change abroad” (n.p.). In a flurry of closing 
generalisations, Byrne becomes the person Saunders would, in turn, seek to satirise—the 
person to invert such generalisations and expose them as frail in world that is diverse and 
deserving of perspectives that respect complexity.  
Whilst Cain and Byrne may be correct, and that the omission of shock tactics results 
in excessive sentimentality, it is nonetheless evident that the underlying intention of Saunders’ 
fiction is empathetic through affective engagement, and geared toward a psychological 
transformation. More importantly, it is an emotional transformation Saunders appears to 
wholeheartedly believe in. In spite of how his satiric worlds are structured with reference to 
reality and depressing historical particulars, it appears that Saunders’ project of increasing 
one’s empathetic capacity outside of the text is sincere, and hopeful. 
 
Hope 
Denouncing the American novelist’s “preoccupation with hopelessness,” Walter Poznar 
writes that: “Nowhere in the American novel is there the faintest hope that the system can be 
humanized” (n.p.). Poznar’s reaction is likely one directed against the degenerative satirists 
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and the black humourists, those who “debas[ed] the human image in the twentieth century 
[and have] seriously weakened our faith in man” (n.p.). Certainly, it is difficult to not see 
Saunders’ satire as a cultural response to Poznar’s observation, and thus Saunders as an artist 
deserving of the classification. Ruben Quintero, for instance, argues that: “[A]ny satirist 
deserving of the name must be more than a partisan advocate or a clownish entertainer, for a 
true satirist must be a true believer, a practicing humanitarian” (Quintero 3). One of the more 
defining aspects of Saunders’ satire that can be understood through his ethics of compassion 
is, I believe, that Saunders’ fiction possesses a rather considerable degree of hope. In doing 
so, Saunders’ not only uses narrative empathy as an affective cushion to his satire, but he also, 
unlike many satirists before him, leaves room for hope, redemption, and transformation. 
Saunders’ engagement with human emotion is to humanise the Other; it is a moral, optimistic 
portrayal of humankind’s affective capacity.  
By assessing Saunders’ hopeful outlook, one can certainly see a strong differentiation 
between Saunders’ optimistic satire and that of his fellow satirists. Hope, that which is not 
imperative in the satirist’s toolbox, most certainly permits strong differentiation between 
Saunders and fellow satirists. Even in one of Saunders’ darkest stories, there are glimpses of 
hope, optimism, and faith. Alex Millen, for instance, reads such buoyancy in “Escape from 
Spiderhead”: 
Like George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, love becomes part of the machinery 
of control, but, unlike Orwell, it has not been corrupted utterly. In this way, 
dealing as it does in love, “Escape from Spiderhead” is at once one of the most 
frightening of Saunders’s stories and one of most hopeful: language can be 
manipulated, freedom can become impossible, but not quite, since the capacity 
for love still remains. For all its characteristic ambivalence, there is something 
redemptive, I think, about the way this story ends. (Millen 13) 
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In reading Tenth of December, one may applaud the bleak worlds Saunders creates, but to do so 
at the expense of Saunders’ fascination with human emotion would mean that, in Saunders’ 
words, he has “failed” (Saunders, The White Review). This is precisely why the classification of 
‘satirist’ can be so limiting, as it likens Saunders with Orwell but simultaneously excludes 
Saunders’ genuine engagement with human emotion both on and off the page. Steven 
Wiesenberger observes that degenerative satire “turns on feelings of antipathy … and abject 
horror. It may not, even in its classical texts (like Gulliver’s Travels), locate any paved roads back 
to normality” (143). In contrast, Saunders’ post-postmodern satire reaffirms the possibility of 
every person’s worth in order to retain hope that, despite the pressures of late capitalism, it is 
not foolish to have faith in humanity. 
 Moreover, Gillian Elizabeth Moore goes a little further in her reading of Saunders’ 
resistance against “nationalist exceptionalist rhetoric” in his stories, suggesting that: 
“Saunders’ fiction is concerned with reworking seemingly pre-postmodern concepts of hope, 
epiphany, and transformation conventionally associated with the short story” (Moore 59; 60). 
It is important to note, however, that hope is not the same as cheerful expectation. When one 
thinks of hope, they do so in circumstances where the possibility of a favourable outcome is 
not likely. Thus, the satirist is accordingly a critic who is simultaneously displeased with the 
current situation but still has hope—such is the existence of their satirical protest. Unlike 
Saunders’ Puritan characters who embody the belief that success and happiness can be 
achieved through hard work or a change of mind, even against all odds, the satirist possesses 
an awareness of life’s painful realities and the difficulties within. One may both possess 
ambivalence about the possibility of reform and also proclaim hope that their ambivalence 
will be positively alleviated in time. In spite of their satiric similarities, Saunders’ production 
of affect in his fiction is less of the resigned despair of Vonnegut and more akin to Emily 
Dickinson’s hope “[t]hat perches in the soul” (116). Indeed, “‘Hope’” is the thing with 
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feathers,” wrote Dickinson, comparing hope to a bird that, no matter the extremes (“in the 
chillest land— / And on the strangest Sea—”) still sings the song of hope eternally, never 
once asking for anything (116). For Saunders, every person should acknowledge the possibility 
of hope coupled with awareness, as does Jeff in “Spiderhead” who joins birds who have left 
their trees and flies with them (Tenth of December 81). Not that which exists apart from 
knowledge and empathy, nor the individualised self-improvement, but that which hopes for 
all humankind, even against difficulties that chip away at the possibility of transformation.  
Granted, it is perhaps bad faith to conduct a simplistic account of an author’s outlook 
through a mixture of their fiction and interviews, but Vonnegut’s ambivalence and diffused 
pessimism in his fiction stands in stark contrast to the satire of Saunders’. Notwithstanding 
the problem of confusing Vonnegut’s fictional voice with that of his own, the sense of 
reformation’s success in his satire is poles apart from Jon and Carolyn’s escape in “Jon,” or 
the successful resistance of the young Eva in “The Semplica Girl Diaries”. Indeed, Donald 
Morse equates Vonnegut’s “belief in progress” (95) with C. P. Snow’s reformulation of 
thermodynamics: “You cannot win. You cannot break even. You cannot get out of the game” 
(102). As a guest on a talk show in Hocus Pocus, says, when speaking about Earth: “We could 
have saved it, but we were too doggone cheap” (143). However, Vonnegut is by no means a 
total pessimist nor a complete cynic. Jay McInerney’s review of Vonnegut’s Hocus Pocus as, “a 
satirist with a heart, a moralist with a whoopee cushion, a cynic who wants to believe,” is 
perhaps a more apt account of describing how Vonnegut never quite devotes himself to either 
cynicism or optimism, rather adopting a careful pessimism (McInerney, 1990). Moreover, as 
Kathryn Hume contends, Vonnegut’s “odd mixture of optimism and pessimism” has “caused 
reviewers considerable discomfort” as Vonnegut’s “symbolic situations reveal no satisfying 
outcomes … [unable] to gratify the expectations of optimism” (Hume 445). Hume reasons 
this is due to personal experience, that all possibilities of hopeful transformation were  
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“blocked” (437) as “Dresden destroyed them” (438). Vonnegut’s exploration of life’s meaning 
contributes to this tension, and thus attests to a fiction like that of cosmic satire, which Tilton 
states, “finds man’s ailment incurable” (Tilton 19). 
Furthermore, Vonnegut has openly expressed his cynicism. Consider the following 
conversation Vonnegut has with Harry Reasoner in 1969: 
Reasoner: You come out of all of this, I would guess, calling yourself a pessimist. 
Would you accept that label? 
Vonnegut: Well, things do seem to get worse. 
Reasoner: Would it be fair to say you see not hope for the world and mankind? 
Vonnegut: Yeah, I see some, as I can see maybe forty years’ more hope. And I 
can see help for people like myself who can retreat. (Vonnegut 1988: 17) 
Vonnegut, interestingly, does not completely reject Reasoner’s questions about his pessimism 
and despair, in fact, he rather passively accepts the label. For himself, there is hope, but such 
hope comes with an expiry date.  
Indeed, Vonnegut, though undoubtedly a humanist, is less concerned with how one 
can transform society’s ills, but rather with how to take life’s tragedy. Vonnegut seeks a comic 
response to tragic fact but rather than edge closer toward moral correction, cynicism paralyses 
the chance for humanity’s redemption. Saunders’ compassionate satire borrows much of the 
humanist and surreal elements of Vonnegut, but it uses such elements toward hopeful ends—
through a dignified optimism. Vonnegut, on the other hand, sees humankind as beyond repair 
and thus represents a fatalistic account to the human condition. Where there is protest in 
Vonnegut’s fiction, it notably does not succeed, rather it falls back on itself to not only disable 
progress but affirm the impossibility of it. Conrad Festa, who argues that “satire is not possible 
without the implicit moral norm and without the hope of reforming aberrant behavior,” 
believes that Vonnegut’s fiction “does not offer a great deal of hope” (Festa 136). “Even when 
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reform does happen in his novels,” he writes, “it is soon corrupted” (137). Where Saunders’ 
unbearably miserable settings in his stories are offset by his dark, dry humour and a comical 
abstraction from the real—as is the way with satire—there are always moments of well-
measured pathos, such as in “Sea Oak” or “The 400-Pound CEO” (CivilWarLand). This 
sadness, however, is unlike the pity invoked in Vonnegut’s satire, which arguably is more akin 
to helplessness and despair. For Saunders, humour and pathos alone are not viable; awareness 
and hope are essential. Like the famous refrain of Slaughterhouse-Five (1969) that is repeated 
with every death that is recorded—“So it goes”—Vonnegut’s critique of society demands 
awareness and arouses condemnation, but does so with a growing weariness that things will 
get better: fatalism and passive acceptance of humanity’s evils result in a language of endurance 
rather than of sincere hope—the latter is a satirical position which seems uniquely Saunders’ 
in the current era. 
Furthermore, Saunders’ satiric critique is not necessarily threatened by his distinctive 
use of affect, but rather suffused by it, eventuating into a scenario where the reader responds 
to a call for awareness of vice and folly and simultaneously comforted by such harsh truths. 
Thus, if we regard narrative empathy as an integral and distinctive aspect of Saunders’ 
identifiable satire, then the intended outcome of his satire stands in contrast to many satires 
before him. Alvin Kernan, in evaluating the progression of a satire’s plot, asserts that, “the 
most striking quality of satire is the absence of plot” (Kernan 270). “We seem at the conclusion 
of satire,” he writes, “to be always at very nearly the same point where we began” (270). This 
is not necessarily the case in Saunders’ fiction. Even though the settings of his stories usually 
remain unchanged, there is an identifiable plot that enables his character progression, such as 
in “The Semplica Girl Diaries” and “Tenth of December”. Further, there is a clear sense of 
empathetic concern in Saunders’ fiction that compassion can be learnt through fiction, even 
satire. Whereas Kernan states that the absence of plot in satire results in the satirist and his 
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target being “locked in the respective attitudes without any possibility of either dialectal 
movement or the simple triumph of good over evil,” Saunders instead attempts to promote 
the triumph of perspective and compassion rather than a simple triumph of evil (271). Sarah 
Pogell, for example, writes that “Saunders still has hope for this country, the world and the 
human race” (478), something that Saunders would attest to. Furthermore, upon hearing of a 
friend’s concerns for Saunders’ wellbeing after reading CivilWarLand, Saunders notes: “I’m 
happy. I’m one of the happiest people I know. My book is not happy. My book is funny. My 
book tells, uh, dark truths. I’m a hopeful person. Writing this book was a happy, hopeful act” 
(CivilWarLand 195). 
Despite accusations that Saunders’ fiction may be read as too contrived and 
sentimental, Juliana Nalerio states that: “[Saunders’] desire to address real world problems 
demonstrates an optimism the majority of postmodern writers and theorists may not share 
with him, but which may be exactly what Literature with a capital “L” needs” (Nalerio 97). 
Empathy in the visceral storytelling that Saunders so masterfully writes is a critical component 
to his undoubted sense of belief in empathy as a step toward social responsibility, and the 
hope that things will get better. The English critic F. L. Lucas, who Poznar so appropriately 
quotes at the end of his essay, warns that, “mentally, as physically, [people] need both light 
and warmth. Light without warmth can become as melancholy and sterile as moonlight on a 
cemetery; warmth without light can become very like Hell” (Lucas 127). When Saunders 
renders a theme park as Hell, he does so with a degree of optimism that still hints at an escape 
from darkness to light. Indeed, although not speaking of satire, Saunders explains this intent: 
You can choose what you write but you can’t choose what you make live. The 
first job is to make it jangly with energy. And in my case that often takes a little 
cruelty, a little dark humour … My hope is that with all that distortion, there's 
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still some kind of light that comes through. And it’s the only way I can get the 
light to come through. (Clark n.p.) 
Just as Millen reads “Escape from Spiderhead” as redemptive, one may also read “Pastoralia” 
as similarly possessing a degree of light. Not far from the theme park where our caveman 
narrator resides, there is Marty and his son, who operate an “Employees Only shop” not 
accessible by guests (11). As the narrator disposes of his waste, he overhears Marty indirectly 
discussing the importance of kindness as his son, who attends an expensive private school, 
explains how the kids there are nice to him: “When I missed at long division they were nice. 
When I ate with my fingers they were nice. When my shoes split in gym they were nice. This 
one kid gave me his shoes” (38). However, the boy mistakenly believes that their kindness was 
learnt at a specific camp, a “being-nice camp” or a “giving-shoes-camp,” instead of practicing 
kindness for the sake of being kind, as Saunders endeavours to preach. Thus, in the mere three 
segments of the story that feature Marty and his family—all of which are not integral to plot—
we learn from Marty that: “[Y]ou don’t have to be rich to be nice. You just have to be nice” 
(39).  
The theme of kindness with no expectation of something in return permeates the story 
as the narrator struggles to complain about Janet’s poor work ethic. In a short paragraph, he 
reflects how his father, who worked at a butchery, never complained about his co-worker, 
Fred Lank, who “had a metal plate in his skull” and would often fail to adequately do his job 
(45). Instead, his father would compensate for Lank’s mistakes by doing twice as much work 
for days at a time. Subsequently, when his dad died, “Lank sent Mom a check for a thousand 
dollars, with a note: Please keep, it said. The man did so much for me” (46). This self-reflection 
mirrors the difficulties of Janet and her relationship with her son. Such passages give warmth 
to a dystopian tale in a manner that is further clarified in Lincoln in the Bardo, specifically in 
Hans Vollman’s description of Lincoln’s disposition: 
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His mind was freshly inclined toward sorrow; toward the fact that the world was 
full of sorrow; that everyone labored under some burden of sorrow; that all were 
suffering; that whatever way one took in this world, one must try to remember 
that all were suffering (none content; all wronged, neglected, overlooked, 
misunderstood), and therefore one must do what one could to lighten the load 
of those with whom one came into contact… (Saunders 303) 
Herein lies Saunders’ capacity for hope and that moralism that so penetrates the satirist’s voice. 
Through narrative empathy, and by viewing each other “as suffering, limited beings” (303), 
we thus seek to understand and assist those in worse conditions than our own. In spite of 
everything, Saunders’ believes in this ethic of reciprocity, a form of the Golden Rule that is 
subtly suffused within his satiric fiction. 
Saunders, I argue, is an optimist concerned about optimism and its place in human 
progress. His consistent criticism of the Puritan work ethic, entwined with the self-destructive 
power of positive thinking under late capitalism, insists that Saunders is worried about an 
American ethos that is too easily manipulated by cynical corporate voices. Throughout his 
stories, Saunders playfully mocks the capitalist settings his characters suffer under, particularly 
how the Law of Attraction preached by Quimby and Oprah—“thinking  positive / saying 
positive”—will supposedly remedy all maladies. Kasia Boddy notes that, for Saunders, the 
problem with self-help is, “in its fetishism of ‘exertion of the will’ and ‘decision,’ and 
concomitant denial of factors outside of the self,” all of which result “in a denial of […] 
tolerance and kindness” (Boddy 8). Saunders thus embarks upon affective territory which 
exists beyond the page, with characters who, with little need to, think outside of their selves 
and attempt to understand one another. This in itself may be seen as wildly optimistic (for 
many characters such empathy transpires after death) and is precisely what Richard Lee briefly 
alludes to in his reading of Saunders’ narrative techniques: 
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Most important, however, is something that his scathing wit leaves submerged 
within his fiction: Saunders is an idealist, an optimist. He values those who 
struggled against the immensity of the cosmos; he underscores the poignancy 
and ephemerality of life even as he castigates pretensions and human folly (Lee, 
2010: 276). 
Although Saunders’ cruel, violent worlds may make one feel uncomfortable, they are 
rationalised through his agenda of “err[ing] in the direction of kindness” (Saunders, 
Congratulations). In fact, as Lee notes, Saunders rewards those who do so against almost 
incomprehensible struggle. In this twistedly dark (albeit idealist) fiction, everyone is capable 
of such kindness, as is suggested by the name of a young girl in Frip.  
Of a generation of writers for whom cynicism toward humankind may be more 
welcome, Saunders goes against the grain of misanthropy, instead opting for an ethics of 
compassion and empathy, of seeing others as noble with a moralism that invites discussion of 
an ethical good in his satire. He is, by all accounts, an optimist, but not a traditional American 
one in the manner of Quimby or Oprah. His is an optimism not of material prosperity for 
oneself, but of collective hope, of a dignified positive sensibility that acts in conjunction with 
empathy and, above all else, humility. As the narrator of “The 400-Pound CEO” asks: 
“[W]hat’s there to do but behave with dignity?” (CivilWarLand 64). Fernanda Moore, in her 
piece describing Saunders as an “Anti-Minimalist” focuses on Saunders’ distinctive working-
class characters and their outcome, stating that: “[I]n the end, thanks to Saunders’s generous 
storylines, his underdogs manage to triumph over hardship, to find grace and transcendence, 
and even to prevail” (Moore 51). But this is not necessarily true. A victory in a Saunders story 
is not so much the triumph over hardship, and by no means is it successful revolution against 
a system that restricts subjectivity; rather it is a victory in awareness of their respective 
hardships. The satire of his working-class heroes does indeed possess a mixture of absurd 
destitution and redemption but this is typically cognitive, not material. In many ways, this is a 
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replacement of America’s positive thinking with a Saunders Aspirin—a form of clarity with 
moral dignity made possible through an empathetic engagement with someone else. In 
Saunders’ fiction there is a clear distinction between the aggressor and the satiric target, but 
neither party is ever solely the victim of satiric anger. Rather, there is a dignified sense of a 
plausible and attractive value in all of humankind. Indeed, for Saunders, empathy is not only 
the guiding moralism of concern for the other in his satiric stories, it is also the fundamental 
corrective that proposes an act of change, even if such change is not concerned with policy 





George Saunders uses the short story, and satire in general, not solely for criticism or for 
cynical, metafictional games, but as a way to search for meaning, truth, and morality in the 
new millennium, at a time many consider to be the end of postmodernism. While many artistic 
forms may generally be a way to provide a sense of escapism, it is clear that through his 
distinctive, morally-charged satire, Saunders does not wholly permit this sense of recreational 
enjoyment to his reader. Rather, by seeking a strong emotional engagement with his reader, 
Saunders views his satire as having a profound impact in the real world. Instead of providing 
an escape through humour alone, Saunders’ creative, satirical criticism uses irony to elicit 
empathy. In doing so, Saunders’ readers are forced to confront the ills of society that his satire 
lays bare, also leaving open the possibility of perhaps confronting their own problems in the 
process—triggering an affective or cognitive transformation. 
Saunders is a generative satirist, working at the end of a degenerative satirical 
landscape, who, with the intent of founding something new after postmodernism, has sought 
to re-work a traditional understanding of satire that differs from both traditional and 
twentieth-century definitions of the term. As explored in Chapter One, Saunders’ satire is 
expressive of major components of traditional satire; however, his work uses satire not as an 
unrelenting or passive critique, but as a means to emotionally connect with his reader. Beyond 
his stories’ satiric targets, Saunders has his style tuned not only to that of critique, humour, 
and irony, but also to affect with moral norms. Secondly, Saunders, despite the influence of 
forebears such as Vonnegut and Pynchon, does not continue on from what Wiesenberger 
understood as ‘degenerative’ satire. Instead, Saunders re-works many of the predominant 
styles of black humour and deconstruction, for example, in order to direct satire towards 
something corrective—something degenerative satirists stopped short of. If Wiesenberger can 
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argue that satire was still popular during postmodernism in the twentieth century—albeit 
misunderstood due to archaic satire theory—then one can most certainly say that Saunders’ 
satire is most definitely responding to postmodernism (and thus also degenerative satire) by 
moving beyond its previous incarnations to provide something new.  
Frye, Kernan, and Mack, all upheld the traditional model of satire as earlier interpreted 
by Dryden, and thus understood satire to require moral norms and the satirist to view the 
world pessimistically. Saunders, however, borrows the moral norms from traditional satire, 
and takes the black humour from the twentieth-century satirists, and re-works a form in the 
twenty-first century which consists of satire’s more common techniques. Regardless of how 
much the composition of Saunders’ satire differs from Juvenal, Pope, or Swift—those whom 
writers regard as creating the long-held definition of satire which Northrop Frye and 
Worcester continued to uphold—Saunders’ satire is unique in how it stands apart from the 
postmodern satire understood to be aligned with fiction of a  generation of writers he is 
supposedly a part of. Importantly, Saunders’ stories do not transcend irony, or go beyond its 
usual characteristics in attempting to respond directly to earlier postmodern fiction. Certainly, 
irony is not absent in these stories either. Rather, Saunders’ use of satire requires irony, but 
utilises it without using it as a cultural norm or the default position to critique the world. 
Indeed, Saunders adopts irony within a traditional mode of satire by restoring it to its use 
within satire, thus making it a component of something larger rather than the text’s primary 
aesthetic. In this manner, irony—albeit still open to misinterpretation, as is the paradoxical 
nature of satire—retains its power for subversion amidst a number of other satirical 
techniques which have each been appropriated toward satire’s cause. While it is clear that 
Saunders’ fiction does not appropriately sit with descriptions of ironic cynicism or nihilism, 
like that of his postmodern forebears, he is in no way committed to its opposite, that of naïve 
optimism. Saunders’ satire does not direct his criticism solely at language, but at human 
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tendencies that have been shaped by sociocultural factors, such as the legacy of positive 
thinking and neoliberalism. 
In Chapter Two, I contend that Saunders’ most consistent satiric targets are positive 
thinking and the negative effects of neoliberalism on the human self. Unlike the focus of 
degenerative satirists during postmodernism, these satiric targets are topical, pertain to the real 
world, and are deeply rooted in history. In this sense, I argue that the components of Saunders’ 
satire are more akin to the etymological roots the term, lanx satura, a mixture of varying 
ingredients each appropriated for satire’s purpose to criticise and reform. Indeed, as I explore 
in Chapter Three, Saunders’ satire possesses many of satire’s popular components, but 
underlying his satire is a strong sense of optimism. 
However, there are also limitations to Saunders’ affective, hopeful satire. While my 
emphasis was more on his satire and his intended results, one may certainly argue that this 
strand of Saunders’ satire—his reliance on affect—reinforces the idea of neoliberal growth 
rather than provide a solution to it. As noted in “Pastoralia” and “Exhortation”, Saunders 
satirises corporate and managerial speak, that which is depicted by Saunders to be evasive, 
manipulative, and controlling. However, in satirising emotion, Saunders wanders into the same 
territory as one would if they were to also regulate someone else’s emotion. “Escape from 
Spiderhead” exemplifies Saunders’ authority over his fiction and his intended results of his 
satire. Saunders satirises affect but appears to only offer his own emotional corrective in 
response. This is perhaps a topic worthy of further exploration, as it raises questions over 
Saunders use of neoliberal politics toward affective ends. Furthermore, while I contend in 
Chapter Three that Saunders’ satire is hopeful, there is also an argument to be made against 
this idea. Indeed, Saunders appears to sincerely believe in the possibility of fiction to positively 
transform his reader, but he may only have hope in the psychological component of this 
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transformation, instead forsaking improvement in the real world altogether. As he states in 
his own words: “There’s something sacred about reading a book like Slaughterhouse-Five, even 
if nothing changes but what’s going on inside our minds” (Braindead Megaphone 83). Saunders’ 
hope in the material world is further complicated by the fact that the majority of his characters 
only reach an epiphanic state or are transformed after death, when their physical body is no 
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